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David M. Frankfordt
In fiscal year 1984, the United States' Medicare program began
reimbursing inpatient hospital services under a system known as the
Prospective Payment System (PPS). This system is a per-case reimbursement
scheme in which cases are divided into relatively homogeneous categories
called diagnosis-related groups (DRGs), and each DRG is paid a unique price
set in advance of treatment. The great promise of PPS was that it would merge,
into aframework of unified organizational rationality, physicians' orientations
toward individual patients and administrators' and regulators' orientation
toward the common good. Processes of hospital care would thus be made
efficient in that judgments regarding diagnosis and treatment would embody
both the particularistic interests of patients and the social interest in the use
of resources. In this Article, the author claims that this normatively attractive
framework is conceptually and empirically flawed because it ignores the
complex interactions that occur within hospitals and the distinctiveness of each
organization. Because the framework is therefore not operating as conceived,
there appears to be no linkage between the goal of efficiency and the use of
the DRGs as a per-case payment system. The author concludes that PPS should
be abandoned in favor of a system in which hospitals would be paid under
locally administered prospective budgets.
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Medicare DRGs
Introduction: Efficiency Through Organizational Rationality
In 1984, Medicare began implementing its prospective payment system
(PPS) for the reimbursement of inpatient hospital services provided to Medicare
beneficiaries. This system incorporated two radically new features. First,
hospitals were to be paid on a prospective rather than a retrospective basis.
Prior to PPS, Medicare had reimbursed hospitals for defined allowable costs
expended in a prior accounting period for the care of Medicare patients. In
essence this system simply had allowed hospitals to "pass through" their costs
to the Medicare fisc. PPS eliminated this open-checkbook system by putting
hospitals on a budget set in advance. Second, PPS is a system whereby
hospitals are paid on a per-case basis, with cases organized around classifica-
tions called diagnosis-related groups (DRGs). Previously, each hospital's
reimbursement was calculated as the sum of costs provided .to its Medicare
patients taken as a whole. PPS launched an effort to assign those costs to
individual patients.
PPS thus offered two promises. First, because the DRGs supposedly
represent the distinct product lines of a multiproduct firm, their use in account-
ing and reimbursement would allow hospital costs to be assigned to particular
products. Clinicians, hospital administrators, and regulators could thereby make
appropriate comparisons within and among different hospitals in order to
improve, first, the efficiency by which hospitals produce laundry, meals,
laboratory tests and the like, and, second, the effectiveness of the practice
patterns by which clinicians organize these inputs into clinical care. The second
major promise of PPS followed from this enhanced efficiency and effectiveness.
It was widely believed that the production processes in hospitals were ineffi-
cient and ineffective, and that there was a synergistic relationship among those
problems, the extant reimbursement system, and the ever-increasing hospital
cost inflation. By forcing hospitals to operate more efficiently, and by forcing
physicians to organize goods and services more effectively, PPS was to set in
motion a process by which Medicare's budget could be capped and controlled.
The two promises, however, were linked. Budgetary control was not to be
sought as an end unto itself but as an embodiment of the underlying newly
found efficiency and effectiveness within hospitals.
This Article focuses directly on the use of the DRGs to attain this goal of
efficiency. Rather than ask whether "PPS is working" '-whether the system
qua prospective payment is working-it asks whether the DRGs are work-
ing-whether a system built around per-case units of payment is working. It
1. See, e.g., LOUISE B. RUSSELL, MEDICARE'S NEW HOSPITAL PAYMENT SYSTEM: IS IT WORKING?
(1989).
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thus assesses whether there is a relationship between DRG-based per-case
payment and efficiency. My answer is that there appears to be none. In the
normative framework used in the development of the DRGs, the concept of
efficiency is the familiar one of a process by which a distinct product's benefits
are equated with its costs. In this framework, the benefits are to reflect an
individual's interests, and the costs to embody the social concern regarding use
of resources. The crucial mediating link between these two potentially conflict-
ing sides was to be the language of the DRGs, reflexively flowing up and down
a chain comprised of the rates paid by regulators, the management' decisions
made by hospital administrators, and the judgments rendered by clinicians.
Through this linkage, the individual patient's interests in the quality of care and
the social interest in the use of resources were to be conjoined in a single
evaluative process. The language of the DRGs was to be the essential medium.
To be effective evaluatively, the language of the DRGs had to affect both
the actions of regulators in setting the rates and the actions of hospital adminis-
trators and physicians in managing the hospital and patient care. There was,
however, a more specific requirement. The actualization of the evaluative
process depended upon merging, into a framework of unified organizational
rationality, physicians' orientations toward individual patients and administra-
tors' and regulators' orientation toward the common good. In the one direction,
clinical judgments would be suffused with wider organizational and social
resource implications; in the other direction, regulators and administrators would
be forced to consider the particularistic consequences of their judgments. I
argue that this normative framework is conceptually flawed because it ignores
the complex interactions that occur within hospitals and the distinctiveness of
each organization. It is therefore understandable that this framework is not
operating as conceived. The link between the use of the DRGs as a per-case
payment system and the goal of efficiency is illusive.
I do, however, conclude on a positive note as a prelude to my continuing
work. The DRGs were constructed on an appealing normative framework in
which there was an attempt to avoid the errors of utilitarianism through the
implementation of a process mediating between universal and particular inter-
ests. We can build upon this conceptual apparatus. Each hospital would remain
subject to prospective reimbursement, but the basic unit of payment would be
the hospital, not the case. Regulatory authority to make distributional decisions
would be transferred from a national administrative agency, which now acts
in conjunction with congressional logrolling, to some form of local community
institutional arrangements. Hospital budgets would then be set through
institutions in which sovereign power would be conjoined with communal
process.
This budgeting process, implemented at both a state and local level, would
accomplish four basic tasks. First, it would allow regulators to focus attention
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more directly on the distributional choices that affect hospitals and their com-
munities. These decisions are now being made under PPS anyway, but they are
being made at the greatest level of aggregation imaginable-through the
payment of national average rates. This aggregation is foolish not only because
behavior in hospitals occurs in local contexts but also because the primary
information exchanged between regulators and affected parties is generated in
the context of PPS's national notice-and-comment regulatory system. In other
words, aggregated rates attract aggregated information, all of which is at odds
with the fact that hospitals are primarily locally driven organizations. Distribu-
tional decisions made through state and local budgeting would be focused more
directly upon the consequences stemming from the exercise of sovereign power,
and these decisions would be informed by a more meaningful exchange of
information among regulators, hospitals, and communities.
Second, by abandoning the attempt to assign costs to individuals and their
fragmented payers, this budgeting process would build upon and instill the
value that a hospital serves a community of patients drawn from a community
of citizens. Our health insurance system and our reimbursement systems are
inseparable and interacting; fragmented insurance has spawned fragmented
reimbursement. Because both insurance and reimbursement are institutions of
social support, both inexorably involve averaging among individuals who
coexist within communities. Per-case payment rests upon the delusion that we
can somehow eliminate this averaging, and it is part of an overall national
context in which we are destroying our health care commons. We can reverse
this direction only-if we abandon the extreme individualism that has generated
and linked a fragmented insurance system to a fragmented reimbursement
system in which costs are disaggregated all the way down to the level of the
case.
Third, by abandoning per-case payment and by reimbursing the hospital as
a whole, we can build upon and strengthen a sense of community within the
hospital. A reimbursement system which relies upon per-case payment only
reinforces the conjoint beliefs that professional responsibility is properly
directed just to an individual case and that the only legitimate form of authority
in the process of care resides in the individual professional. In short, per-case
payment reinforces the ideology of individual professional autonomy. It is
therefore ironic that this mode of reimbursement-sovereign micro-management
of cases-was imposed precisely as a means to confront this autonomy. Our
reimbursement systems must reflect the recognition that professional discretion
is inevitable and that confrontation in an attempt to eliminate that discretion
only generates frustration for all. Rather than just assert countervailing sover-
eign power against professional power in an endless game of move-counter-
move, we must instead work to build organizations which can elicit work
shaped by the normatively attractive features of professionalism-the commit-
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ment towards others, towards the value of work, and towards collegial processes
and organization-and which can simultaneously discourage the abuses-the
rapacious seeking of wealth and professional hegemony in the domain of ideas.
A reimbursement system structured around the hospital would encourage the
belief that each professional works within an organization in which responsibili-
ty flows toward both individual patients and the organization's multiple profes-
sional communities. The performance of work would then be organized around
the value that the individual professional is responsible both to her patients and
to professional communities rather than the value that the individual profession-
al is and must remain autonomous.
Fourth and perhaps most importantly, a process which both draws from and
builds upon community values-a "normative localism"--could act to integrate
hospitals into communities. These communities could then exercise influence
in shaping the respective roles of the hospital and other types of health care
organizations and those of the medical profession and other types of care givers.
As such, normative localism could act as a brake on the continuing medicaliza-
tion. of everyday experience.
My discussion begins with a description of the evaluative framework used
to develop the DRGs and adopted, at least in rhetorical form, for PPS. Follow-
ing, I describe, first, the organistic form of organizational rationality upon
which the actualization of this framework depends and, second, the predictions
concerning the manner in which the hospital organism would respond to PPS.
I then show that these predictions have been satisfied only to a limited extent.
This evidence indicates that this organizational model is both conceptually and
empirically flawed, and I elaborate this point by discussing the extent to which
the evidence conforms more fully to much more complex and situationally rich
organizational models. I conclude by indicating briefly the manner in which
we might build upon the normatively attractive framework used to develop the
DRGs.
I. The Evaluative Framework: Merging the Clinical Management of the
Individual Case with the Social Management of Organizations
A. Conceptualizing the Hospital as a Multiproduct Firm
Hospitals impose unique problems for internal and external management.
First, there is substantial difficulty in defining, measuring, and evaluating the
"hospital products." We can consider these products to be homogeneous if we
conceive of the hospital's output as consisting of laundry, meals, different types
of diagnostic tests and services, pharmaceuticals, and so on. However, accord-
ing to the proponents of the DRGs, this conceptualization is meaningless. In
their words, "because the real business of the hospital is to treat individual
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patients, [laundry, meals, diagnostic tests and services, pharmaceuticals, and
the like] are really only intermediate outputs. The specific set of these interme-
diate outputs provided to each patient is a 'product' of the hospital .... "I
Thus, at the limit, we can consider the particular process of care provided each
patient to constitute one product of a multiproduct firm, and we can consider
the hospital's products to be as heterogeneous as its patients: "Since individual
patients receive different amounts and types of services, the hospital may be
viewed as a multiproduct firm with a product line that in theory is as extensive
as the number of patients it serves."3 Given both the individuality of each
patient and the difficulty of measuring the outcome of care provided to each
one, there are difficult problems in pricing (or rate regulating) and evaluating
quality. As summarized by the developers of the DRGs, "unlike gallons of
water or kilowatt hours of electricity, medical care is not delivered in standard-
ized units of services, all uniform and measurable, the quality of which is easily
assessable."'
The second managerial problem is the concomitant difficulty in defining
the costs of each of the hospital's products. Much of the hospital's plant and
labor is structured so that it can be used to care for patients with diverse needs.
Some services, such as meals, are delivered in standardized form and are easily
attributed to the care of particular patients. However, other plant and services,
such as those pertaining to an operating room, are used in the treatment of
many patients and are not necessarily delivered in standardized units.5 There-
2. Robert B. Fetter & Jean L. Freeman, Diagnosis Related Groups: Product Line Management Within
Hospitals, 11 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 41, 42 (1986).
3. Robert B. Fetter et al., Case Mix Definition by Diagnosis-Related Groups, 18 MED. CARE 1, 1 (Supp.
1980); see, e.g., Robert L. Seidman & Richard G. Frank, Hospital Responses to Incentives in Alternative
Reimbursement Systems, 14 J. BEHAVIORAL ECON. 155, 156 (1985) ("[Tlreatment of each diagnosis is a
distinct hospital product.").
4. Robert B. Fetter et al., A System for Cost and Reimbursement Control in Hospitals, 49 YALE J.
BIOLOGY & MED. 123, 127 (1976). For a summary of the conceptual difficulties in defining "the hospital
product," see PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, TECHNICAL APPENDIXES TO THE REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 74-78
(1985).
5. See, e.g., Keith E. Braganza, Cost Finding, in 1 HANDBOOK OF HEALTH CARE ACCOUNTING AND
FINANCE 197, 197 (William 0. Cleverly ed., 1982) [hereinafter I HANDBOOK OF HEALTH CARE ACCOUNT-
ING AND FINANCE]. William A. Glaser has summarized the difficulty as follows:
Perhaps some simple and recurrent procedures in the hospital's industrial services can be costed
plausibly; for example, the cost of each laboratory test, the cost of each X ray, and the cost of
laundering can be estimated just as the costs of each output of a business firm are estimated. But
many other procedures-such as a thoracic operation or a physiotherapy session-are not so
standardized and vary in their resource use each time. The inputs throughout a hospital appear
more heterogeneous than the inputs throughout an industrial factory, and clustering them to
estimate the costs of an output is more difficult than cost assignment in a factory.
WILLIAM A. GLASER, PAYING THE HOSPITAL: THE ORGANIZATION, DYNAMICS, AND EFFECTS OF DIFFERING
FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS 33 (1987).
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fore, the problems of assigning plant and labor are particularly acute:
In any organization delivering multiple products (the hospital offers
hundreds, if not thousands, of products), some costs cannot be attributed
specifically to any single activity. Rather, they are costs that arise jointly
with a cluster of activities. Administration, property taxes, and the like
are obvious examples of fixed costs that contribute to many activities;
these are commonly included in a hospital's "overhead rate." But the
hospital contains many examples of more refined common costs. The
floor nurse provides a prime example: her activities include patient care
in the usual sense, administration, medical record-keeping, pharmaceuti-
cal services, assistance to physicians in medical procedures, and a whole
host of other activities. How can one account for the nurse's time in a
meaningful sense? Even if the nurse maintained an infinitely detailed
record of her minute-by-minute activities, some activities would truly
be "joint production" of two or more services. Talking to the patient
while changing a. bed, for example, may represent both housekeeping
and clinical psychological care, and observing the patient's vital signs
and general demeanor at the same time represents the practice of medi-
cal diagnosis. There is no meaningful way to separate such common
costs into distinguishable categories of "marginal costs" of each activi-
ty.6
The problem, however, extends beyond this materialistic conception.
Physician "labor" is the most important component in the care of patients, but
this labor does not create a material output like the classic widget. Instead, the
primary task of physicians is a cognitive and evaluative one, for it is the
physicians who are responsible for organizing the goods and services furnished
patients. To some extent, the manner in which physicians exercise this responsi-
bility crystallizes into regularities-the so-called "practice pat-
terns"--formulated around a particular hospital or a group of hospitals in a
common community.7 To some degree, however, there is also variance within
a single organization because physicians within the hospital are not subject to
centralized hierarchical control.' In either case, these practice patterns-perhaps
6. Charles E. Phelps, Cross-Subsidies and Charge-Shifting in American Hospitals, in UNCOMPENSATED
HOSPITAL CARE: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 108, 117 (Frank A. Sloan et al. eds., 1986).
7. The relatively early, classic discussion is ELIOT FREIDSON, THE PROFESSION OF MEDICINE: A STUDY
OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF APPLIED KNOWLEDGE 91-95, 105-136, 188-201, 305-22 (1970). For more recent
examples, see JOHN M. EISENBERO, DOCTORS' DECISIONS AND THE COST OF MEDICAL CARE 45-46 (1986);
William S. Custer & Richard J. Willke, Teaching Hospital Costs: The Effects of Medical Staff Characteris-
tics, 25 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 831 (1991).
8. For a recent discussion of the substantial variations that exist within a large, prestigious, urban
teaching hospital, see Joe Feinglass et al., The Financial Effect of Physician Practice Style on Hospital
Resource Use, 26 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 183 (1991).
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better described as professional norms-generate "spillover effects" among
patients. In fact, the key components in the care of any patient are professional
practices, and these practices are generated communally, circumscribed either
by hospital walls or even more broadly by a larger community.' It is thus
difficult to define a "production process" and associated costs pertaining to any
particular patient.' °
If a hospital is reimbursed retrospectively or prospectively as a single unit
for the care provided to all patients, the difficult questions of cost allocation
are ameliorated. Under a system of retrospective reimbursement, a payer or
group of payers would simply want to know what costs had been expended by
the hospital, taken as a whole, in the prior accounting period. Under a system
of prospective payment, the payer or group of payers would set a budget for
the hospital as a whole for the upcoming accounting period. In either case, the
hospital is paid as a unit, and the "hospital product" can be defined quite
broadly, at least for purposes of payment." However, such a definition is
unacceptable in an environment composed of a multitude of payers, each acting
for its own interests, and none acting jointly either voluntarily or through
governmental compulsion. In this situation, each payer reimburses the hospital
just for the care provided its patients, and it must therefore know the costs
attributable to them alone. Hence there is a pressing practical reason to define
the "hospital product" much more narrowly, even toward the limit at which the
care provided to a single patient is defined as a separate product. Concomitant-
ly, as one approaches this limit, the problems of cost allocation intensify. It is
no longer meaningful to allocate costs to particular departments, such as
radiology and pathology, or to generalized types of patient-care services, such
as nursing or outpatient care. Instead, costs allocated to such accounting units
9. The point has been expressed, though metaphysically, as follows: "In hospitals the core task is
uncertain, and the technology for performing it is largely imbedded in people-that is, physicians and nurses
deliver medical and nursing care primarily through the exercise of their professional judgment, although
they are aided by machines that may redefine professionals' roles." Donde P. Ashmos & Reuben R.
McDaniel, Jr., Physician Participation in Hospital Strategic Decision Making: The Effect of Hospital
Strategy and Decision Content, 26 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 375, 380 (1991).
10. For a review of economists' attempts to specify hospital cost functions and the determinants of
hospital costs, see MICHAEL D. ROSKO & ROBERT W. BROYLES, THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH CARE 211-52
(1988). See also T.G. Cowing et al., Hospital Cost Analysis: A Survey and Evaluation of Recent Studies,
4 ADVANCES HEALTH ECON. & HEALTH SERVICES RES. 257 (1983). For present purposes, I make no
distinction between cost and production function models.
1I. See, e.g., GLASER, supra note 5, at 44-45. Any reimbursement process requires an evaluation of
the benefits provided to a pool of patients. Therefore, even when "budgeting" is used-when the hospital
is paid as a unit under a prospective or retrospective budget-the payer has incentives to "peer behind" the
budget's bottom line. For example, the payer might evaluate distinct line-items. The particulars of these
practices ire outside the scope of this Article.
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must be further differentiated and assigned to individual patients. 2 In the
United States, we have such an environment.' 3
In theory, a system of workable competition would solve these problems,
and cost would be allocated efficiently. The joint and common costs of a
multiproduct firm would be allocated-indeed generated-by the separable
demands for each of the products.'4 In the context of Medicare, however, the
cost accounting problems cannot be solved by these "centrifugal and centripetal
forces."' 5 Medicare is the dominant payer of America's hospitals. Its deci-
sions are obviously subject to constraint, because Medicare officials do not wish
to price their beneficiaries-or perhaps themsetves-out of business by driving
providers away from Medicare. 6 Nonetheless, no one seriously contends that
there is a market dictating the prices Medicare pays for hospital services.
Medicare has substantial discretion.
Therefore, at least in this conception, the problem for Medicare is that it
must set its prices so as to mimic the results that would obtain in an open
market. 7 For example, in 1982 Julian Pettengill and James Vertrees, two
researchers then at the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), wrote
that "[i]t is generally recognized that traditional public and private financing
12. [Ejach hospital must be described in terms of the specific services rendered to each
patient. This cannot be done simply by describing the operating centers such as
laboratory, pharmacy, dietary, and the like no matter how precise are the terms in
which costs for such centers are recorded. The hospital renders service to each patient
by drawing on these service centers to produce the set of resources necessary for each
episode of patient care.
Fetter et al., supra note 4, at 130; see, e.g., John D. Thompson et al., Planning, Budgeting, and Control-
"ling-One Look at the Future: Case-Mix Cost Accounting, 14 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 111, 113 (1979).
13. In other work I have described more fully the linkage between Medicare's per-case payment system
and the fragmentation of our reimbursement environment. See David M. Frankford, The Complexity of
Medicare's Hospital Reimbursement System: The Paradoxes of Averaging, 78 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming
1993). In less fragmented systems, per-case accounting is not used for per-case reimbursement. For
example, in many European systems, a hospital is reimbursed under a global budget but the payer utilizes
some form of per-case accounting to evaluate that budget, see e.g., Cam Donaldson & Jon Magnussen,
DRGs: The Road to Hospital Efficiency, 21 HEALTH POL'Y 47 (1992), or to evaluate the quality of
processes of care. See, e.g., Miriam M. Wiley, Hospital Financing Reform and Case-Mix Measurement.
An International Review, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Summer 1992, at 119. Below I discuss the extent
to which per-case accounting might be a useful tool, not as part of a formula to set reimbursement, but as
a means to generate information for internal or external management. See infra notes 175-83, 227-32, 240-
48 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Phelps, supra note 6, at 110. In this conception, the internal organization of the firm,
as well as the objectives it pursues, are themselves driven by rational consumer choice. See Mark V. Pauly,
Nonprofit Firms in Medical Markets, 77 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 257, 259, 261-62 (1987).
15. The metaphor is borrowed from Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62
(1910). It should be clear that for present purposes I am interested only in the context of Medicare, not
the validity of the competitive model in other circumstances.
16. See generally Mark V. Pauly, Market Power, Monopsony, and Health Insurance Markets, 7 J.
HEALTH ECON. 111 (1988); Mark V. Pauly, Monopsony Power in Health Insurance: Thinking Straight
While Standing on Your Head, 6 J. HEALTH ECON. 73 (1987).
17. See, e.g., Seidman & Frank, supra note 3, at 165 & n.17 (optimal revenue mechanism embodied
in rate-setting would ensure "that the non-profit constraint facing hospitals applies to each patient, and
precludes cross-subsidization of patients and using non-patient sources of funds to earn either positive or
negative net revenue for a given patient") (emphasis in original).
282
Medicare DRGs
mechanisms have contributed to the continuing problem of inflation in hospital
costs.... [A]lternative reimbursement methods are intended to create strong
incentives, much like those found in a competitive market, for efficient use of
hospital resources." 8 Medicare is not a price-taker in a world of atomized
buyers but a dominant firm which possesses sovereign power and operates
alongside a substantial fringe, no member of which possesses similar might.
It is therefore crucial that Medicare pay exactly the value obtained by its
beneficiaries. 9 Stated in terms of the cost allocation problems described
above, by the exercise of sovereign power, Medicare must put into play an
accounting and reimbursement system such that hospitals are forced to operate
efficiently when they provide care to Medicare patients, and such that Medicare
would payjust those efficient costs. Because the care provided to each patient
constitutes a separate product, at the optimum, Medicare's system would pay
precisely the value conferred on each individual patient. Consequently, again
at the optimum, the costs of the entire hospital would be disaggregated and
assigned to individual patients. In the words of Robert B. Fetter and John D.
Thompson, the principal developers of the DRGs, hospital accounting must
perform the following fundamental task:
[T]he critical need is for a method by which hospitals can be character-
ized in terms of the services which they provide to patients and the
resources consumed for each delivery incident. Since the basic problem
underlying this task is to build a system which will produce perfor-
mance and utilization measures comparable from one hospital to another
and allow rate setting which is equitable for both consumers and provid-
ers, each hospital must be described in terms of the specific services
rendered to each patient.2'
The accounting would then lead to efficient pricing: "Under ideal circumstanc-
es, the expected [prices paid for] the DRGs should reflect the efficient marginal
costs of producing an additional unit (case) in each DRG."'
18. Julian Pettengill & James Vertrees, Reliability and Validity in Hospital Case-Mix Measurement,
HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Dec. 1982, 101, at 101. The role of the Pettengill-Vertrees report in the
adoption of the DRGs as a case-mix measure is discussed in DAVID G. SMITH, PAYING FOR MEDICARE:
THE POLITICS OF REFORM 34-35 (1992). This report is also discussed more fully below. See infra notes
44-51 and accompanying text.
19. The designers of the DRGs at Yale University wrote that any hospital reimbursement system must
act to further "social utility." See Fetter et al., supra note 4, at 126-27. They explained this concept as
follows: "The rationale on which social utility is structured should be the needs of the patient. Patients'
needs are conceived as being multiple, varying in complexity, and requiring different levels of service at
different times. This service must be rendered effectively and efficiently." Id. at 127.
20. Id. at 130.
21. Pettengill & Vertrees, supra note 18, at 105. It might be objected that by altering their language,
I have mischaracterized the significance of the Pettengill-Vertrees report. In the quoted passage, Pettengill
and Vertrees were discussing the appropriate data to be used in the construction of a hospital case-mix
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The designers of the DRGs thought that traditional accounting methods were
woefully inadequate for attainment of these goals. Under these traditional
methods, the hospital is divided into "revenue centers" and "cost centers."22
In these methods, the revenue centers are simply expressions of the accounting
units used to bill patients (e.g., the operating room, laboratory, pharmacy, and
radiology). To the extent possible, the costs of the nonrevenue-producing
centers are directly allocated to each other and to the revenue centers. Unas-
signed, indirect expenses are then allocated through the use of various rules-of-
thumb, often called "statistics." For example, depreciation of buildings and
fixtures are allocated by the square feet of the areas to which these costs are
to be assigned; the costs of producing laundry are allocated by the pounds of
laundry used by other cost and revenue centers; dietary costs by the number
of meals served; housekeeping by hours of service; pharmacy by costed requisi-
tions; and intern-resident service by assigned time. To the extent that the
indirect cost to be allocated from one cost center depends upon allocations from
other cost centers, either a step-down procedure is used, whereby costs are
allocated from the most general cost centers first (e.g., general administrative
expenses) and the most specific ones last, or the interactions between the cost
measure. Their actual statement was that "[ulnder ideal circumstances, the expected cost weights for the
DRGs should reflect the efficient marginal costs of producing an additional unit (case) in each DRG." Id.
(emphasis added). It could be claimed that the classification system was simply developed and used as a
comparative tool-as a means to rank hospitals. This defense-that the DRGs are "just" a case-mix
measure-is, however, incoherent. If the DRGs are only to measure, they must be based on extant costs.
Yet, the entire purpose of the enterprise is to evaluate actual costs because those costs supposedly embody
inefficiency. To provide a norm for efficiency, then, the DRGs must somehow be independent of extant
costs. The underlying tension is a desire to account for existing variations among hospitals while simulta-
neously acting to eliminate those variations. See generally Frankford, supra note 13.
Pettengill and Vertrees seemed to have been aware of this problem. They indicated that a case-mix
measure should incorporate the efficient costs that would obtain in a competitive market. See id. at 105-06
(discussing the options to develop a surrogate measure of the efficient relative cost of treatment in each
DRG); see also Fetter et al., supra note 3, at 31-35. See generally PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT
COMM'N, supra note 4, at 83-103; PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, TECHNICAL APPENDIXES
TO THE REPORT TO THE SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 52-55 (1988).
They also indicated that any use of the DRGs as an evaluative tool simply assumes that this linkage exists:
"[Our procedure] means that relative weights ... reflect the average pattern of practice and the average
quality of care in each DRG. More important, the relative structure of the average cost weights is assumed
to reflect the structure of efficient costs among the same categories." Pettengill & Vertrees, supra note 18,
at 106. In other words, they recognized the problem that is the entire subject of this Article-that one needs
a means to link the DRGs to efficiency.
What Pettengill and Vertrees did not appear to recognize is that the problem stems from the belief
system of social scientific positivism. The positivist claim is that behavioral models are used only to
correspond with a reality-actual behavior-and that the models are devoid of normative content. However,
social scientific models are developed and used to change the behavior "reflected." Thus, when this
endeavor succeeds, the models also "reflect" the behavior of those who have developed the behavioral
models. The endeavor, therefore, is normative. Medicare regulators were (and still are) using behavioral
models to measure cost, but their normative interest collides with their positivism. They wish to displace
clinical judgments concerning efficiency and effectiveness, but are forced to rely upon those judgments in
setting efficient reimbursement. See generally Frankford, supra note 13.
22. This discussion of traditional cost finding is drawn from Braganza, supra note 5, and L. VANN
SEAWELL, INTRODUCTION TO HOSPITAL ACCOUNTING 435-64 (rev. ed. 1977).
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centers are captured through the use of simultaneous equations." At the end
of this process, all the costs of the hospital have been allocated to the units used
for billing purposes.
If the hospital is conceptualized as the multiproduct firm described above,
this process provides the means for neither internal nor external management
by budgeting. Traditional cost-finding methods can tell managers whether
laundry, laboratory tests and the like have been efficiently produced. 4 Howev-
er, the information necessary to evaluate hospital performance concerns the
processes of patient care by which these intermediate products are packaged
into the final products. To generate this information, managers need a way to
classify patients into meaningful groups so that costs can be assigned to the
hospital's final products. In the words of Fetter's group,
The fundamental problem which must be solved, if effective re-
source and cost control is to be achieved within hospitals, is to define
in a precise and manageable way the services provided by hospitals. It
is not a useful observation simply to say that hospitals provide "patient
care." What hospitals provide is patient care of various kinds and
intensities over various durations based on the needs of the patients they
treat. The total patients treated can be classified, based on selected
clinical and demographic characteristics, into patient classes which
consume the resources of the hospital in a similar manner. This would
provide a categorization of the services provided by a hospital and
establish a product definition. Such a definition of hospital services
allows the resources utilized and the costs incurred to be related directly
to the types of patients the hospital treats.25
Internally, this information can then be used to evaluate the efficiency and
effectiveness of processes of patient care.26 Externally, this information can
provide a uniform and meaningful way by which to draw interhospital compari-
23. For an example of the use of simultaneous equations, see Ian R. Chandler et al., Cost Accounting
and Budgeting, in DRGs: THEIR DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT 91, 116-17 (Robert B. Fetter et al. eds., 199 1)
[hereinafter DRGs: THEIR DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT].
24. : am here ignoring the fact that a uniform system of accounts has been a rather late development
in the hospital industry and that this problem long plagued administrative oversight. See generally John
J. Dalton, Uniform Reporting, in I HANDBOOK OF HEALTH CARE ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE, supra note
5, at 49; Stephen M. Weiner, "Reasonable Cost" Reimbursement for Inpatient Hospital Services Under
Medicare and Medicaid: The Emergence of Public Control, 3 Am. J.L. & MED. 1,40-41, 45 (1977). All
forms of cost reporting, whether based on DRGs or not, depend upon such a uniform system, and this
problem is therefore separate from the conceptualization of the hospital product.
25. Thompson et al., supra note 12, at 112.
26. See generally Fetter & Freeman, supra note 2; Robert B. Fetter, Background, in DRGs: THEIR
DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 23, at 3, 45.
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sons.27 In both cases, traditional cost-finding was inadequate for measuring
productivity because it provided no means to classify patients and to link those
groups to inputs and to decisions regarding the manner in which those inputs
are used."
B. The DRGs: A Linguistic Medium to Link Clinicians with Administrators
and Regulators
1. Development
The DRGs were designed to fill this lacuna. They constitute a patient
classification system in which the uniqueness of each patient is acknowledged,
but it is likewise recognized that operationally, for purposes of budgeting, cost
control, and peer review, meaningful groups of patients must be created and
utilized.29 Stated generally, the principal purpose behind the classification
system is to provide an informational interface between the clinical decisions
that organize the hospital's intermediate products into the final products provid-
ed each patient, and the resource implications of those decisions. Hence, there
are two general criteria for the construction of the DRGs. First, in order to
transmit information concerning the efficient use of resources from administra-
tors and regulators to clinicians, the categories must be administratively man-
ageable and they must embody information concerning the efficient use of
resources. Second, the categories must be clinically meaningful so that they can
transmit clinically relevant information from clinicians to hospital administrators
and regulators, who are responsible for the ultimate level of resources commit-
ted to a hospital or group of hospitals. Stated in terms of lines of authority
within and without "the hospital," the DRGs communicate information among,
first, the line stemming from persons outside the hospital (regulators, trustees,
and third-party payers), second, the chain flowing down the administrative side
27. See Thompson et al., supra note 12, at 112-13; Fetter et al., supra note 3, at 23-29. Traditional
reimbursement typically used a relatively inclusive per diem rate calculated by dividing a hospital's costs
by the number of patient days. Costs among diverse patients were therefore aggregated and undifferentiated.
See generally GLASER, supra note 5, at 15-16, 45-54. Fetter's group "suggestledl that diagnostic-specific
(product-centered) case costs could be derived based on resource utilization and would be preferable both
as a measure of hospital output and as a basis for reimbursement than the undifferentiated patient day."
John D. Thompson et al., Case Mix and Resource Use, 12 INQUIRY 300, 309-10 (1975); see Fetter et al.,
supra note 3, at 1-2, 31-34. Analogously, Fetter's group argued that in the peer review process, comparisons
among length-of-stay patterns for hospitals in a geographic area were not meaningful unless variances among
the hospitals could be "attributed to differences in the types of patients they treat or to differences in their
length of stay." Fetter et al., supra note 3, at 27. Hence, the DRGs could be "an effective mechanism in
profile analysis by providing a structure of consistent patient-class definitions within which institutional
performance can be compared based on similar types of patients." Id.
28. Thompson et al., supra note 27, at 311.
29. This paragraph is drawn from id. at 311-12; Fetter et al., supra note 4, at 126-27, 131-35;
Thompson et al., supra note 12, at 1-2, 118-21, 123-24; Fetter et al., supra note 3, at 1-2, 5-6, 21-22, 34,
38; Fetter & Freeman, supra note 2, at 43-53; and Fetter, supra note 26, at 8-11, 14-22.
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of the hospital's organizational chart (from the CEO down), and, third, the
authority collected in the medical staff (organized as a whole and around
different clinical specialties and subspecialties). The DRGs are thus to be an
information medium that transparently transmits the normative judgments made
in the furtherance of social interests, on the one hand, and individual interests,
on the other.30
To achieve this purpose--to formulate the ultimate medium for transmitting
evaluative judgments-the Yale DRG group utilized two steps." First, the
researchers asked physician panels to group all possible principal diagnoses into
"23 mutually exclusive principal diagnosis areas, referred to as 'major diagnos-
tic categories' (MDCs)."32 The aim was to derive classifications coherent to
clinicians. "In general, each MDC was constructed to correspond to a major
30. Fetter and his collaborators understand the DRGs to be an information medium that transmits
normative judgment. See Thompson et al., supra note 27, at 311-12; Fetter et al., supra note 4, at 126-27,
130-35; Fetter et al., supra note 3, at 21-22, 27-35, 38; Fetter & Freeman, supra note 2, at 45-53. But see,
e.g., Richard F. Averill & Michael J. Kaison, Structure of a DRG-Based Prospective Payment System, in
DRGs: THEIR DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 23, at 207, 233 ("The DRG inflation update factor
should be computed on the basis of a predefined algorithm and be independent of political manipulations.").
I have previously argued that quite often this normativity gets lost in the aura of technique and the failure
to recognize the evaluative component ofjudgments concerning "efficiency." See generally Frankford, supra
note 13. The difficulty is in strict reliance on statistical method without appreciating that data construction
and manipulation are directed by normative interests. See MAX WEBER, "Objectivity" in Social Science
and Social Policy,.in THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 49, 72 (Edward A. Shils & Henry A.
Finch trans. and eds., 1949). David G. Smith has artfully expressed this attitude:
Diderot, the French Encyclopedist and philosopher, is credited with the slogan, "Despotism
and statistics cannot coexist." This slogan rested on the kind of optimistic belief shared by many
who helped design and implement PPS: that a fair and technically sound system of hospital
payments could be designed, would win assent and be enacted into law, and could be administered
without being destroyed by "politics."
SMITH, supra note 18, at 71-72; see id. at 4, 11, 84, 86, 100, 106, 232-33, 246-47.
It should be quite obvious at this-point that I have tremendous respect for the conceptual power of
Fetter's normative framework. However, I have serious problems with the concept that we can construct
a medium which will transmit normative judgments but not affect those judgments. See generally David
M. Frankford, Privatizing Health Care: Economic Magic To Cure Legal Medicine, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
1 (1992).
31. This paragraph is drawn from Fetter et al., supra note 3, at 5-20; and Richard F. Averill, Develop-
ment, in DRGs: THEIR DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 23, at 28, 33-41. My discussion summariz-
es the basic design used initially in PPS. For later design developments, see Jean L. Freeman et al.,
Refinement, in DRGs: THEIR DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 23, at 57; Richard F. Averill et al.,
A Study of the Relationship Between Severity of Illness and Hospital Cost in New Jersey Hospitals, 27
HEALTH SERVICES RES. 587 (1992).
32. Averill, supra note 31, at 33 (reference to accompanying table omitted). In order to be operational,
the DRGs were designed to draw on readily and generally available data. For this purpose, the researchers
utilized the diagnostic codes provided by the International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision,
Clinical Modification (the ICD-9-CM), which was first made available in 1979. This system is a "statistical
classification of morbidity and mortality, used for indexing hospital medical records by disease, as well as
data storage and retrieval processes." PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 4, at 14-15.
A patient's "principal diagnosis" is drawn from an abstract generated at the time of a patient's discharge
from the hospital. This discharge abstract in turn utilizes the Uniform Hospital Discharge Data Set, a
standardized code for reporting information regarding a patient's stay. The elements of the data set include:
patient identification, date of birth, sex, race, residence, hospital identification number, admission date,
discharge date, attending physician, operating physician, principal diagnosis, other diagnoses, principal
procedure, other procedures, disposition (the reason why the patient left the hospital-release, transfer, death,
discharge against medical advice) and expected payment source. See id. at 15..
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organ system (for example, respiratory system, circulatory system, digestive
system) rather than etiology (such as malignancies or infectious diseases). This
approach was used since clinical care is generally organized in accordance with
the organ system affected, and not etiology. '33 Second, "each MDC was
evaluated to identify those additional patient characteristics that would have a
consistent effect on the consumption of hospital resources."34 For this evalua-
tion, the Yale group utilized statistical methods to derive the tightest possible
clusters of patients in which length of stay was correlated with the best explana-
tory characteristics, with appropriate adjustments to make the clusters and
explanatory criteria clinically coherent and derivable from generally available
patient data.35 By and large, the MDCs were divided into medical and surgical
groups, which were then differentiated'according to the principal diagnosis or
surgical procedure, respectively, and then further differentiated as necessary
according to the criteria of age, sex, complication or comorbidity, specified
secondary diagnoses or surgical procedures, and discharge status (see figure 1
on opposing page). Throughout, the "actual process of forming the DRGs was
highly reiterative, involving a combination of statistical results from test data
with clinical judgment. 36
2. Conceptualized Impact
What would this linguistic medium do? At least as Fetter and collaborators
conceived it, the use of the DRGs in a reimbursement system would spark
changes in the language that both flows within the hospital and spans the
boundary between the hospital and the external world. However, authority to
33. Averill, supra note 31, at 34. Some examples of the MDCs are "Diseases and Disorders of the
Nervous System"; "Diseases and Disorders of the Eye"; "Diseases and Disorders of the Ear, Nose, and
Throat"; "Diseases and Disorders of the Respiratory System"; "Diseases and Disorders of the Circulatory
System"; and "Diseases and Disorders of the Digestive System."
34. Averill, supra note 31, at 34.
35. See, e.g., PAUL L. GRIMALDI & JULIE A. MICHELETTI, PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT: THE DEFINITIVE
GUIDE TO REIMBURSEMENT 22-43 (1985). Length of stay was utilized as the dependent variable, and hence
as the measure of output. The designers explained, "While [length of stayl may not be as accurate an
indicator of the level of output as actual costs, it is still an important indicator of utilization as well as being
easily available, well standardized and reliable." Fetter et al., supra note 3, at 5. Length of stay had also
been correlated with the total charges rendered a patient and with other measures of case-mix complexity.
See id. at 6.











































*Structure according to the fourth revision of the DRGs.
Source: Robert B. Fetter, Jean L. Freeman, and Harry L. Savitt, "DRG Refine-
ment with Diagnostic Specific Comorbidities and Complications: A Synthesis of
Current Approaches to Patient Classification," final report of cooperative agreements
nos. 15-C-98930/1-01 and 17-C-98930/1-0251 between the Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA) and Yale University, January 1989.
Reprinted with permission from DRGs: TBEm DESIGN A D DEvELoPMENT, supra note
23, at 15. Copyright 1991 Health Administration Press. All rights reserved.
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direct the use of resources would not necessarily change hands.37 Fetter and
his collaborators repeatedly implied that the irrationalities of management, cost
control, and quality assessment stemmed from the lack of a common language
through which the relevant actors-administrators, regulators, third-party payers,
and clinicians-can communicate their evaluative positions. The following
passage is illustrative:
[T]he need for effective communication is perhaps the most serious
problem facing regulation of the health-care industry. To be effective,
regulators and managers must build a language to the physicians. It is
a reflection of the state of the art that appeals in the hospital industry
are managed by lawyers and accountants and therefore examine prob-
lems of allocation and finance. If the financial and medical information
were merged, it would become possible to trace the relationship between
the physicians' decisions and their effects on costs. From this base, the
proper questions can be framed to deal equitably with issues of effec-
tiveness, quality and efficiency in patient care.3
8
The DRGs were the solution because they had been created to be a mode of
communication that could translate between managerial and clinical discourse.
This language would permit rational evaluation, for a "means of measuring
performance allows for the development of a system to understand, to predict,
and ultimately to control. Managerial control refers to understanding and
mastering the process rather than restraining it." 39 The DRGs would make
such an understanding possible-they would make the processes of work
intelligible to both administrators and clinicians-because they "address[]
simultaneously the administrative concerns of the department managers and the
clinical concerns of the providers. This combination should allow for a con-
structive dialogue between management and clinician."'4 Once such intelligi-
bility were obtained, the system would then provide a means to fit the needs
of the individual patient, as defined within the clinical judgment of her individ-
37. In this sense, Fetter's framework is extremely different from those that explicitly focus on changing
the power matrix inside the hospital. See, e.g., Jeffrey E. Harris, Regulation and Internal Control in
Hospitals, 55 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 88 (1979); DAVID W. YOUNG & RICHARD B. SALTMAN, THE
HOSPITAL POWER EQUILIBRIUM: PHYSICIAN BEHAVIOR AND COST CONTROL (1985); Phelps, supra note 6,
at 112-16. But see Sanford L. Weiner et al., Economic Incentives and Organizational Realities: Managing
Hospitals Under DRGs, 65 MILBANK Q. 463, 465 (1987) ("Implicit in Fetter and Thompson's view was
a restructuring of hospital management that would result in hospital administrators holding sufficient
authority to influence directly the way physicians used resources. . . . DRG-based reimbursement, by
providing the financial incentives to minimize costs, is the mechanism to force this realignment of internal
authority."). I discuss the question of authority more fully below. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying
text.
38. Fetter et al., supra note 3, at 34.
39. Fetter, supra note 26, at 5 (emphasis in original).
40. Id. at 22.
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ual physician, into the larger social and professional picture of responsibility."'
At least in the developer's conception, use of the classification system would
not enable social interests to dominate individual ones or vice versa. Rather,
it would create a process whereby individual deviations from a social norm,
as defined through the interaction of regulatory authority and collective profes-
sional activities, would have to be justified. The respective lines of authority,
and the concomitant need for a dialogue to bridge the gap between them, would
thus run from the profession, as a communal expression of clinical norms, to
the individual professional; and from regulation, as a communal expression of
social utility, to administrators within hospitals."2 The dialogue between these
two subsets of an overall system would thereby suffuse individual and social
clinical judgments with individual and social economic rationality and vice
versa. In the words of the designers,
The development of the patient classes is not intended to inhibit in
any way the practice of medicine but to offer one the capability of
examining reasons for variations in service utilization, treatment process,
and outcome. In this context, the groups can provide a framework for
the initiation of an ongoing process of comparative analysis of health
care with the long-run goal of determining both the cost and value of
any kind of care that might be delivered. With such information, mean-
ingful dialogue among clinicians, administrators, planners and regulators
can proceed in rationalizing of observed differences. Only in this way
can strategy, policy and politics interact to the benefit of the communi-
ties served by each institution. 3
41. Fetter and collaborators provided the fullest explication of this mediation process in Fetter et al.,
supra note 4.
42. Pettengill and Vertrees described the linkage, embodied in the rates, between regulators and hospital
administrators in the following way:
The objective of prospective payment systems is to create incentives for economically efficient
use of resources. The cost values attached to the case type categories implicitly define incentives
for the hospital and standards of comparison against which hospital performance will be judged.
The problem for the hospital administrator is to internalize these standards as a basis for control.
Pettengill & Vertrees, supra note 18, at 102. In turn, "Itlo control the use of resources within their
institutions, hospital administrators [will) be able to communicate standards of behavior to the admitting
physicians." Id. at 103. This process will eliminate incentives for overintensive use of resources. In turn,
the possibility that administrators would encourage physicians to undertreat is counterbalanced in part
because the physician is neither economically nor evaluatively dependent upon the hospital. Her "choice
of treatment modality ... is likely to be more strongly influenced by the relative risks to the patient and
the economic incentives embedded in the physician fee structure than by any effects on hospital reimburse-
ment." Id.
43. Fetter et al., supra note 3, at 22.
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11. Actualizing the Evaluative Framework: The Dependence upon an Organ-
istic Form of Organizational Rationality
A. Embodying Efficiency: Uniform Rates Structured Around the DRGs
To have this impact, however, the DRGs obviously had to become embod-
ied in the process of hospital regulation. Originally-in the late 1960s and early
70s-the system was conceived, not as the basis of PPS or any other reimburse-
ment system, but instead as a management tool that could be used to evaluate
hospital performance." Nonetheless, as early as 1975, Fetter's group under-
stood that the "next logical extension" of their work was that "[t]hird-party
reimbursement policies could.., be directed toward the use of the diagnostic-
specific case cost as the method of paying for hospital services, rather than
patient days. '4 5 Furthermore, at least by the early 1980s, when the group was
working closely with HCFA in refining the DRGs, it was quite clear that some
at HCFA, including Pettengill and Vertrees, wanted the DRGs to be the basis
of the case-mix measure in a new reimbursement system, although even then
it seemed unlikely that HCFA was going to recommend that the basic unit of
payment be per-case." In any event, regardless of Fetter's intent, the evalua-
tive framework was picked up by many in the Department of Health and
Human Services (DHHS), HCFA, and Congress who were interested in control-
ling Medicare's budget.
47
The most difficult task in setting rates for hospitals has been the search for
measures to compare, evaluate, and control the costs of treating different
patients in one hospital and, moreover, across different hospitals. Hospital
regulators can confidently set uniform rates applicable to groups of hospitals
only if they believe they can satisfactorily account for the factors that cause
treatment costs to vary. Once their causal models are sufficient, regulators can
then evaluate the causes of cost variation. They can separate "illegitimate"
sources, which supposedly reflect inefficient production processes and ineffec-
tive clinical practices, from "legitimate" sources, which are caused by factors
outside a hospital's control, such as severity of illness.
Prior to the development of the DRGs, pioneering work by Judith Lave,
Lester Lave and Samuel Leinhardt had successfully correlated a substantial
44. See Fetter, supra note 26, at 8.
45. Thompson et al., supra note 27, at 311-12; see Robert B. Fetter, Diagnosis Related Groups:
Understanding Hospital Performance, INTERFACES, Jan.-Feb. 1991, at 6, 10.
46. See SMITH, supra note 18, at 28-45, 59.
47. Many observers, including some whose suggestions have strengthened this Article, believe that
Congress and HCFA were not interested in Fetter's fancy evaluative framework; they only cared about
holding down federal outlays. This statement is undoubtedly true of many members, staff, and administra-
tors, but it is not true, for a prominent example, of Pettengill and Vertrees. See supra note 42 and infra
note 59. My method is to take seriously the evaluative premises of persons like Fetter, Thompson, Pettengill
and Vertrees, and to analyze whether those premises can be satisfied.
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portion of cost variation with various hospital characteristics, such as teaching
status, and with patient categories constructed around diagnoses and surgical
procedures."8 However, it was generally believed that the method for classify-
ing patients was insufficient. It was thus in this regard that the DRG classifica-
tion system-a classification system that supposedly groups all patients in all
hospitals into homogeneous categories-was a major breakthrough, a "fact"
demonstrated by the important Pettengill-Vertrees report. In this study Pettengill
and Vertrees combined diagnosis, categorized by DRG, with several hospital
characteristics into a causal model that would "explain" the variations observed
in the treatment of all Medicare patients. They reported that this model could
account for far more cost variation than had ever been achieved before. 9
It was at this point that hospital regulators became confident that they could
utilize some form of uniform rates structured around the DRGs. Moreover,
given the evaluative framework used to develop the DRGs, regulators could
have some faith that those rates would (eventually) embody the conjoined
clinical, administrative, and regulatory evaluative judgments concerning the
efficient and effective treatment for each type of case. The imposition of
uniform rates, therefore, would force hospitals and physicians to operate
efficiently and effectively. It is this use of uniform rates, coupled with rate-
makers' confidence that they can account for a tolerable degree of cost varia-
tions among hospitals, that constitutes the conceptual core of PPS.50 Medicare
regulators believed that they could impose uniform national rates fine-tuned by
adjustments to attain the behavioral effects they desired with only a tolerable
degree of undesired subsidiary effects. Hospitals would be forced to become
48. See Judith R. Lave & Lester B. Lave, The Extent of Role Differentiation Among Hospitals, 6
HEALTH SERVICEs REs. 15(1971); Judith R. Lave et al., Hospital Cost Estimation Controlling for Case-Mix,
4 APPLIED ECON. 165 (1972); Judith R. Lave & Samuel Leinhardt, The Cost and Length of a Hospital Stay,
13 INQUIRY 327 (1976).
49. For example, in 1976, Judith Lave and Samuel Leinhardt studied a sample drawn from a year's
billing data in a large teaching hospital in Pittsburgh. They aggregated patients by means of a diagnostic
classification system utilizing 30 categories and thus far less differentiated than the 467 original DRGs.
Running regressions using these diagnostic categories, as well as other variables affecting cost and length
of stay, they found that the specifications in their model accounted for 45% and 43% of the variations in,
respectively, average daily cost and average length of stay for the patients studied. See Lave & Leinhardt,
supra note 48, at 330-41; see also Lave & Lave, supra note 48, at 16-17 (using 17 diagnostic categories
and data from 19 Pittsburgh-area hospitals over a three-year period and 65 Pittsburgh-area hospitals over
a half-year period); Lave et al., supra note 48, at 166 (same). In contrast, in 1982, Pettengill and Vertrees
studied a sample comprised of 1.93 million Medicare inpatient hospital discharges in 1979 from 5,947 short-
stay hospitals. The sample in turn comprised 20% of all such discharges in that year. Based on this sample
and the differentiation of the discharges through use of the 467 DRGs, Pettengill and Vertrees concluded
that their model accounted for 72% of the variation in the Medicare cost per case. See Pettengill & Vertrees,
supra note 18, at 106, 113.
50. Stated generally, a hospital's reimbursement for each Medicare case is the cost of treating the
average Medicare patient, weighted by the relative resources demanded by the particular type of case, as
organized through the DRGs and adjusted to account for legitimate cost variation. For a lengthy explication
of the averages that form the motivational core of the system, see Frankford, supra note 13.
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efficient in their production of intermediate products, and physicians would be
forced to utilize effective processes of care in the packaging of those prod-
ucts.5
B. Fostering Competition Through Regulation
How was this supposed to happen? Ironically, PPS, a system of adminis-
tered prices, was sold in large part under the ideology that it was "pro-competi-
tive." As David G. Smith relates, in the early 1980s Congress "had been
developing the political resolve to make a drastic and radically different change
in the system of hospital reimbursement." 52 At the same time, HCFA had
been considering the use of various case-mix measures, including the Yale
DRGs, to impose more stringent controls on Medicare costs. 53 In that era of
substantial political commitment to deregulation,' Secretary of DHHS Richard
Schweiker, despite substantial internal opposition, latched onto the Yale DRGs
as the basis of a prospective payment system. Such a system, he believed,
would not encounter opposition from organized medicine and could be sold,
first, to the hospital industry as an "objective" methodology which would leave
hospitals with managerial discretion, and, second, to the rest of the Reagan
White House as a means of control based on "competition" rather than regula-
tion.55 Hence it is understandable that one can read amazingly self-contradicto-
51. Needless to say, many at HCFA opposed the use of national rates because their assessments of
the model's predictive power were more cautious. See SMITH, supra note 18, at 28-45, 59. Compare Judith
R. Lave et al., A Proposal for Incentive Reimbursement for Hospitals, 11 MED. CARE 79, 85-89 (1973)
(proposing the use of a case-adjusted per-case reimbursement system with cost sharing between the
government and a hospital for deviations from the per-case rate, and with periodic readjustment to account
for technological change); Judith R. Lave, Hospital Reimbursement Under Medicare, 62 MILBANK
MEMORIAL FuND Q. 251, 254-56 (1984) (recommending the immediate abandonment of the use of national
rates); and Judith R. Lave, The Impact of the Medicare Prospective Payment System and Recommendations
for Change, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 499, 521-27 (1990) [hereinafter Lave, The Impact of PPS] (recommending
various changes to reduce the reliance upon national rates) with Larry A. Oday & Allen Dobson, Paying
Hospitals Under Medicare's Prospective Payment System: Another Perspective, .7 YALE J. ON REG. 529,
537 (1990) (rejecting Lave's recommendations because her "proposal represents a return to cost-based
reimbursement that runs counter to the price incentives put in place by PPS"). Lave was the Director of
HCFA's Office of Research from 1980 to 1982. Oday and Dobson were respectively the Director of
HCFA's Bureau of Eligibility, Reimbursement and Coverage, and the Director of the Office of Research
at the time PPS was designed and implemented.
52. SMITH, supra note 18, at 32.
53. See id. at 32-35.
54. In Smith's words, "One of the top priorities of the new administration was deregulation or, as
President Reagan was fond of saying, 'getting government off the backs of the people."' Id. at 35-36.
55. See id. at 3-4, 23-24, 26-27, 35-50, 231-37, 243-48. Smith recounts that congressional passage
was obtained largely because the details of PPS were developed in secret, thereby hiding the potential
distributional consequences from any Congressman intent on protecting parochial interests. There was not
even a bill before the Health Subcommittee of Ways and Means at the time of the "markup" in which the
"bill" was "amended," a process Smith likens to "the fabled Chesire cat of Alice in Wonderland, that
disappeared leaving a grin behind." Id. at 50. All in all, it appears that almost no one in Congress
understood what the proposal would do. See id. at 47-56. Smith summarizes this legislative episode as
follows:
Not only was [passage] close to a record for speed, but one of the most important single laws
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ry and incoherent statements concerning the aims of PPS, such as the following
one, in which competition and rate regulation are strange bedfellows and the
control of physicians is pictured as a means of giving them an even greater role
in organizational governance:
The rationale for reimbursing hospitals on the basis of a prospective
payment system, i.e., a system based on a fixed price per discharge, is
to create an incentive for hospitals to operate in a more cost-effective
manner. Under the system, hospitals are allowed to retain the amount
paid per discharge that is in excess of their costs, but they have to
absorb any costs that exceed the amount paid.
In electing to replace the cost-based reimbursement system with a
prospective payment system, the government asserted that the following
benefits can be obtained from a system that is based on a fixed set of
rates for each type of case or discharge and that places hospitals at risk
in the use of their resources: it establishes competitive market-like
forces in the health care system; it restrains hospital cost increases in
order to preserve the integrity of the Medicare trust funds and the
financial status of other payors; and it identifies more accurately the
product being purchased, which over time will have the desirable effect
of determining which services a hospital can, and cannot, deliver more
efficiently. In addition, the strong link between payment and diagnosis
in a prospective payment system invites more active medical participa-
tion in the financial affairs and operating routines of hospitals.56
Sadly, the normative framework's strength in the political process is con-
nected with its crucial conceptual weakness. To begin, this weakness is apparent
in Fetter's conception that hospital management was irrational because no
common language linked clinicians, administrators, and regulators. One asks,
"Did clinicians, administrators, and regulators not communicate without the
DRGs?" From the beginning of Medicare, the disputes over accounting have
been battles over the authority to direct resources. The fact that the conflict
raged in that form is unremarkable, for as Max Weber taught us many years
ago, control over the language of the books carries with it substantial power
both to direct affairs within an organization and to shape the relationship of the
dealing with health care since the passage of Medicare in 1965, with the possible exception of
the Social Security Amendments of 1972, passed both houses of Congress with the most perfunc-
tory of hearings and virtually no debate. Perhaps it could have only been passed this way. But
the implications of these statements for democratic government are not reassuring.
Id. at 56. This was truly a revolution without the masses.
56. 1 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) I 4203, at 1511-12 (1990).
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organization with the outside world.17 Moreover, it is difficult to understand
how the social managerial task could be solved by the purposive supply of
language. One asks, "Now that there is a common language, what happens and
how does it happen?" The problem is not a failure to communicate but con-
flicting judgments concerning what is appropriately done.
This lack of specificity in the normative framework, and the resultant
complete avoidance of questions regarding authority," help us understand a
remarkable aspect of Fetter's work-that it could be all things at once to all
people. It could serve as a vehiicle for proponents of regulation who were
searching for administrative mechanisms by which to get a handle on hospital
cost inflation and productivity, while also attempting to render correctly the
necessary but very difficult and complex allocative and distributional decisions.
Simultaneously, it could serve as a vehicle for proponents of competition,
particularly in the early Reagan years, who were trying to dismantle and destroy
the very apparatuses sought by proponents of regulation. Similarly, it waged
war neither for the physician groups anxious to protect the authority of their
members, nor for hospital management hard pressed to assert authority against
the clinicians. The framework used by the Yale group could satisfy all camps
because there was absolutely no specification of the process to be set in motion
by the DRGs and no recourse to a theory of power, other than a vague argu-
ment that suddenly everyone would get along.59
57. See MAx WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 90-100 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978).
My point here is much more fully elaborated in Frankford, supra note 13. I owe a heavy intellectual debt
to YOUNG & SALTMAN, supra note 37, which has helped me enormously in developing my idea that
accounting is the exercise of power. For a fascinating historical account, see Bruce G. Carruthers & Wendy
N. Espeland, Accounting for Rationality: Double-Entry Bookkeeping and the Rhetoric of Economic
Rationality, 97 AM. J. SOC. 31 (1991). 1 am grateful to Kevin Delaney for steering me to Carruthers and
Espeland.
58. See James A. Morone, American Political Culture and the Search for Lessons from Abroad, 15
J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 129 (1990).
59. As Bruce C. Vladeck has captured, the DRGs were perhaps less a basis for prediction than a source
of inspiration:
But even if prospective payment, in any number of forms, can achieve significant savings,
the ultimate issue must always be not the economic side of the equation but the implications for
what actually happens to actual Medicare beneficiaries in need of actual medical services. Here
it is important to remember the aspirations, if not yet the demonstrated performance, that tie at
the root of the development of DRG-based payment. As opposed to any other currently available
methods for prospective price-setting for hospitals, DRGs focus, at one and the same time, both
on the specific issue of hospital productivity for clinically defined products, and on the identifica-
tion and scrutiny of the patterns of care being rendered in individual institutions. In other words,
what DRGs are all about is finding a mix of services that, in the inevitable statutory phraseology,
are both efficient and effective. That is an aspiration that extends far beyond fiscal solvency.
If it succeeds, then it will succeed at addressing some of the broadest and most basic concerns
of Medicare, not just its potentially transient fiscal problems.
Bruce C. Vladeck, Comment on "Hospital Reimbursement Under Medicare," 62 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUJND
Q. 269, 277-78 (1984).
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C. Relying upon Organizational Rationality to Generate Organizational
Rationality
Stated more particularly, the problem is a failure to specify the meaning of
the organizational rationality that PPS was supposed to invoke or generate.
Rationality is an individual faculty, and our theories of organizational behavior
have to work hard to transform an individual attribute into a collective mecha-
n.ism or characteristic. Here there are three relevant dimensions in the models
of hospital behavior.' First, there is the conception of individual rationality.
With a few notable exceptions to be discussed below, most of the models
invoke a conception of rationality in which individuals within the hospital are
purposeful maximizers.6 This conception is the one handed down to us from
nineteenth century social scientific positivism.62 Individuals canvass all possi-
ble means to effectuate an end, which they then act to attain. Second, there is
the conception of the objects of rationality.3 Here there are multiple possibili-
ties: hospital cash flow or net revenue;' hospital reimbursement; 65 an
optimal mix, as perceived by the hospital, of patient-care services, amenities
for patients and physicians, and operating surpluses;66 number of hospital
sales;67 physician income;68 an optimal mix of physician income, time,
convenience and reputation ; 69 the net present value of proprietary shareholders'
equity;7 ° number and mix of patients treated, as perceived by the hospital7
or by physicians;72 an optimal mix of quantity and quality of services, as
60. My discussion here has been aided greatly by YOUNG & SALTMAN. supra note 37, at 21-38, and
Philip Jacobs, A Survey of Economic Models of Hospitals, 11 INQUIRY 83 (1974), although both my
taxonomy and focus are somewhat different from theirs. I have also benefitted from the literature review
in ROSKO & BROYLES, supra note 10, at 105-29.
61. For a classic criticism, see Herbert A. Simon, Rationality as Process and as Product of Tlught,
68 AM. ECON. REv. PAPERS & PROC. 1 (1978).
62. See generally TALCOTr PARSONS, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION 51-74 (1968).
63. See generally ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS 9-66 (1977).
64. See KAREN DAVIS, ECONOMIC THEORIES OF BEHAVIOR IN NONPROFIT, PRIVATE HOSPITALS (1971).
65. See Martin Feldstein, Hospital Cost Inflation: A Study of Nonprofit Price Dynamics, 61 AM. ECON.
REV. 853 (1971).
66. See FRANK A. SLOAN & BRUCE STEINWALD, INSURANCE, REGULATION, AND HOSPITAL COSTS 18-
22 (1980).
67. See Robert G. Rice, Analysis of the Hospital as an Economic Organism, 106 MOD. HosP. 87, 88
(1966).
68. See Mark Pauly & Michael Redisch, The Not-For-Profit Hospital as a Physicians' Cooperative,
63 AM. ECON. REV. 87 (1973).
69. See MARK V. PAULY, DOCTORS AND THEIR WORKSHOPS: ECONOMIC MODELS OF PHYSICIAN
BEHAVIOR 17-24 (1980).
70. See Michael A. Morrisey et al., Hospital Rate Review: A Theory and an Empirical Review, 3 J.
HEALTH ECON. 25, 27 (1984).
71. See HERBERT E. KLARMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH 121 (1965); Carole Siegel, A Risk-Based
Prospective Payment System That Integrates Patient, Hospital and National Costs, 11 J. HEALTH ECON.
1, 3-4, 9, 16-17 (1992).
72. See Melvin W. Reder, Some Problems in the Economics of Hospitals, 56 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS
& PROC. 472, 479-80 (1965).
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perceived by the hospital and embodied in the scope of facilities and servic-
es;73 an optimal mix of number of admissions, case-mix, quality and profits,
as perceived by physicians;74 salary, prestige, security, power, and professional
satisfaction as perceived by administrators 75 or by physicians;76 technical
control; 77 uncertainty within the organization; 78 or institutional growth.
79
Third, regardless of the objects of rationality, there is the conception whether
and to what extent this individual faculty is converted into a unified organiza-
tional rationality.
With regard to this last dimension, which is the central focus of this article,
we can distinguish among three types of models. In the first, the problem of
merging individual rationality into the organizational rationality of a complex
organization is simply assumed away. The hospital truly is an organism,
adapting to its changing and hostile environment in a rationally maximizing
way.' It is in this limited sense that I use the word "organistic" in this article.
By means of a crude economic functionalism, a complex organization is
assumed to be a single, unified organism which is governed by a rational
whole. Under this assumption, the "mind" of the organization weaves its
disparate parts into a coordinated unit that then acts to attain a unified and
ordered preference scheme. In these organistic models, the fact that there are
multiple actors in the hospital-much less multiple types of actors-is simply
ignored. The hospital is "the firm" in the neoclassical tradition."'
In contrast, in the second type of model, it is recognized that multiple actors
comprise the hospital and that different occupational categories of ac-
tors-physicians, administrators, nurses, and so forth-might pursue different
agendas. Nonetheless, even in this second type, the organization effectively
operates like the simple unified organism. Either it is assumed that the maxi-
73. See Joseph P. Newhouse, Toward a Theory of Nonprofit Institutions: An Economic Model of a
Hospital, 60 Am. EcoN. REV. 64 (1970).
74. See Marsha Goldfarb et al., Behavior of the Multiproduct Firm: A Model of the Nonprofit Hospital
System, 18 MED. CARE 185 (1980).
75. See Maw Lin Lee, A Conspicuous Production Theory of Hospital Behavior, 38 S. ECON. J. 48
(1971).
76. See YOUNG & SALTMAN, supra note 37, at 42-46. See generally EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 29-
86.
77. See generally ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL POWERS: A STUDY OF THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION
OF FORMAL KNOWLEDGE (1986).
78. See Jeffrey E. Harris, The Internal Organization of Hospitals: Some Economic Implications, 8 BELL
J. EcoN. 467 (1977).
79. See YOUNG & SALTMAN, supra note 37.
80. From my examples above, these models are DAVIS, supra note 64; Feldstein, supra note 65; SLOAN
& STEINWALD, supra note 66, at 11-35; Rice, supra note 67; KLARMAN, supra note 71, at 121-24, 131-44;
Siegel, supra note 71, at 3-4, 9, 16-17; Reder, supra note 72; Newhouse, supra note 73; Goldfarb et al..
supra note 74; and Lee, supra note 75.
81. My term "organistic" therefore does not include uses of the biological metaphor in organizational
theory, such as the adaptation and selection models that fall into the third type discussed immediately below.
I am grateful to David Mechanic for suggesting this clarification.
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mizing strategy of one type of actor is the sole form of rationality at work, 82
or it is assumed that this form of rationality predominates in the form of a fairly
unspecified organizational equilibrium. Sometimes this rationality is pictured
as deriving from a cooperative or noncooperative equilibrium obtaining between
the different but homogeneous groups.83 In more sophisticated versions, the
predominant type of actor is differentiated into individuals who coexist within
a cooperative, exchange equilibrium.84 In neither instance, however, is it
explained just how this cooperative or noncooperative equilibrium exists, given
the underlying supposition that the hospital is composed of multiple actors who
pursue egoistic, maximizing, and sometimes inconsistent strategies. Moreover,
all of these equilibrium models essentially efface each hospital as an organiza-
tion sui generis, for they picture all hospitals as "just a neutral forum within
which individual actors pursue their personal goals."85 Even where "the
hospital" is a separable interest, included in either "the physician's" utility
function or the budget constraint she faces,86 this interest is given no embodi-
ment in flesh and bones. This "hospital" to be affected by "the physician"
remains an abstraction-to iterate, a neutral forum for individual interest
seeking-in which specification of the equilibrating process is limited to a
vague structural characteristic (cooperative, noncooperative, or duopolistic), the
point that the transactions costs of internal organization increase with size of
the medical staff, and the point that the "quality objectives" of the nonprofit
82. It is assumed that multiple actors within broad occupational categories follow a unified strategy.
The rationality of the organization is then driven solely by the rationality of one these sets-e.g., "the
medical staff' or "the administration." See, e.g., Rice, supra note 67; KLARMAN, supra note 71, at 121-24,
131-44; Newhouse, supra note 73, at 65; SLOAN & STEINWALD, supra note 66, at 19; Goldfarb et al., supra
note 74, at 186 n.§; see also Jacobs, supra note 60, at 84-92.
83. See, e.g., Cotton M. Lindsay & James M. Buchanan, The Organization and Financing of Medical
Care in the United States, in HEALTH SERVICES FINANCING 535 (British Medical Ass'n ed., 1970); Kenneth
Clarkson, Some Inplications of Property Rights in Hospital Management, 15 J.L. & ECON. 363 (1972).
84. See, e.g., Pauly & Redisch, supra note 68; PAULY, supra note 69. at 20-22; Frank A. Sloan &
Edmund R. Becker, Internal Organization of Hospitals and Hospital Costs, 18 INQUIRY 224, 225-28 (1981);
Patricia M. Danzon, Hospital "Profits": The Effect of Reinbursement Policies, I J. HEALTH ECON. 1, 38
(1982); Morrisey et al., supra note 70, at 26-27; Seidman & Frank, supra note 3, at 158, 166-68; Gail A.
Jensen & Michael A. Morrisey, Medical Staff Specialty Mix and Hospital Production, 5 J. HEALTH ECON.
253, 255-56 (1986) [hereinafter Jensen & Morrisey, Medical Staff Specialty Mix]; Gail A. Jensen & Michael
A. Morrisey, The Role of Physicians in Hospital Production, 68 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 432, 432-33
(1986) [hereinafter Jensen & Morrisey, The Role ofPhysiciansl; Pauly, supra note 14, at 260; Kenneth E.
Thorpe & Charles E. Phelps, Regulatory Intensity and Hospital Cost Growth, 9 J. HEALTH ECON. 143, 147
& n.7 (1990).
Pauly & Redisch, supra note 68, is a breathtaking piece of work. It was written in the context of prior
models in which the physician barely appeared in "the hospital," and it singularly eliminated such models
as a possibility. A relatively early essay by Michael A. Redisch was also fairly unique in that there was
an extended argument why a physician-dominated model was appropriate. See Michael A. Redisch,
Physician Involvement in Hospital Decision Making, in HOSPITAL COST CONTAINMENT 217, 217-21 (M.
Zubkoff et al. eds., 1978).
85. YOUNG & SALTMAN, supra note 37, at 22; see Jacobs, supra note 60, at 92-96.
86. See, e.g., Pauly & Redisch, supra note 68; PAULY, supra note 69; Sloan & Becker, supra note 84;
Danzon, supra note 84; Seidman & Frank, supra note 3; Jensen & Morrisey, Medical Staff Specialty Mix,
supra note 84; Jensen & Morrisey, The Role of Physicians. supra note 84; Pauly, supra note I4.
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firm are consistent with the "quality objectives" of consumers and their external
agents. Additionally, other actors in the hospital, particularly managers, are
given no objectives other than satisfying physicians, and thus the models ignore
the possibility of conflicting objectives. Finally, "the physician" and "the
hospital" are both homogeneous and very abstract constructs. The models are
thus incapable of considering particularities among them.
The third type of models, which together fall under the rubric "organization-
al theory," lifts this veil of abstraction. There remains the conception of an
equilibrium at work, but the equilibrium itself takes on the characteristics of
means-end rationality,87 in which its objects are the ends that individual actors
themselves pursue.8" Thus, in the most fully elaborated form of this last type
of model, it is posited that throughout time the strategies of all actors in each
unique hospital are constantly bent into an adaptive form that is focused on the
object of organizational survival. 9 This rich and complicated process thus
87. It can be conceptualized either that "the organization" itself satisfic'es or that individuals are forced
to do so.. See Noralou P. Roos, Influencing the Health Care System: Policy Alternatives, 22 PUBLIC POL'Y
139, 141 n.10 (1974). When individuals or organizations satisfice, they make due with means and ends
they deem "good enough" rather than try in vain to optimize. See, e.g., Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral
Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99 (1955).
88. See, e.g., Stephen M. Shortell et al., Strategy Making in Health Care Organizations: A Framework
and Agenda for Research, 42 MED. CARE REV. 219, 222 (1985) (defining "emergent strategies" as "realized
strategies that were never intended by the organization. They represent spontaneous adaptive and largely
unconscious strategies that may have arisen as a function of rapidly changing external forces."). If I were
to choose among behavioral models of organizational rationality relevant to most if not all hospitals, I would
prefer the one picturing organizational choice as organized anarchy, in which an organization "can be
described better as a loose collection of ideas than as a coherent structure; it discovers preferences through
action more than it acts on the basis of preferences." Michael D. Cohen et al., A Garbage Can Model of
Organizational Choice, 17 ADMIN. Q. 1 (1972). More fully, one can view organizational choice:
as a garbage can into which various kinds of problems and solutions are dumped by participants
as they are generated. The mix of garbage in a single can depends on the mix of cans available,
on the labels attached to the alternative cans, on what garbage is currently being produced, and
on the speed with which garbage is collected and removed from the scene.
Id. at 2; see, e.g., Ashmos & McDaniel, supra note 9 (applying Cohen, March and Olsen's concept of fluid
participation in organizational choice). However, even with this relaxation of the ends-means distinction,
I become concerned when organizational actors become mere "carriers of problems and solutions," see,
e.g., Lawrence T. Pinfield, A Field Evaluation of Perspectives on Organizational Decision Making, 31
ADMIN. ScI. Q. 365, 379 (1986), when an organization is given a unified "world view," see, e.g., Richard
L. Daft & Karl E. Weick, Toward a Model of Organizations as Interpretation Systems, 9 ACAD. MGMT.
REV. 284 (1984); James B. Thomas et al., Hospitals as Interpretation Systems, 25 HEALTH SERVICES RES.
859, 863-64, 871-72 (1991), or even when these theoretical formulations are combined. See Ashmos &
McDaniel, supra note 9, at 377-80. To unite power and information, and to preserve the uniqueness of
individual actors while integrating them into a cognate, expressive and normative but not necessarily unified
organizational structure and process, I would probably abandon behavioral models in favor of symbolic
interactionist ones, see, e.g., ANSELM L. STRAUSS, MIRRORS AND MASKS: THE SEARCH FOR IDENTITY
(1977), reflecting my preference for interpretation against explanation. See generally Linda Smircich,
Concepts of Culture and Organizational Analysis, 28 ADMIN. SCL Q. 339 (1983). For present purposes,
however, I can stop at the threshold of satisficing, behavioral models.
89. See, e.g., Paul J. Gordon, The Top Management Triangle in the Voluntary Hospital, 9 Hosp. ADMIN.
46 (1964); Basil S. Georgopoulos, The Hospital as an Organization and Problem Solving System, in
ORGANIZATIONAL RESEARCH ON HEALTH INSTITUTIONS- 9 (Basil S. Georgopoulos ed., 1972); Duncan
Neuhauser, The Hospital as Matrix Organization, 17 HosP. ADMIN. 8 (1972); Harris, supra note 78; W.
Richard Scott, Health Care Organizations in the 1980s: The Convergence of Public and Professional
Control Systems, in CONTEMPORARY HEALTH SERVICES: SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES 177 (A.W. Johnson
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enables the hospital, a complex organization, to persist despite the existence
of a hostile external environment and an internal situation marred by internecine
warfare, all of which is extremely fluid.90
Fetter's work and that of the designers of PPS simply ignored the complica-
tions indicated by the models based on a simple or complex equilibrium.
Fetter's work does incorporate a conception of adaptive rationality. The use of
the DRGs in reimbursement and quality assurance purportedly enables the
sovereign "to implement equitable rate setting, monitor hospital performance,
and at the same time produce a feedback to each hospital of information for
et al. eds., 1982); W. Richard Scott, Managing Professional Work: Three Models of Control for Health
Organizations, 17 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 213 (1982); YOUNG & SALTMAN, supra note 37; Phelps, supra
note 6, at 112-16; Weiner et al., supra note 37; Charles E. Phelps & Itai Sened, Market Equilibria with Not-
for-Profit Firms (March 28, 1990) (unpublished draft); cf ANDREW ABBOTr, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS:
AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF EXPERT LABOR (1988) (describing a dynamic equilibrium between
competing professional groups). For a recent general summary, see RICHARD M. CYERT & JAMES G.
MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 214-38 (2d ed. 1992). For a manifesto regarding the
application of a theory of organizational adaptation in the face of regulatory and competitive selection, see
Karen Cook et al., A Theory of Organizational Response to Regulation: The Case of Hospitals, 8 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 193 (1983); Shortell et al., supra note 88. For an extremely helpful discussion of the core
concept of strategic adaptation, see John R. Kimberly & Edward J. Zajac, Strategic Adaptation in Health
Care Organizations: Implications for Theory and Research, 42 MED. CARE REV. 267 (1985). In Section
V below, I discuss some literature from organizational theory concerning the structural and procedural forms
of this adaptive rationality.
90. Admittedly, my typology contains categories that are fuzzy at the edges, as do all categories useful
for analytic purposes. Most prominently, in some models "the hospital" is given incentives different than
physicians and the range of incentives is broadened, even to include ethical considerations. See Randall
P. Ellis & Thomas G. McGuire, Provider Behavior Under Prospective Reimbursement: Cost Sharing and
Supply, 5 J. HEALTH ECON. 129 (1986); Richard G. Frank et al., The Impact of Medicare's Prospective
Payment System on Psychiatric Patients Treated in Scatterbeds, 8 ADVANCES HEALTH ECON. & HEALTH
SERVICES RES. 1, 5 (1987); Kyle L. Grazier & Thomas G. McGuire, Payment Systems and Hospital
Resource Use: A Comparative Analysis of Psychiatric, Medical and Obstetric Services, 8 ADVANCES
HEALTH ECON. & HEALTH SERVICES RES. 75, 79-80 (1987); Judith R. Lave & Richard G. Frank, Factors
Affecting Medicaid Patients' Length of Stay in Psychiatric Units, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Winter
1988, at 57, 58 (1988) [hereinafter Lave & Frank, Factors Affecting Medicaid Patients' Length of Stay in
Psychiatric Hospitals]; William S. Custer et al., The Production of Health Care Services and Changing
Hospital Reimbursement: The Role of Hospital-Medical Staff Relationships. 9 J. HEALTH ECON. 167 (1990).
Although it remains unclear to me who "the hospital" is in these models, and although the picture of
organizational life is not nearly as rich as in Harris's work, the models are nonetheless a clear departure
from the prior, single-headed models of the hospital in the neoclassical tradition. In short, these authors
give "the hospital" an existence. I therefore see them as a bridge between the simple and complex
equilibrium models, because the sine qua non of the latter is that each organization strives to maintain its
autonomy and unique identity. See, e.g., Cook et al., supra note 89, at 197. Nonetheless, as Lave and Frank
have commented, "the relationships between physicians, patients, and hospitals need to be better character-
ized in empirical analyses. Research by Ellis and McGuire ... offers theoretical characterizations of these
relationships. Empirical analyses need to catch up to this work." Judith R. Lave & Richard G. Frank,
Hospital Supply Response to Prospective Payment as Measured by Length of Stay, II ADVANCES HEALTH
ECON. & HEALTH SERVICES RES. 1, 19 (1990) [hereinafter Lave & Frank, Hospital Supply Response to
Prospective Payment]; see also Phelps, supra note 6, at 112-16; Thorpe & Phelps, supra note 84, at 147
& n.7.
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each institution to review and evaluate its own performance and quality crite-
ria." More fully, this system of informational cybernetics has the following
capability:
The result of comparison of resource requirements with resource use
is a set of measures of hospital performance capable of producing the
required utilization reports by hospital and comparing hospitals and
groups of hospitals. Such measures must be viewed in an adaptive
manner as it is to be expected that review and feedback of results will
produce, over time, alterations in behavior. Thus, [evaluation of a
hospital's performance] ... deriv[es] from both experience and judg-
ment but requir[es] actual data for verification and/or change.92
However, at the crucial point of specifying what it is that is adapting,
Fetter's model falls short. It is specified that authority in the hospital is bifur-
cated into two lines, one headed by physicians and one by administrators. On
the clinical side, the physician is in charge of the "Patient Care Team, which
is composed of personnel (nurse, radiologist, pathologist, technician, therapist,
dietician, social worker, etc.) delivering support services from their respective
functional departments (Nursing, Radiology, Pathology, Operating Room,
Physical Therapy, Dietary, Social Services, etc.)."93 On the administrative
side, authority is held by the "administrators of the intermediate product centers.
Specifically, the administrators of the laboratory, kitchen, blood bank, and so
forth are responsible for the production, including quality control, of the
respective department's services. They therefore are accountable to the Chief
Executive Officer for the efficiency with which specific services, ordered by
the physicians, are provided."94 Yet, the model then assumes away the impor-
tant question of how it is that these lines meet within an organization. It is
merely stipulated that the bifurcated structure "allows the organization to assign
specific organizational authority and responsibility."9 5 In other words, at this
point it is presupposed that a unified entity, the hospital, has rationally deter-
mined its mode of organization. We are in a regress, and the hospital has again
simply become a unified organism, steered by external forces.96 It can then
91. Fetter et al., supra note 4, at 130-31.
92. Id. at 135.
93. Fetter & Freeman, supra note 2, at 47-49. Given the conception that the hospital is a multiproduct
firm driven by the unique needs of individual patients, this hierarchy is pictured as relatively fluid: "These
teams are formed around each patient as he/she arrives for the duration of his/her stay. Thus, as patients
are admitted and discharged, teams can be found 'constantly forming, dissolving, and forming again, perhaps
rarely with the same membership'." Id. at 49.
94. id.
95. Id. (emphasis added).
96. The metaphor of force affecting the behavior of the organism is very important in the literature
concerning PPS. See, e.g., Judith Feder et al., How Did Medicare's Prospective Payment System Affect
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be assumed that the bifurcated lines of authority, equipped with a common
language, would somehow generate "rationalization." There is thus no need
for either a linkage between the language of the DRGs and the rational results
to be attained, or a theory explicating the manner in which the DRGs would
meld different components into a rationally acting whole. Put somewhat
differently, after developing a rich picture of organizational life, Fetter and the
designers of PPS in the end gave into the "seductiveness [that] economic
incentives hold for policy analysts. Economic logic appeals to common sense
and its prescriptions appear to be self-executing: change the financial rewards
and behavior changes."97
III. The Predicted Course of Hospitals' Organistic Rationality Under PPS
This lack of specification-this assumed essential rationality of "the hospi-
tal"-similarly generated (and still generates) numerous predictions of what
"hospitals" would do under PPS. In article after article, there is a discussion
of how "the hospital" had "acted" before PPS, what it has done during PPS,
and what it will do in the future.98 As summarized by the authors of a recent
literature review, "PPS was designed to create incentives for the balancing of
costs and benefits in treating patients. In the economic model of the hospital
as thus construed, the hospital is a black box, calculating and adjusting blood-
lessly to the new regime."99 The authors also noted that the massive amount
of literature "is more impressive for its size than for its value in understanding
how PPS works and the pattern of its effects."'0 These two points are con-
nected because both public policy and the predicted effects thereof were largely
based on the black-box models, which utilize an organistic view of hospital
rationality,'0' and because the massive literature then consists of efforts to
Hospitals?, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 867 (1987); Jack Hadley et al., Profits and Fiscal Pressure in the
Prospective Payment System: Their Impacts on Hospitals, 26 INQUIRY 354 (1989) (associating the impact
of PPS with the degree of fiscal pressure applied to individual and classes of hospitals and using hospitals'
anticipated total PPS profits or losses to construct an ordinal'proxy for the amount of force faced by different
institutions).
97. Weiner et al., supra note 37, at 464.
98. For an apt illustration, see Seidman & Frank, supra note 3, at 163-73.
99. Robert F. Coulam and Gary L. Gaumer, Medicares Prospective Payment System: A Critical
Appraisal, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., 1991 Ann. Supp., at 45, 64. My discussion concerning predicted
and actual responses is heavily indebted to this extremely helpful survey. For other helpful summaries, see
Joe Feinglass & James J. Holloway, The Initial Impact of the Medicare Prospective Payment System on
U.S. Health Care: A Review of the Literature, 48 MED. CARE 91 (1991); LEwIN/ICF, AN EXAMINATION
OF WINNERS AND LOSERS UNDER MEDICARE'S PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM: A SYNTHESIS OF THE
EVIDENCE, EXTRAMURAL REPORT E-91-06 (1991) (report prepared for the Prospective Payment Assessment
Commission); Lave, The ImpactofPPS, supra note 51. Hereinafter I will no longer put scare quotes around
"the hospital."
100. Coulam & Gaumer, supra note 99, at 46.
101. If any lesson is to be taken from this Article, it should be that I agree with Coulam and Gaumer
in their call for more qualitative work in this context and in health services research more generally. They
wrote:
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verify these predictions, with only a few attempts to falsify the underlying
model of organizational rationality.1
2
What rational choices were supposed to be made? 1°3 Stated generally,
the hospital, qua organism, was predicted to act like the "firm" modeled by
neoclassical economics. Responding to the financial incentives embedded within
PPS, it would rationally weigh margins of revenue against margins of cost for
a case or a highly differentiated group of cases, while accounting for its ability
to affect its revenue for a case or group of cases. These choices were expected
to be differentiated by DRG because marginal revenue in this context means
net change in reimbursement, which in turn is driven largely by the rate for
each DRG, and because the margin of cost is supposedly differentiated by
.DRG."
ITIhe management literature and the effects literature are not joined. In the end, we lack a
systematic, concrete picture of how the significant changes in operations under PPS were actually
administered. A more detailed appraisal of the connection between hospital operations and PPS
effects would give us a better understanding of how hospitals generate and control costs and
would give us a more reliable foundation for making policies to shape the hospital environment.
Id. at 64; see Kimberly & Zajac, supra note 89, at 287-88 (arguing that "to understand patterns of change
at the level of individual institutions, one needs to understand both the macro environmental changes and
their specific institutional implications and the micro behavioral changes that are occurring within these
institutions"); see id. at 270, 277, 279-82, 287-98; Ashmos & McDaniel, supra note 9, at 376, 393. In this
regard, the collaborative work betweenMichael A. Morrisey and organizational theorists has been fairly
unique, for it has bridged to some extent the gap between the neoclassical models of "the firm" and
organizational theory. See, e.g., Cook et al., supra note 89 (collaboration between Cook, Shortell, Conrad
and Morrisey); Morrisey et al., supra note 70 (collaboration between Morrisey, Conrad, Shortell and Cook);
Jeffrey A. Alexander et al., Effects of Competition, Regulation, and Corporatization on Hospital-Physician
Relationships, 27 J. HEALTH & HuM. BEHAV. 220 (1986) (collaboration between Shortell, Morrisey and
Conrad).
102. My view here is informed by the large literature in both the philosophy and sociology of the
natural and social sciences in which it is shown that science does not proceed by falsification. See, e.g.,
LU)WIK FLECK, GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF A SCIENTIFIC FACT (Thaddeus J. Trenn & Robert K.
Merton eds., and Fred Bradley & Thaddeus J. Trenn trans., 1979); CAN THEORIES BE REFUTED? ESSAYS
ON THE DUHEM-QUINE THESIS (Sandra G. Harding ed., 1976). To its great credit, the Prospective Payment
Assessment Commission (ProPAC) has questioned underlying premises, in part because it has been
developing the necessary qualitative work. I discuss this point more fully below. See infra notes 157, 235-
48 and accompanying text.
103. My summary of the predictions is gleaned from Seidman & Frank, supra note 3, at 163-73;
RUSSELL, supra note 1, at 24-46, 69-82; LEWIN/ICF, supra note 99, at 15-19; Coulam & Gaumer, supra
note 99; and the various ProPAC reports, such as PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, MEDICARE
PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 11-54
(1989). Many of the predictions pertained to all hospitals, rather than particular hospitals categorized by
type, size or location. Where relevant I discuss the more particular predictions. I have attempted to be quite
comprehensive, but given space limitations, it would be impossible for me to canvass the entire range of
predictions and effects.
104. The supposition that hospitals would respond to margins of cost is not dependent upon neoclas-
sicism's construct of the marginal cost of production. Instead, the margins could refer to differences
between average costs. For example, suppose that there are two possible tests to be used for a particular
DRG, with average costs of $100 and $150. The margin of cost can refer to this difference.
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A. The Site of Care
For purposes of analysis, the predicted choices can be organized around
three categories: (1) the site of care; (2) the process of care; and (3) the
financing of care. With regard to the site of care, there were three groups of
predictions, two of which stem from the fact that PPS rates apply only to stays
in short-term acute-care hospitals and not to care provided on an outpatient
basis, 05 in an exempt free-standing hospital or "distinct-part unit,"' 1 6 or in
post-acute care facilities such as nursing homes and home health care agen-
cies. ' 7 First, hospitals were expected to shift some entire episodes of care
to outpatient facilities. These shifts were supposed to occur selectively, with
hospital managers weighing the differences in costs and reimbursement between
the alternative sites. Hospitals were also expected to unbundle some services
from the inpatient stay and to provide them prior to admission.' l Second,
hospitals were expected to release patients earlier and to discharge them home
or to various types of nursing care facilities, home health care, or exempt
facilities and distinct-part units. These decisions too were expected to be
differentiated by DRG.0 9 It was also predicted that if necessary, hospitals
105. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395ww(a)(4) (West 1992).
106. Exempted are psychiatric, rehabilitation, children, long-term, and certain cancer hospitals, as well
as qualifying "distinct-part units" providing rehabilitation and psychiatric care within hospitals subject to
PPS. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395ww(d)(l)(B) (West 1992). To qualify as a "distinct-part unit," the unit must
be primarily engaged in providing rehabilitation or psychiatric care, and it must satisfy specified require-
ments such as separately identifiable admission and discharge records, physically separate beds, establish-
ment as a separate cost center, state licensure laws, appropriate utilization review standards, and servicing
by the hospital's fiscal intermediary. See I Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) W 4221.02-.03 (1990).
107. After an inpatient stay, Medicare beneficiaries are eligible for benefits provided in such post-acute
care facilities. There are separate reimbursement structures for each type. See generally I Medicare &
Medicaid Guide (CCH) 9 1300-1500 (1990).
108. With regard to preadmission unbundling there was less reason to expect differentiation among
types of DRGs. The incentive to unbundle stems from the fact that part A reimbursement is fixed for each
DRG. Therefore, a hospital could provide services prior to an admission and obtain part B reimbursement
for those services on top of the part A payment for the subsequent inpatient stay. This "double-dipping"
would pay so long as the part B reimbursement exceeded the outpatient cost of the service and so long as
this marginal revenue exceeded any increased cost imposed by the decision to unbundle. The literature
evidences no expectation that this calculus would be DRG-dependent.
109. The degree of integration between the hospital and the provider of post-acute or exempt care
complicates the incentives in this area. If the hospital has no relationship with that provider, then one would
not expect it to weigh the cost incurred and reimbursement levels available for the follow-up or exempt
care against the costs and reimbursement levels of continued inpatient services. If, however, there is some
degree of integration, the calculus would depend upon the type of integration, see Judith R. Lave et al., The
Decision to Seek an Exemption from PPS, 7 J. HEALTH ECON. 165, 166 (1988), as well as the benefits to
be gained from the use of creative accounting to allocate costs. See PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT AsSESSMENT
COMM'N, MEDICARE AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 99-102
(1991). Indeed, this area in particular indicates how difficult it is to infer a hospital's rational choice from
observations of its behavior. See also Pauly, supra note 14, at 258 ("The heart of the problem is that the
[hospital's utility] function is usually unobservable."); Joseph P. Newhouse & Daniel J. Byrne, Did
Medicare's Prospective Payment System Cause Length of Stay to Fall?, 7 J. HEALTH ECON. 413 (1988)
(discussing difficulties in defining observations). The problem is much more general, however, as indicated
by a striking explication by Grazier and McGuire. Suppose we observe a drop in length of stay. We must
ask:
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would create exempt facilities and units for this purpose. Third, the use of per-
case rates was expected to cause hospitals to identify their strong and weak
suits. It was predicted that hospitals would segregate specific product lines,
eliminate the losing ones, and specialize in those they could make win."'
B. The Process of Care
The hospital product, whether differentiated by DRG or not, can be con-
ceived as a mix of the inpatient stay, the number and types of services provided
during that stay, the different technologies used in the provision of those
services, and the capital and types of labor used in service delivery. Therefore,
with regard to the process of care, there were four linked groups of predictions,
organized around the four major ways that hospitals can alter their costs. It was
predicted that hospitals would alter (1) length of stay; (2) physicians' use of
diagnostic and treatment modalities during the stay; (3) the rate of technological
innovation and diffusion; and (4) the labor and nonlabor inputs provided
physicians and the mix of nonphysician and physician labor used in treatment.
Because each element of cost potentially affects the other elements, optimal
decision making would have to account for these interactions.
First, hospitals were supposed to reduce lengths of stay. These actions were
to occur selectively in that a hospital would attempt to hit or better the norm
embodied in the rate for a DRG, while weighing, first, the manner in which
a deviation would affect its own unique financial picture and, second, the
constraints imposed by such factors as malpractice, peer review, the ethical
commitment to quality of care, and competition among hospitals with regard
to reputation.
Second, hospitals were expected to reduce the number and qualitative types
of services provided during a stay-the so-called "intensity of care."''. A
Is utilization demand constrained (the patient desires less service than the hospital wishes to
supply and refuses recommended treatment), supply constrained (the patient desires more than
the hospital is willing to supply and the patient is discharged before he or she would choose),
or is there some accommodation of demand and supply interests?
Grazier & McGuire, supra note 90, at 8B. It would seem that there cannot be an a priori assumption, for
"[iln general, one would suspect the LOS to be a negotiated decision between the patient (and his or her
agent), and the hospital (and its agent)." Id. at 90. For a general, introductory discussion of the problem
of inferring individual, much less organizational, mental states from observed behavior, see LEN DOYAL
& ROGER HARRIS, EMPIRICISM, EXPLANATION AND RATIONALITY 52-72 (1986).
110. 1 am omitting discussion of decisions to close a facility or to withdraw beds from service because
such decisions do not directly involve product-line management.
Ill. The word "intensity" is sometimes used to refer just to the number of service units provided during
a stay-for example, "number of imaging tests." See, e.g., Coulam & Gaumer, supra note 99, at 56. The
difficulty with this usage is that a numerical count of service units cannot account for changes in the"
qualitative differences among the units-for example, a technological change in the "imaging unit" from
an x-ray to a CT-scan. See John L. Ashby, Jr. & Stuart H. Altman, The Trend in Hospital Output and Labor
Prnductivity, 1980-1989, 29 INQUIRY 80, 83-85 (1992). Accordingly, a better usage of "intensity" includes
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shorter stay, however, would possibly require either that the same number and
types of services be delivered over a shorter duration or that there be greater
intensity of services. Therefore, hospitals were expected to balance the costs
and benefits of different levels of service intensity against the costs and benefits
of different lengths of stay. Again these decisions were supposed to be made
selectively by. DRG.
Third, hospitals were expected to slow the rate of technological innovation
and diffusion." 2 To the extent that a technology is specific to a particular
DRG or to a relatively small group of DRGs, these actions too would occur
selectively by DRG. Many technologies, however, are used across multiple
DRGs. For these technologies, optimizing decisions would have to account for
the incentive structure across a far greater number of categories. In either case,
hospitals were expected to consider the relatively long-run effects of technologi-
cal innovation and diffusion on productivity, with due concern for the extent
to which innovations would be incorporated into future rates and the speed at
which such incorporation would occur.' " Because substitution among technol-
ogies can affect the length of stay, the number of services provided during the
stay, and the amount and type of labor used, these optimizing decisions would
also have to consider the impact of technological change on these other ele-
ments of cost.
Fourth and finally, hospitals were expected to control their wages and their
mixes of types of labor. It is generally believed that hospitals hire in local labor
markets, and PPS was designed so that rates depend in substantial part on the
prevailing level of hospital wages within locally defined geographic areas."
4
Given this design, PPS was supposed to force hospitals to compete for labor.
Each hospital would aim for an optimal mix of professional and nonprofessional
labor, as well as an optimal mix of the types of labor within professional
.categories, again with due consideration for the other elements of produc-
tion-the length of stay, the level of service intensity, and the use of alternative
technologies. However, compared with the other elements of cost, neither the
mix of capital and labor nor the mix of types of labor was expected to be as
responsive to the rates for particular DRGs. Because much of this mix is fixed
in the short-run, and because these decisions typically have implications for
many different types of care, it was expected that optimal decisions would be
two dimensions: (1) the number and types of intermediate products available to physicians and (2) the
manner in which physicians package those products in the treatment of particular patients. Except where
indicated, I use "intensity" in this latter sense.
112. This category is redundant with my usage of "service intensity." I include it as a separate category
because of the differing uses of the latter term.
113. See, e.g., Frank A. Sloan et al., Diffusion of Surgical Technology: An Exploratory Study, 5 J.
HEALTH EcON. 31, 37 (1986).
114. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395ww(d)(2)(C)(ii), (2)(H), (3)(E) (West 1992); see also id. § 1 395ww(d)(1 0)
(establishing the Medicare Geographic Classification Review Board to review the geographic classifications
of hospitals, categories that are used in part to determine the wage rate applied to particular hospitals).
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driven to a greater degree by the overall pool of money made available by
Medicare, with due consideration for different levels of reimbursement for
inpatient care, taken as a whole, and outpatient care, also taken as a whole. A
wrinkle was added to this calculus because PPS has only recently begun to
incorporate capital into prospective rates."5 Accordingly, it was expected that
hospitals would substitute capital for labor to take advantage of the fact that
capital expenditures would continue to "pass through" as cost-based reimburse-
ment. With regard to all of these process-of-care decisions, there were fears of
"undertreatment" due to the use of fixed prospective rates. Given the use of
per-case payments, it was hypothesized that such undertreatment would occur
selectively by product line.
C. The Financing of Care
Finally, with regard to the financing of care, our last category of predicted
choice, hospitals were expected to act as "reimbursement-maximizing" firms.
There were three major predictions. First, because the system is built on
payments for "cases," hospitals were expected to increase the number of
"cases" by generating a greater number of admissions overall and by admitting,
discharging and then readmitting some patients. They were also supposed to
admit and to transfer selectively, cream-skimming the lucrative cases and
turning away types of cases for which reimbursement was too low or the
relationship between expected costs and reimbursement too uncertain." 6 Sec-
ond, hospitals were expected to take advantage of the discretion in the classifi-
cation system by coding discharges into more lucrative categories where
possible-the phenomenon known as "DRG creep." Third, hospitals were
expected to take advantage of the facts that PPS is not an all-payer system and
that substantial discretion remains in the accounting and charging practices used
to allocate costs among different payers. Accordingly, hospitals were expected
to shift as many costs as possible to payers without the market power or the
will to defend themselves-most prominently the commercial insurance compa-
nies and to a lesser extent the Blues-or to charitable and other public sources
of revenue.
115. From the very beginning, Congress indicated its intent that capital costs be folded into the system.
See Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 601(a)(3), 97 Stat. 65, 149 (1983).
Wrangling between Congress and HCFA led to numerous rounds of delay and study, with the result that
transition toward a separate prospective payment system for capital-related costs began in fiscal year 1992.
See Health Care Fin. Admin., Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., Prospective Payment System for Inpatient
Hospital Capital-Related Costs, 56 Fed. Reg. 43,358 (1991).
116. As a rough cut, patients could be categorized into groups of the "mildly" or "severely" ill. See
Joseph P. Newhouse, T1vo Prospective Difficulties with Prospective Payment of Hospitals, or, It's Better
to Be a Resident Than a Patient With a Complex Problem, 2 J. HEALTH ECON. 269 (1983). More
differentiated means of dividing patients were also hypothesized. See Seidman & Frank, supra note 3, at
171-72.
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IV. The Actual Course of Hospital Behavior Under PPS
A. The Site of Care
Did the hospital organism make these rational choices?" 7 Let us start with
the site of care and follow the structure of the predictions detailed above. First,
as summarized by Coulam and Gaumer, "[v]irtually all studies show a sharp
shift in physician services away from the inpatient setting to the outpatient
setting, according to a variety of different measures.""' 8 Most of this change
was due to the increased use of outpatient surgery, with one-third to one-half
of the total attributable to lens procedures alone." 9 Some procedures like
cataract surgery are relatively simple, generally thought to be overused, and
good candidates for outpatient treatment. 20 They were thus targeted by the
peer review organizations (PROs) and the subject of technological innovation
making outpatient surgery a safe and effective possibility. 2' Additionally,
117. Given space limitations, I do not attempt to canvass the enormous complication and controversy
in the studies discussed immediately below. Instead, I discuss areas of general agreement and indicate some
relevant difficulties and controversies. Two generalized caveats are worth noting. First, all conclusions
depend upon the use of an adequate control for case mix, see, e.g., Coulam & Gaumer, supra note 99, at
57; JACK HADLEY & STEPHEN ZUCKERMAN, DETERMINANTS OF HOSPITAL COSTS: OUTPUT, INPUTS, AND
REGULATION IN THE 1980s 131-32 (1991), and the interpretation of case mix has been perhaps the most
troubled area of PPS. See Frankford, supra note 13. Second, most of the data used in the studies derive
from the very early years of PPS; those data may not be reflective of current behavior. Rates in the first
two years were set relatively high due to a confluence of mistakes, direct political choices, and indirect
political choices attributable to lax oversight of junior. staff by more experienced officials. See Bruce C.
Vladeck, Medicare's Prospective Payment System at Age Eight: Mature Success or Midlife Crisis?, 14 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 453, 456-57 (1991). Since those early years, however, the average rates have been
lowered but with a multitude of loosening adjustments. Depending upon one's characterization, these
adjustments have been accomplished to achieve equity among defined classes of hospitals or just to give
pork to particular ones. See SMITH, supra note 18, at 69-72, 86-111, 234-37, 243-48. Cynics holding to
the latter viewpoint invented a game "called 'guess the hospital,' in which professionals and technicians
would try to infer from the statutory specifications which hospital in which county had been selected for
governmental largess." Id. at 110.
118. Coulam & Gaumer, supra note 99, at 58.
119. See, e.g., Paul B. Ginsburg & Grace M. Carter, Medicare Case-Mix Index Increase, HEALTH CARE
FINANCING REV., Summer 1986, at 51, 61-63; Susan I. DesHarnais et al., Trends and Regional Variations
in Hospital Utilization and Quality During the First Two Years of the Prospective Payment System, 25
INQUIRY 374, 378 (1988); Viola Latta & Charles Helbing, Medicare: Short-stay Hospital Services by
Leading Diagnosis-related Groups, 1983 and 1985, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Winter 1988, at 79,
80; RUSSELL, supra note 1, at 27-29, 43-35; Stuart Guterman et al., The First 3 Years of Medicare
Prospective Payment: An Overview, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Spring 1988, at 67, 70. Overall there
has been a surge in outpatient capacity. See, e.g., RUSSELL, supra note 1, at 34.
120. For two attempts to identify surgical procedures that might fruitfully be shifted to Outpatient care,
see Ginsburg & Carter, supra note 119, at 51, 61-63; Noralou P. Roos & Jean L. Freeman, Potentialfir
Inpatient-Outpatient Substitution with Diagnosis-Related Groups, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Summer
1989, at 31.
121. See, e.g., RUSSELL, supra note I, at 27-29, 43-45.
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some tests that had typically been performed upon admission the night before
surgery were unbundled and provided on an outpatient basis prior to admis-
sion.121
Second, "[s]imple, unadjusted statistics for the early years of PPS show an
increase in discharges to Medicare skilled nursing facility (SNF) care and in
other measures of utilization." ' 3 More sophisticated studies looking for a
greater number of discharges to nursing care facilities across all DRGs failed
to find them.1" It is important to note, however, that studies concerned just
with hip fractures found relatively shorter lengths of stay and concomitant
increased use of nursing home care,' and one study found a greater number
122. See, e.g., id. at 32-33; Ashby & Altman, supra note 111, at 84 n.7. Preadmission services are
complements to an inpatient stay. Consequently, some of these services might have vanished with the
reduced number of admissions in the years after PPS was implemented. See Joyce A. Lanning et al.,
Endogenous Hospital Regulation and Its Effects on Hospital and Non-Hospital Expenditures, 3 J. REG.
ECON. 137, 138, 143-44 (1991). Nevertheless, federal outlays may have actually increased because the
remaining preadmission services were reimbursed under part B but still incorporated within the DRG rates.
See, e.g., Jerry Cromwell & Dena Puskin, Hospital Productivity and Intensity Trends: 1980-87, 26 INQUIRY
366, 370, 379 (1989). Accordingly, in 1990 Congress enacted a prophylactic rule "expanding the DRG
payment window" such that preadmission services would be deemed to be "operating costs of inpatient
hospital services." See Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4003, 104 Stat. 1388,
1388-38 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395ww(a)(4) (West 1992)).
123. Coulam & Gaumer, supra note 99, at 58; see, e.g., PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N,
MEDICARE AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 107-08 (1992).
124. See Michael J. Long et al., The Effect of PPS on Hospital Product and Productivity, 25 MED.
CARE 528, 532-34 (1987); RUSSELL, supra note 1, at 35 (table 3-4), 37-41; Cynthia Leibson et al.,
Disposition at Discharge and 60-Day Mortality Among Elderly People Following Shorter Hospital Stays:
A Population-Based Comparison, 30 GERONTOLOGIST 316, 319 (1990); Kenneth G. Manton & Korbin Liu,
Recent Changes in Service Use Patterns of Disabled Medicare Beneficiaries, HEALTH CARE FINANCING
REV., Spring 1990, at 51, 59, 65; Kenneth G. Manton et al., Changes in Health Service Use and Mortality
Among U.S. Elderly in 1980-1986, 2 J. AGING & HEALTH 131, 152 (1990). The researchers in Long et
al., supra, studied the fifty most important DRGs. The analysis by Russell, which utilized a corrected
version of the data in DesHarnais et al., supra note 119, as well as the analyses by Leibson and collaborators
and by Manton and collaborators, all pertained to discharges in the aggregate. It should be noted that there
are difficult questions of study design, particularly pertaining to controls for case mix and the availability
of post-acute care in a local geographic area. See, e.g., Genevieve Kenney & John Holahan, The Nursing
Home Market and Hospital Discharge Delays, 27 INQUIRY 73 (1990); Christine E. Bishop & Lisa C. Dubay,
Medicare Patient Access to Posthospital Skilled Nursing Facility Care, 28 INQUIRY 345 (1991) (showing
that the availability of post-discharge skilled nursing care cannot be measured by counting the number of
beds per population but must also specify proxies for the willingness of facilities to provide care to Medicare
beneficiaries).
125. See John F. Fitzgerald et al., Changing Patterns of Hip.Fracture Care Before and After Implemen-
tation of the Prospective Payment System, 258 JAMA 218 (1987) [hereinafter Fitzgerald, First Hip Fracture
Studyl; John F. Fitzgerald et al., The Care of Elderly Patients with Hip Fracture: Changes Since the
Implementation of the Prospective Payment System, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1392 (1988) thereinafter
Fitzgerald, Second Hip Fracture Studyl; Meghan B. Gerety et al., Impact of Prospective Payment and
Discharge Location on the Outcome of Hip Fracture, 4 J. GENERAL INTERNAL MED. 388 (1989); see also
Michael J. Long et al., Were Hospitals Selective in Their Product and Productivity Changes? The Top 50
DRGs After PPS, 24 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 615, 631 (1989); PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT
COMM'N, supra note 103, at 30-31; Peter Holt & Carol H. Winograd, Prospective Payment and the
Utilization of Physical Therapy Service in the Hospitalized Elderly, 80 AM. 1. PUB. HEALTH 1491, 1493
(1990); PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, MEDICARE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT AND THE
AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 84 (1990). The findings in Robert M.
Palmer et al., The Impact of the Prospective Payment System on the Treatment of Hip Fractures in the
Elderly, 149 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2237 (1989), are somewhat contradictory but probably explicable
due to the different types of hospitals studied. Indeed, many of these studies used very small sample sizes,
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of discharges to nursing homes for the five most important Medicare DRGs,
particularly for hip procedures, pneumonia, and stroke.'26 In contrast, over-
whelming evidence shows that across many DRGs, there occurred a sharp
increase in both discharge planning and the use of home health care servic-
es. 2 7 Finally, the number and use of exempt facilities and distinct-part units,
particularly the latter, increased greatly.'28 In particular, psychiatric discharges
evidenced more substantial responsiveness to financial incentives than did
surgical and medical discharges, as shown by much greater declines in length
of stay among psychiatric patients than among medical and surgical pa-
tients,'29 and by the fact that different reimbursement structures evoked
and the results "are therefore not generalizable. For a general discussion of the factors-such as age, sex,
race, severity of illness, and the availability and substitutability of alternative services-associated with the
use of post-acute care for hip fractures, see PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 123,
at 135-38.
126. See Michael A. Morrisey et al., Medicare Prospective Payment and Posthospial Transfers to
Subacute Care, 26 MED. CARE 685, 691-93, 696 (1988); see also Frank D. Gianfrancesco, Prospective
Payment System and Other Effects on Post-Hospital Services, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Winter 1990,
at 37 (similar findings for stroke and hip replacement but not for pneumonia). With many fewer controls,
the researchers in Long et al., supra note 125, at 630-31, found an increased number of discharges to nursing
facilities for stroke and hip procedures but no change or slight decreases for heart failure with shock,
pneumonia, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. The latter did not specify their confidence level.
Although Morrisey and collaborators found no statistically significant decrease in average length of
stay for the patients in these DRGs discharged to nursing facilities, this apparent anomaly-a greater number
of discharges to nursing care facilities without an associated decline in length of stay-is probably explained
by substitution between discharges to nursing homes and discharges to home or to home health care. Some
patients who would have been discharged to nursing care before PPS continued to be discharged to this
type of sub-acute care but earlier in their stay-for example, instead of being discharged on day 16, they
were discharged on day 13. Some patients who before PPS were discharged home or to home health care
after a longer stay-say day 18-were instead discharged earlier-say day 15-but to nursing facilities,
a different destination. Therefore, there was an overall increase in the number of discharges to nursing
facilities, but in terms of the average length of stay for those discharges, the two effects offset. See
Morrissey et al., supra, at 694, 697.
127. See Coulam & Gaumer, supra note 99, at 58-59. These studies could be improved by controlling
for the relationship, if any, between the discharging hospital and the second provider. See supra note 109
and accompanying text. None of the studies concerning discharge to a post-acute care provider utilized
such a control, in part because data were all drawn from inpatient records and because neither those records
nor others traced patients through the entire episodes of care. See, e.g., Coulam & Gaumer, supra note 99,
at 71-72.
128. See, e.g., James M. Hatten & David A. Gibson, Medicare Discharges by Facility Status Under
the Prospective Payment System, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Fall 1987, at 97; Allen W. Heinemann
et al., Prospective Payment fir Acute Care: Impact on Rehabilitation Hospitals, 69 ARCHIVES PHYSICIAN
MED. REHABILITATION 614 (1988); Marc P. Freiman, Reimbursement Decisions for Hospital Services: The
Case of Psychiatric Units under Medicare, 26 INQUIRY 399 (1989); Susan DesHarnais et al., How the
Medicare Prospective Payment System Affects Psychiatric Patients Treated in Short-Term General Hospitals,
27 INQUIRY 382 (1990); PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 109, at 100. There is
substantial evidence that a hospital sought an exemption for a psychiatric unit when its reimbursement under
TEFRA, the applicable scheme, was expected to be higher than its payments under PPS. See Lave et al.,
supra note 109; Judith R. Lave et al., The Early Effects of Medicare's Prospective Payment System on
Psychiatry, 25 INQUIRY 354, 355-56 (1988); Freiman, supra.
129. See Frank et al., supra note 90, at 17-19; Grazier & McGuire, supra note 90, at 90-93; Stephen
F Jencks et al., Evidence on Provider Response to Prospective Payment, 25 MED. CARE 37, 40-41 (Supp.
1987); Lave & Frank, Factors Affecting Medicaid Patients' Length of Stay in Psychiatric Hospitals, supra
note 90, at 60-64; Lave & Frank, Hospital Supply Response to Prospective Payment, supra note 90, at 16-17.
For methodological reasons, the most rigorous studies of the effects of PPS on psychiatric lengths of stay
utilize discharges from scatterbeds. Given that more complex cases are treated in psychiatric units, it is
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disparate changes in length of stay among the different beds and units to which
they pertain' 3 ° In none of these areas concerning the reorganization of the
medical division of labor between organizational types has there been a docu-
mented, discernible adverse effect on quality, at least from well-designed
studies controlling for severity of illness, patient demographics or both. 13'
possible that lengths of stay in those units declined less than those for medical (and perhaps surgical) DRGs.
See Frank et al., supra note 90, at 6-9, 18-19; see also Lave et al., supra note 128, at 356-57. Because
behavioral responses in psychiatric units are confounded by the self-selection involved in obtaining
exemptions, this question is difficult to answer. See id. However, evidence concerning the impact of
different Medicaid reimbursement schemes indicates that lengths of stay in units, like scatterbeds, are more
responsive to financial incentives than medical and surgical diagnoses (although one must be careful about
generalizing from effects on Medicaid patients and the facilities that treat them). See Richard G. Frank &
Judith R. Lave, The Effect of Benefit Design on the Length of Stay of Medicaid Psychiatric Patients, 21
J. Hum. RESOURCES 321, 328, 331-36 (1986); Lave & Frank, Factors Affecting Medicaid Patients' Length
of Stay in Psychiatric Hospitals, supra note 90, at 64. The fact that lengths of stay in units did not fall as
much as those for scatterbeds is probably a reflection of the actual or anticipated level of reimbursement
for the different sites. See also Grazier & McGuire, supra note 90, at 91 (finding that length of stay in an
exempted psychiatric unit exhibited very strong decline in reaction to increased supply-side cost sharing).
130. See Frank et al., supra note 90, at 6-16; Grazier & McGuire, supra note 90, at 90-93; Marc P.
Freiman et al., Provider Response to Medicare's PPS: Reductions in Length of Stay for Psychiatric Patients
Treated in Scatter Beds, 26 INQUIRY 192 (1989); Lave et al., supra note 128, at 356-60; Lave & Frank,
Hospital Supply Response to Prospective Payment, supra note 90, at 14-19; cf. Frank & Lave, supra note
129; Lave & Frank, Factors Affecting Medicaid Patients' Length of Stay in Psychiatric Hospitals, supra
note 90 (studying Medicaid discharges and correlating some of the variations among lengths of stay with
type of Medicaid coverage).
131. This conclusion cuts across both small- and large-sample studies, and studies measuring quality
in terms of process, outcome, or both. See, e.g., Gerety et al., supra note 125 (small-sample, outcome-based
(ambulatory status, mortality and continued institutionalization) study of hip fractures); Palmer et al., supra
note 125 (same); Michael B. Flynn et al., Impact of Diagnosis-Related Groups on the Quality of Postopera-
tive Care of Patients with Neck Dissections, 160 AM. J. SURGERY 356 (1990) (small-sample study correlating
decreases in length of stay after head and neck cancer surgery with variation in the extent of the operation
and postoperative complications); Katherine L. Kahn et al., Measuring Quality of Care with Explicit Process
Criteria Before and After Implementation of the DRG-Based Prospective Payment System, 264 JAMA 1969
(1990) (large-sample, process-based study of congestive heart failure, myocardial infarction, pneumonia,
cerebrovascular accident, and hip fracture); Katherine L. Kahn et al., Comparing Outcomes of Care Before
and After Implementation of the DRG-Based Prospective Payment System, 264 JAMA 1984 (1990) (large-
sample, outcome-based (mortality and continued institutionalization) study of congestive heart failure,
myocardial infarction, pneumonia, cerebrovascular accident, and hip fracture); Leibson et al., supra note
124 (small-sample, outcome-based (mortality) study of all discharges); Manton & Liu, supra note 124, at
59-65 (large-sample, outcome-based (mortality) study of all discharges); Manton et al., supra note 124
(large-sample, outcome-based (mortality) study of discharges to nursing homes); Wayne A. Ray et al.,
Mortality Following Hip Fracture Before and After Implementation of the Prospective Payment System, 150
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2109 (1990) (large-sample, outcome-based (mortality) study of hip fractures).
The contrary findings in Fitzgerald's small-area hip studies, showing decreased ambulation at discharge
coupled with a higher likelihood of longer post-discharge institutionalization, see Fitzgerald, First Hip
Fracture Study, supra note 125; Fitzgerald, Second Hip Fracture Study, supra note 125, are probably
attributable to failure to control adequately for changed severity of illness, see Ray, supra, at 2113,
differences in the quality of care provided in the post-acute-care facilities, see Gerety et al., supra note 125,
at 390-91, as well as the limited utility of the outcome measure used. See Fitzgerald, Second Hip Fracture
Study, supra note 125, at 1396. The findings of a greater number of deaths in nursing homes in both large-
sample, see Mark A. Sager et al., The Impact of Medicare's Prospective Payment System on Wisconsin
Nursing Homes, 257 JAMA 1762 (1987); Mark A. Sager et al., Changes in the Location of Death After
Paisage of Medicare's Prospective Payment System, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 433 (1989), and small-sample
studies, see Yvonne M. Lyles, Impact of Medicare Diagnosis-Related Groups (DRGs) on Nursing Homes
in the Portland, Oregon Metropolitan Area, 34 J. AM. GERIATRIC SOC'Y 573 (1986), seem explicable in
large part by idiosyncracies in the pre-PPS base year used and the failure to stratify patients by age, sex,
and cause of death. See Manton et al., supra note 124, at 132-36, 139-55. Other factors contributing to
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Moreover, the evidence from the most well-designed study indicates that both
the timing and destination of discharge were driven not by the net profit conse-
quences of particular DRGs but by the overall pressure PPS exerted to reduce
length of stay, interacting with careful medical consideration of the medical
benefits of alternative institutional structuring for an episode of care.'32
The third point regarding site of care, and the most important one for my
purposes, is the fact that there is little or no evidence that hospitals endeavored
to specialize as predicted. Coulam and Gaumer summarize:
Hospitals diversified, rather than specialized, after PPS began, in the
sense that the number of hospitals that performed procedures for Medi-
care patients increased. Apparently, competitive considerations, notably
fears about losing market share, have been at work. Meanwhile, for
select procedures studied by ProPAC, the volume at the average hospital
performing the procedures increased. But this increase was largely the
result of an overall increase in procedure volume, rather than a consoli-
dation of where the procedures were performed.'33
those findings include the relatively recent and growing belief that it is more humane to die at nonhospital
sites (for example, in hospices, nursing homes, and homes), see Leibson et al., supra note 124, at 321;
Manton et al., supra note 124, at 143-46; Alma McMillan et al., Trends and Patterns in Place of Death
for Medicare Enrollees, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Fall 1990, at 1, 6, and the substitution of home
health care and community-based services for nursing home care, which resulted in a more severely ill
nursing home population. See Lyles, supra, at 577. Moreover, the fact that a patient has been discharged
to a nursing home for terminal care does not necessarily indicate that the care provided in the hospital or
the discharge was inappropriate. See, e.g., Manton et al., supra note 124, at 133-34.
132. See generally Manton et al., supra note 124. These researchers studied, among other things, length
of stay, mortality rates, and mortality location when death occurred from cancer, stroke, heart disease, and
septicemia. These diseases were chosen because they range, in the order listed, from the relatively chronic
and incurable to the relatively acute and curable. See id. at 132, 143-46. The findings are important:
The trends for the four causes of death are very different. There is little shift in the location
of septicemia deaths, with a large shift in stroke deaths, that is, stroke deaths increasingly
occurring in institutions. Cancer deaths shift more to in-home locations, possibly reflecting the
effects of hospice programs-both Medicare-funded and private. Thus it appears that causes of
death implying more acute morbidity show less of a shift from hospital inpatient facilities than
do deaths from chronic conditions. Overall this suggests that hospitals are being medically
discriminating in selecting patients to be discharged earlier and to other forms of care ....
Id. at 145. It should be stressed again that this conclusion does not link length of stay and discharge
destination to the differentiated payment rates for particular DRGs. Rather, it indicates that physicians were
exercising medical judgment concerning the clinical appropriateness of the timing and type of discharge
destination, with a generalized attempt to reduce length of stay concomitant with PPS's generalized effort
to obtain such a reduction.
In the language omitted from the quotation above, the authors claimed that the financial incentives
provided by outlier payments have been important in preserving appropriate care. See id. at 145-46. The
structure of the outlier payment scheme has been very controversial. See, e.g., PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT
ASSESSMENT COMM'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CONGRESS 95-107 (1992) [hereinafter
PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, 1992 MARCH REPORT]; PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT
COMM'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES 18, 40-42, 77-83 (1989). Because the authors make no reference to that structure, the
claimed linkage between outlier payments and the timing and destination of discharge is unsupported.
133. Coulam & Gaumer, supra note 99, at 63; see, e.g., SYSTEMETRICS/MCGRAW-HILL, AN ANALYSIS
OF HOSPITAL SENSITIVITY TO DRG PRICE VARIATION IN THE MEDICARE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM,
TECHNICAL REPORT E-88-02, at 4-6, 27, 33-46 (1988) (report prepared for the Prospective Payment
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Indeed, this theme can carry us through the large literature concerning the
selection and organization of resources for use during a patient's stay. All
observers agree that average length of stay fell during the first two years of PPS
and then stabilized," although there is tremendous controversy concerning
the magnitude of the change, the extent to which it was caused by PPS or
would have happened anyway, whether it was a one-time or continuing affair,
and whether additional slack exists that could be removed by exerting greater
force on all or some types of hospitals.'35 There is one study finding de-
Assessment Commission); PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 103, at 19-23, 112-13.
Farley and Hogan have recently purported to find evidence of specialization. See Dean E. Farley &
Christopher Hogan, Case-Mix Specialization in the Marketfor Hospital Services, 25 HEALTH SERVICES RES.
757 (1990). Their analysis, however, is viciously circular. They define a hospital's degree of specialization
"as the extent to which its case-mix proportions deviate from what might be considered 'normal."' Id.
However, they used the DRG classification system both to create their "normal" case mix and the particular
hospital case mixes compared against this norm. Thus, their findings do not tell us about specialization.
Rather, they tell us about the manner in which cases are classified within the DRGs. Put somewhat
differently, they equate "efficiency" with changes in the structure of DRG-based case mix. It is circular,
however, to use a DRG-based classification system to analyze the impact of the DRG-based classification
system.
134. As Coulam and Gaumer summarize, the "introduction of PPS is associated with a brief, but
(compared with historical norms) large, reduction in [length of stay], after which average [length of stayl
stabilizes or increases slightly." Coulam & Gaumer, supra note 99, at 55. Statistics unadjusted for changing
patterns of admissions and case mix indicate that length of stay has been creeping upward again. See
PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 125, at 66.
135. See Coulam & Gaumer, supra note 99, at 47-48, 53-58. Compare, e.g., Feder et al., supra note
96 and Hadley et al., supra note 96 (finding one-time reduction in length of stay in response to the shock
of new or anticipated incentives) with Craig G. Coelen, Effects of Medicare's Prospective Payment System
on the Financial Performance of Hospitals 13-15 (June 1991) (unpublished working paper, Abt Associates)
(implying continuing effect over time). Conclusions here are very difficult, because the effects of PPS on
length of stay are difficult to separate from such factors as changed admission patterns, particularly due to
site-of-care substitutions to outpatieit and exempt facilities; other types of changes in case mix; hospitals'
coding behavior; and the activities of the PROs, other payers and other regulators. A warning issued by
Newhouse and Byrne is particularly striking because of its message that empirical conclusions must
cautiously consider these factors. Their article raised the possibility that acute-care facilities shifted many
of their long-stay patients to exempt facilities. If this hypothesis were correct, the decline in average length
of stay, discussed in often-cited studies, would merely represent phantom savings-a shell game in which
costs were shifted from PPS to non-PPS reimbursement. See Newhouse & Byrne, supra note 109. To my
knowledge, the hypothesis that acute-care facilities shifted long-stay cases to exempt rehabilitation hospitals
and units and to long-term-care hospitals has not been systematically studied, although there has clearly
been an increase in the use of such exempt facilities, see supra note 128 and accompanying text, and even
though some evidence indicates that patients in rehabilitation and long-term-care facilities are more severely
ill than before PPS. See Heinemann et al., supra note 128; Norman V. Carroll & W. Gary Erwin, Effect
of the Prospective-Pricing System on Drug Use in Pennsylvania Long-Term-Care Facilities, 47 AM. J. HosP.
PHARMACY 2251 (1990) [hereinafter Carroll & Erwin, Long-Term-Care Facilities in Pennsylvania]. But
see Norman V. Carroll & W. Gary Erwin, Patient Shifting as a Response to Medicare Prospective Payment,
25 MED. CARE 1161 (1987) [hereinafter Carroll & Erwin, Long-Term-Care Facilities in Georgia]. In
contrast, the hypothesis of such case shifting has been tested for psychiatric discharges, which have
comprised roughly 60% of the combined discharges from exempt hospitals and units (excluding children's
hospitals), see PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, 1992 MARCH REPORT, supra note 132, at
24 (table 1-9), and just over 50% of the Medicare expenditures for those combined discharges. See John
C. Langenbrunner et al., Developing Payment Refinements and Reforms Under Medicare for Excluded
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creased lengths of stay in the medical intensive-care units of three California
community hospitals,'36 but a study utilizing a wider data base found no
statistically significant change in the use of intensive care.137 In sum, "hospi-
tals were not selective in their reductions: [length-of-stay] reductions appear
to have been made across the board, rather than selectively-that is, the reduc-
tions are not concentrated in specific DRGs or specific age, race, or sex
categories."' 38
Similarly, there may have been productivity gains, but the magnitude of
those gains and the reasons for their occurrence are controversial. For one thing,
there is the difficulty of accounting for site-of-care substitution. Not only is it
difficult to determine the amount of this substitution, butjudgments concerning
productivity gains or losses therefrom depend upon extremely complex compari-
sons between, on the one hand, the costs and quality of the inpatient care
diverted, and, on the other, the costs and quality of the care provided in the
locations to which the inpatient care has been shifted.' With regard to
productivity more generally, there are complex problems of measurement.
Alone, simple statistics regarding the number and types of services are mean-
ingless." ° Consequently, there must be recourse to proxies tracking the use
of select services and the rate of technological innovation and diffusion, 4'
Hospitals, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., spring 1989, at 91, 94 (table 3). Although the number of
discharges from scatterbeds and nonexempt units to exempt psychiatric and rehabilitation hospitals and units
did increase, see DesHarnais et al., supra note 128, at 387 (table 3), the available evidence indicates that
the number of long-stay patients in exempt facilities did not. See Lave et al., supra note 128, at 360-61.
136. See S. Allison Mayer-Oakes et al., The Early Effect of Medicare's Prospective Payment System
on the Use of Medical Intensive Care Services in Three Community Hospitals, 260 JAMA 3146, 3148-49
(1988). Happily, there was no finding of increased mortality. It is obviously dangerous to generalize from
a study of this size.
137. See Frank A. Sloan et al., Medicare Prospective Payment and the Use of Medical Technologies
in Hospitals, 26 MED. CARE 837, 842-44 (1988).
138. Coulam & Gaumer, supra note 99, at 56.
139. See, e.g., PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, TECHNICAL APPENDIXES TO THE REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 17-21
(1986).
140. See, e.g., Ashby & Altman, supra note 11l, at 81.
141. See, e.g., PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 139, at 11-13 (discussing
the need to study factors other than just the use of new services and technologies); Daniel Dore, The Effect
of the Medicare Prospective Payment System on the Utilization of Physical Therapy, 67 PHYSICAL THERAPY
964 (1987) (studying the inpatient use of physical therapy); Fitzgerald et al., Second Hip Fracture Study,
supra note 125, at 1393-94 (studying the type of hip surgery performed and the inpatient use of physical
therapy); Peter D. Jacobson & John Rosenquist, The Introduction of Low-Osmolar Contrast Agents in
Radiology: Medical, Economic, Legal, and Public Policy Issues, 260 JAMA 1586 (1988) (studying the
introduction of low-osmolar contrast media for certain radiologic procedures); Long et al., supra note 124,
at 534-35 (studying the average length of stay as a proxy for routine care, and the average number of chest
x-rays, drugs and other laboratory and diagnostic tests, as a proxy for the provision of ancillaries); Long
et al., supra note 125, at 625-26 (same); Mayer-Oakes et al., supra note 136 (studying the use of medical
intensive-care units); Sloan et al., supra note 137 (studying the use of defined intensive-care facilities,
various non-coded "little ticket" nonsurgical procedures, and 23 selected nonsurgical and therapeutic
procedures which spanned various clinical fields and were at different Stages of a "diffusion process"); Earl
P. Steinberg et al., Determinants of Acquisition of MR Imaging Units in ant Era of Prospective Payment,
1,68 RADIOLOGY 265 (1988) (studying the introduction of magnetic resonance imagers); Palmer et al., supra
note 125, at 2239; Holt & Winograd, supra note 125 (studying the use of inpatient physical therapy).
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or to various composites comprised of the costs of nonlabor inputs, the rates
'of employment, the levels of wages and benefits, and the numbers and qualita-
tive types of services per admission ("intensity"), which together comprise the
largest component of the overall "input mix" or "operating costs." 142
These measures indicate that in the first two years of PPS, there was a sharp
decline in non-medical employment and a decrease in the level of wage and
benefit inflation (even as compared with the declining pace of inflation in the
general economy). 43 There was also, however, an increasing level of skill
mix, attributable (in declining order of significance) to the substitution of RNs
for LPNs, and the substitution of more highly trained occupational therapists
and physical therapists for less highly trained personnel.'4 Because service
Sometimes these services are conceptualized as inputs and sometimes as intermediate products.
142. Stated generally, the studies of productivity differ along two dimensions. First, some attempt to
measure the costs of an aggregate product, while others try to separate costs into multiple products. Second,
studies of multiple products differ in that some rely upon the averaging used in the cost-accounting practices,
while others try to derive estimations of marginal cost. See generally HADLEY & ZUCKERMAN, supra note
117, at 41-108 (discussing the different methods and the problems of measurement raised by each). ProPAC,
for example, has not used constructs of marginal cost and has developed an aggregate productivity measure,
defined as the ratio of case-mix-adjusted admissions against full-time-equivalent employees, holding the
skill mix of labor constant. ProPAC has also'developed measures of the two components of aggregate
producti'ity: (1) a proxy for the efficiency by which hospital employees produce intermediate
goods-"intermediate productivity"-which consists of comparisons over time of the ratio of skill-mix-
adjusted labor to hospital charges, adjusted by an inflation index to remove the effect of hospitals'
discretionary pricing decisions; and (2) a case-mix-adjusted measure of the number and types of the
intermediate goods used by physicians across all admissions-"intensity of services." See, e.g., Ashby &
Altman, supra note 111, at 80-87. See generally PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, TECHNICAL
APPENDIXES TO THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVICES 39-40 (1987). For somewhat different proxies, see Jerry Cromwell & Gregory C. Pope,
Trends in Hospital Labor and Total Factor Productivity, 1981-86, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Summer
1989, at 39, 39-43.
143. See Cromwell & Pope, supra note 142, at 46-47; Cromwell & Puskin, supra note 122, at 372-74,
378-79; PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 109, at 65-66; PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT
ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 123, at 56-57; cf, e.g., Thorpe & Phelps, supra note 84, at 162-63
(attributing cost savings obtained by New York rate-setting officials to reductions in non-medical staff, with
no substitution of LPNs for RNs). The decline in employment, however, did not match the contemporaneous
decline in service intensity, with the result that relatively more workers were producing fewer services, and
intermediate productivity declined. See, e.g., Ashby & Altman, supra note 11l, at 86.
144. See, e.g., Cromwell & Pope, supra note 142, at 46-47; HADLEY & ZUCKERMAN, supra note 117,
at 11-12, 14-15, 150-57; PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 109, at 66; PROSPECTIVE
PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 123, at 56-57. Underneath these averages, rural and urban
hospitals acted in different directions. For reasons that are not clear, urban hospitals substituted RNs for
LPNs, and rural hospitals substituted in the opposite direction. See, e.g., HADLEY & ZUCKERMAN, supra
note 117, at 155-57, 160-61. Case studies have indicated that nursing skill mix is largely attributable to
idiosyncratic local supply characteristics. In the rural areas studied, the availability of nursing services was
relatively stable, with minor differences across different localities. By contrast, the urban hospitals studied
were somewhat at the mercy of such factors as the number of nursing schools, whether there had been a
recent hospital closure, and the like. See LEWIN-ICF, AN EVALUATION OF WINNERS AND LOSERS UNDER
MEDICARE'S PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM, EXTRAMURAL REPORT E-92-02, at E-5, 4-9 to 4-10, 5-32
to 5-34 (1992) (report prepared for the Prospective Payment Assessment Commission). More generally,
Lewin-ICF found that "the county or MSA-level data sets that are available nationally do not adequately
characterize the micro-environments faced by the hospitals' managers and physicians." Id. at 4-12. This
finding is very disturbing, given that crucial payment features-for example, the assignments to rural and
urban categories and the derivation and application of the local wage adjustments--depend upon those data
sets, as do numerous assessments of PPS.
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intensity also decreased somewhat in this period, the combined reduction in
non-medical employment and decreased intensity-albeit spread over a much
smaller admissions base-added up to a net gain in aggregate productivity.'45
In later years, however, due to generous payments in the first two years of PPS,
the rate of wage and benefit inflation started to rise again, as did, moreover,
the levels of employment and the intensity of services. Indeed, the latter trend
swamped earlier productivity gains, although there was some stabilization in
the period from 1988 to 1991."1 With regard to the rate of technological
innovation and diffusion, there seems to have been no generalized effect, 4
7
but there is at least one very well-studied instance in which the development
and use of a new technology has been impeded by the rate structure. 148 How-
ever, because the influx of technology stems in part from regulators' decisions
regarding the means of incorporating new technologies into the DRG rates (as
well as expectations thereof), the significance of PPS's impact is open to
dispute, with alternative assessments whether there has been benefit or
harm. 149 Finally, there has been an immense surge in capital expenditures,
145. See, e.g., PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 109, at 66-69; PROSPECTIVE
PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 123, at 57-59; Ashby & Altman, supra note 11, at 81-82,
85-88.
146. PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 109, at 66-69; PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT
ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 123, at 57-59; Ashby & Altman, supra note 11l, at 81-82, 85-88;
PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CONGRESS 68-69
(1993). Measuring long-run marginal cost from 1980 through 1986, Hadley & Zuckerman report a similar
pattern. See HADLEY & ZUCKERMAN, supra note 117, at 116. Data from 1991 are the last discussed in
ProPAC's reports.
147. See, e.g., PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, MEDICARE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ANI)
THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: REPORT TO CONGRESS 20-23 (1988): PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT
ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 103, at 16-17; PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note
125, at 70-72; PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 109, at 91-92. But see Sloan et
al., supra note 137, at 848-49. However, the reliance on statistical averages across large samples masks
differential effects. For example, one study based on a relatively small but well-designed sample correlates
the adoption of new technologies with larger hospital size, higher occupancy rates, preexisting ownership
of high-tech equipment, and the ability to predict the future course of PPS rates. See Steinberg et al., supra
note 141; see also CODMAN RESEARCH GROUP, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DECLINING USE OF RURAL
HOSPITALS AND ACCESS TO INPATIENT SERVICES FOR MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES IN RURAL AREAS,
TECHNICAL REPORT #E-90-01, at 5, 18-20 (1990) (report prepared for the Prospective Payment Assessment
Commission). These findings are consistent with the growing evidence that under PPS, many of the quality-
rich hospitals have gotten richer, and the poor poorer, particularly correlating with success (and failure) to
adapt to local circumstances and to the rate structures. See, e.g., Jerry Cromwell & Russel Burge, The
Impact of Medicare Prospective Payment on Hospital Profits 1-2, 4-7 (August 1991) (draft report, Health
Economics Research, Inc.); PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, WINNERS AND LOSERS UNDER
PPS, INTRAMURAL REPORT 1-92-01 (1992). These last two studies are particularly fruitful because they
specify proxies for hospitals' expectations regarding, and organizational adaptability to, the rates, rather than
just correlating the rates to observed behavior and then attempting to infer generalized expectations. See.
e.g., HADLEY & ZUCKERMAN, supra note 117, at 31, 79-80, 135-38; Coelen, supra note 135, at 5-6.
148. See, e.g., Nancy M. Kane & Paul D. Manoukian, The Effect of the Medicare Prospective Payment
System on the Adoption of New Technologies: The Case of Cochlear Implants, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1378
(1989). For recent discussions of the benefits of cochlear implants, see Thomas Balkany, A Brief Perspective
on Cochlear Implants, 328 NEW ENG. J. MED. 281 (1993); Noel L. Cohen et al., A Prospective, Randomized
Study of Cochlear Implants, 328 NEW ENG. J. MED. 233 (1993).
149. See generally PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 139, at 82-86; PROSPEC-
TIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 142, at 127-36.
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but mainly in the construction of hospital outpatient departments and stand-
alone ambulatory and exempt-care facilities, the productivity of which is again
disputable. 5 °
Indeed, the significance of all these trends is unclear because no good
benchmarks are available from comparisons with other industries. Without such
benchmarks it is difficult to judge, first, the productivity of professional labor,
the most important component of hospital operating costs, second, the signifi-
cance of patterns of technological innovation and diffusion, all of which are
necessarily linked to decisions made in setting the payment rates, and third and
crucially, the productivity of the practice patterns by which physicians link
goods, services, and technology.'' In sum, while many believe that PPS,
taken as a whole, has increased the productivity of the average inpatient stay,
there is little agreement on the questions of how, why, and where. Particularly
in the absence of good outcome measures,'52 at best one can conclude that
the production of intermediate goods is somewhat more efficient 53 but that
intensity of services has continued its historical pattern of increase, broken only
by a brief respite during the first two years of PPS. Put differently, during
an inpatient stay that is now on average shorter than before PPS, "the average
hospital worker is, in fact, turning out more services than ever." '  Given
that intermediate goods are more efficiently produced while case-mix-adjusted
service intensity has been moving upward again, continuing cost inflation in
150. See generally PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, 1992 MARCH REPORT, supra note
132, at 31, 56-63; PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, OUTPATIENT PAYMENT POLICY REFORM:
INTERIM CONGRESSIONAL REPORT (1992). Another problem of evaluation is the fact that until recently,
PPS reimbursed capital as a pass-through. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. There is general
consensus that hospitals took advantage of this feature of the reimbursement environment by substituting
capital expenditures for some noncapital ones and by altering their accounting techniques so as to classify
more costs as capital. See, e.g., PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 21, at 9;
HADLEY & ZUCKERMAN, supra note 117, at 150.
151. See, e.g., Frankford, supra note 13; see also HADLEY & ZUCKERMAN, supra note 117, at 70-71,
76-81, 97-99, 104-05, 129-30; Thorpe & Phelps, supra note 84, at 162-63. There are obviously fruitful
comparisons by which to judge the efficiency by which many intermediate goods, such as laundry, are
produced. At this point it should be absolutely clear that judgments concerning productivity are evaluative
not just technical.
152. See, e.g., PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 21, at 27-30; HADLEY &
ZUCKERMAN, supra note 117, at 131-32; Coulam & Gaumer, supra note 99, at 65-69; Ashby & Altman,
supra note 11l, at 84; LEWIN-ICF, supra note 144, at 5-40. A study of the issues involved in the introduc-
tion of low-osmolar contrast media, a very expensive new imaging contrast technology, carefully frames
the evaluative issues, although it merely assumes away the difficult questions about social choice in its
unquestioning reliance on utilitarian ethics. See Jacobson & Rosenquist, supra note 141, at 1590.
. 153. See, e.g., Cromwell & Pope, supra note 142, at 48-50; Cromwell & Puskin, supra note 122, at
372-79; Ashby & Altman, supra note 11l, at 86-87. Even this conclusion, however, is dubious, for the
latest evidence indicates a sharp decline. See PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note
146, at 69.
154. See, e.g., Cromwell & Puskin, supra note 122, at 372, 375; Ashby & Altman, supra note I11.
There are, of course, disparate productivity gains and losses among different hospitals underneath these
averages. See, e.g., Cromwell & Puskin, supra note 122, at 376-77; Coelen, supra note 135.
155. Ashby & Altman, supra note II , at 87.
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hospitals is attributable to the practice patterns of physicians, not the efficiency
of the laundry service."56
Therefore, it appears that "hospitals" are not generally "controlling" their
physicians' packaging habits: "[W]hile hospitals have become more efficient
in producing the services their medical staffs elect to provide, in terms of
overall productivity of inpatient care, the system appears to continue becoming
less cost effective and therefore more expensive."' 157 Moreover, in the few
studies attempting to measure, not the productivity of PPS as a whole, but the
productivity of particular DRGs, there are explicit findings that hospitals have
not identified particular DRG-based product lines amenable to more efficient
production." 8 Except for the few DRGs discussed above, there is no evidence
156. See, e.g., id. at 87-88.
157. Ashby & Altman, supra note 111, at 87-88. For that reason, ProPAC has continually expressed
reservations regarding an incentive structure that places force on the hospital organism. See, e.g., PROSPEC-
TIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SECRETARY, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 57-58 (1988); PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT
COMM'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
25-28 (1990). In the words of Ashby and Altman, "t]he most promising avenue for major gains appears
to be quality and utilization review efforts or organizational changes designed to help clinicians practice
medicine in such a way that fewer tests, procedures, and perhaps days of care are required to produce
optimal patient care outcomes." Ashby & Altman, supra note 11, at 90 (footnote omitted); see, e.g., Stuart
Altman et al., The Need for a National Focus on Health Care Productivity, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1990,
at 107; PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 123, at 83-94. Interestingly, economists
who utilize marginal cost constructs have been more sanguine. See, e.g., HADLEY & ZUCKERMAN, supra
note 117, at 165. In short, ProPAC has made the "organizational turn," while many economists have not.
158. See Long et al., supra note 125. Unfortunately, there was no attempt in this study to isolate the
effects of PPS from other factors at work, see, e.g., Sloan et al., supra note 137, at 838-39 (utilizing trends
in states not subject to PPS-the "waiver states"-as a control); HADLEY & ZUCKERMAN, supra note 117,
at 21, 25, 67-68, 72-76 (controlling for non-PPS types of regulation and sources of competition), and the
measurement of service units was inadequate (for example, an x-ray and a CT-scan both counted as one
imaging unit). See Ashby & Altman, supra note 11l, at 84-85.
It is sometimes asserted that "many hospital managers have responded to the incentives created by PPS
by encouraging physicians to discharge patients according to the mean length of stay for their DRG."
KAREN DAVIS ET AL., HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT 59-60 (1990). There are clearly instances of
such behavior. For example, in their case studies of Hospital Corporation of America's response to PPS,
Campbell and Kane reported such activity in one-but only one-of the four hospitals studied. See Paul
Campbell & Nancy M. Kane, Physician-Management Relations at HCA: A Case Study, 15 J. HEALTH POL.,
POL'Y & L. 591 (1990). Similarly, I have been told of practices in another leading proprietary chain in
which individual stays exceeding the expected mean are consistently identified and swept within the
hospitals' utilization review procedures. (Personal communication from Linda P. Peeno, M.D., 1993).
Finally, in their study of the use of medical intensive-care units, Mayer-Oakes and collaborators reported
similar activities, see Mayer-Oakes, supra note 136, at 3148, although it is hard to generalize from
discharges from intensive-care units because the latter are an especially crucial source of high costs.
However, to the extent that there is the necessary systematic qualitative evidence to evaluate the breadth
of these occurrences, it points in a contrary direction. See infra notes 221-48 and accompanying text. In
any event, a knee-jerk use of mean length of stay to identify individual instances of inefficient production
and ineffective practice is not exactly consistent with Fetter's evaluative framework for efficiency. For one
thing, Fetter and his collaborators were quite cautious about their use of length of stay as a proxy for
efficient costs. In this regard, it is important to note, as I have discussed more fully elsewhere, that HCFA
is no longer using length of stay to set the relative resource use among the DRGs, and thus the extent to
which the rates embody clinical judgment is becoming increasingly attenuated. See Frankford, supra note
13. For another thing, the identification of just the cases exceeding the expected mean is not the same
process as using the DRGs in an overall budget and management process. See also infra notes 175-83, 250
and accompanying text.
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of productivity gains from a discrete focus on the productivity of particular
DRGs.
C. The Financing of Care
Likewise, the observed evidence does not support the proposition that
hospitals have selectively tailored their admission and transfer patterns to fit
the revenue opportunities offered for discrete DRGs. Virtually all evidence
supports the conclusion that admission rates fell during the first three years of
PPS, stabilizing or possibly increasing slightly in year four.159 The dominant
factors in this decline were the reduced admissions for high volume medical
conditions for which there is relatively weak consensus on the need for hospi-
talization-pneumonia, congestive heart failure, and transient ischemic at-
tack '6 -and the shift of some services to outpatient care, particularly lens
procedures.'.6 In these regards, there clearly was particular attention to specif-
ic DRGs, although much of this attention was forced by the PROs, not by the
pressures of financial incentives. 6 However, there is no other proven linkage
between changed admission patterns and the incentives posed by the reimburse-
ment for particular DRGs, and no evidence shows that hospital administrators
could exert effective, DRG-selective influence on physicians' admission or
transfer practices.'63 Instead, as with practice patterns pertaining to length of
159. See Coulam & Gaumer, supra note 99, at 54.
160. See CODMAN RESEARCH GROUP, supra note 147, at 5, 14-16, 22.
161. See, e.g., David B. Smith & Robert Pickard, Evaluation of the Impact of Medicare and Medicaid
Prospective Payment on Utilization of Philadelphia Area Hospitals, 21 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 529 (1986);
Charles R. Fisher, Trends in Medicare Enrollee Use of Physician and Supplier Services, 1983-86, HEALTH
CARE FINANCING REV., Fall 1988, at 1, 4-5; Jack Hadley & Katherine Swartz, The Impacts on Hospital
Costs Between 1980 and 1984 of Hospital Rate Regulation, Competition, and Changes in Health Insurance
Coverage, 26 INQUIRY 35, 44 (1989); CODMAN RESEARCH GROUP, supra note 147, at 16; Coulam &
Gaumer, supra note 99, at 54-55.
162. As Bruce Vladeck reports,
most of the new PROs established by simple administrative fiat that Medicare would no longer
pay for cataract operations on an inpatient basis, except under extraordinary circumstances. Seven
other routine elective surgical procedures were treated in the same manner. Since cataract surgery
represented the single most common reason for Medicare admissions prior to PPS, tens of
thousands of inpatient cases disappeared almost overnight.
Vladeck, supra note 117, at 459-60 (footnote omitted). Similarly, the PROS targeted select high-volume
medical admissions "for which there was a relatively weak consensus on the need for hospitalization." Viola
B. Latta & Roger E. Keene, Use and Cost of Short-Stay Hospital Inpatient Services Under Medicare, 1988,
HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Fall 1990, at 91, 91. Some of the decline in those admissions was due
to this monitoring, not financial incentives. See, e.g., id.
'163. There were some marked changes in the number of discharges in particular DRGs, such as the
563% increase in the number of discharges for DRG 124 (circulatory disorders, excluding acute myocardial
infarction, with cardiac catheterization and complex diagnosis). See Latta & Helbing, supra note 119, at
79-80, 82, 86. However, such changes are probably artifacts of the coding system rather than attempts to
manipulate the number of admissions. See id. In any event, the significance of such unadjusted statistics
is difficult to interpret. There is also evidence of delayed admissions for some of the very important
diseases, particularly acute myocardial infarction and pneumonia, and the evidence indicates that this delay
has increased the average severity of those admissions. See, e.g., Emmett B. Keeler, Changes in Sickness
at Admission Following the Introduction of the Prospective Payment System, 264 JAMA 1962, 1965-68
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stay and service intensity, the evidence supports the conclusion that hospital
administrators could attain at most some generalized effect.'" Thus, no credi-
ble evidence indicates that admissions or readmissions were increased solely
for the sake of churning volume. 65. Likewise little evidence supports the
hypothesis that hospitals have cream-skimmed select, profitable DRGs while
avoiding select, nonprofitable ones. 166 Although there is of course substantial
(1990); William H. Rogers, Quality of Care Before and After Implementation of the DRG-Based Prospective
Payment System, 264 JAMA 1989, 1993 (1990). However, because the PROs targeted these diseases, one
cannot attribute such changed admission patterns to the weighing of financial incentives in the manner
presupposed by the theory of the organistic firm. See also Latta & Helbing, supra note 119, at 79-80, 82;
Latta & Keene, supra note 162, at 91.
164. See, e.g., Weiner et al., supra note 37, at 476.
165. With regard to readmissions, Coulam and Gaumer summarize a large literature as follows: "The
relative consistency of research results on readmissions argues against any inference that hospitals systemati-
cally changed their patterns of care in ways that increased readmissions." Coulam & Gaumer, supra note
99, at 67. Recall that the authors in Manton et al., supra note 124, concluded that the changed organization-
al division of the labor at the discharge side of the stay reflected consideration of medical appropriateness.
See supra note 132 and accompanying text. They reach a similar conclusion at the admission side: "The
evidence suggests that no increase in hospital mortality or of admissions from another type of Medicare
service use to hospitals was engendered by PPS. ... Thus there is evidence that hospitals made medical
distinctions both in discharge and admissions decisions and that the number of deaths in Medicare facilities
of all types (notjust hospitals) decreased." Id. at 153. As with the discharge side, I stress that this evidence
pertaining to the admission side does not support the thesis that changed admission patterns were driven
by the differentiated revenue opportunities of the DRG-based payment rates. Rather, it indicates that,
consonant with the overall incentive of PPS to reduce inpatient length of stay, physicians generally tried
to obtain that reduction while considering the medical appropriateness of alternative sites of care instead
of, or prior to, an inpatient stay.
Naomi S. Soderstrom purportedly found evidence that, to increase their revenues, hospitals under
financial pressure tried inappropriately to admit patients in lower-weight DRGs. This finding relied upon
the supposition that such profit-generating admissions were more likely to occur in the less resource-
intensive, lower-weight DRGs. Crucially, the inference that such behavior occurred was based on a finding
of a greater PRO denial rate for those admissions, as compared with the higher-weighted DRGs and those
with complications or comorbidities. See Naomi S. Soderstrom, Are Reporting Errors Under PPS Random
or Systematic?, 27 INQUIRY 234 (1990). It is unclear, however, that inappropriate admissions in low-weight
DRGs provide profit opportunities. Moreover, there are numerous reasons why PROS deny admissions,
including, most importantly, differences in professional judgment. The inference is unjustifiable.
166. See, e.g., Frank A. Sloan et al., Case Shifting and the Medicare Prospective Payment System, 78
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 553 (1988); Lave et al., supra note 128, at 360-61. These studies used data limited
to 1984 and 1985, and thgre is some evidence that the number of transfers between acute-care facilities
increased substantially, beginning in 1986. See PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note
125, at 78; Coulam & Gaumer, supra note 99, at 67. It should be noted, however, that a decision to transfer
is often unprofitable for both the transferring and recipient hospitals, due to the manner in which PPS
reimburses transfers. See, e.g., PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, 1992 MARCH REPORT, supra
note 132, at 47-48. Given these incentives, if hospitals were transferring patients to maximize reimburse-
ment, then ceteris paribs the increase in the number of transfers in 1986 is inexplicable, particularly since
the methodology for reimbursing transfers has remained the same over the lifetime of PPS. See I Medicare
& Medicaid Guide (CCH) 1 4214 (1990).
Two studies deserve extended discussion. First, by studying discharges and transfers of veterans
eligible for care in both Medicare and VA hospitals, Hurley and colleagues found evidence of case shifting
from the former to the latter. Their study tested the hypothesis that Medicare hospitals were taking
advantage of this dual eligibility by shifting patients in "problem"--i.e., potentially unprofitable-DRGs
to VA facilities. They hypothesized that this case shifting was occurring by transferring these problem
patients or by discouraging their admission. The evidence did not show that Medicare hospitals had isolated
these DRGs for transfer. Nonetheless, compared with a random sample of other DRGs, the problem DRGs
evidenced a distinctive pattern of increased admissions at the VA hospitals. Based on this evidence, the
authors concluded that Medicare hospitals were indeed selectively discouraging admissions. See Jeremiah
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evidence of efforts to increase the overall profitability of the patient census,
here too the effort more resembles the use of a blunt instrument, applicable
across broad categories of "product-lines"-for example, "orthopedics"--rather
than fine cutting with a scalpel by DRG.16 7
This evidence stands in stark contrast to the use of more purely financial
tools to increase reimbursement. There is no dispute that hospitals have expend-
ed considerable effort to upcode their discharges into higher paying DRGs.165
Additionally, while a massive literature has utilized multivariate analysis to
debate the existence and magnitude of cost-shifting,169 all of the qualitative
Hurley et al., Assessing the Effects of the Medicare Prospective Payment System on the Demand for VA
Inpatient Services: An Examination of Transfers and Discharges of Problem Patients, 25 HEALTH SERVICES
RES. 239 (1990). This finding, however, is questionable, for much of the documented change in number
of discharges was probably attributable to changed practice patterns and upcoding-such as the DRGs for
cardiac disorders, compare id. at 244 (table 1) (DRGs 127, 138 and 140) with Katherine L. Kahn, The
Effects of the DRG-Based Prospective Payment System on Quality of Care for Hospitalized Medicare
Patients, 264 JAMA 1953, 1954 (1990), the ones for lens procedures, some of the respiratory illnesses, and
some of the gastrointestinal diseases. Compare Hurley et al., supra, at 244 (table 1) (DRGs 39, 96, 148
and 182) with Latta & Helbing, supra note 119, at 79-80.
Second, in a well-designed study based on a national sample, Joseph Newhouse found some evidence
that city and county hospitals--"hospitals of last resort"-were treating a higher distribution of unprofitable
DRGs than were Medicare hospitals, thereby implying that Medicare hospitals were turning away unprofit-
able admissions. See Joseph P. Newhouse, Do Unprofitable Patients Face Access Problems?, HEALTH CARE
FINANCING REV., Winter 1989, at 33, 38-41. However, as discussed by Newhouse, this evidence was
equivocal, and the DRG-selection hypothesis was belied by a contrary distribution of outliers and by a
finding that unprofitable DRGs were less likely to be transferred than were profitable ones. See id. at 37-41.
All in all, Newhouse concluded that the statistical evidence is troubling, "but the evidence is as yet too weak
to conclude that [cream-skimming of admissions] is a serious problem." Id. at 41.
167. See infra notes 175-83, 250 and accompanying text. In two studies, researchers concluded that
PPS led hospital administrators to alter their hospitals' technical core, thereby significantly affecting
admissions, readmissions and other aspects of practice. The researchers also found evidence that these
alterations have occurred selectively, motivated by DRG profitability. See E. Greer Gay et al., An Appraisal
of Organizational Response to Fiscally Constraining Regulation: The Case of Hospitals and DRGs, 30 J.
HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV. 41(1989); E. Greer Gay & Jennie J. Kronenfeld, Regulation, Reirenchment-The
DRG Experience: Problems from Changing Reimbursement Practice, 31 Soc. ScI. & MED. 1103 (1990).
Unfortunately, these studies were flawed because, among other things, they failed to specify organizational
processes and structure that made the purported responses possible, their definition of the technical core
was dubious, their measurement of regulatory intensity was inadequate, they did not control for nonregula-
tory environmental factors, their proxies for physician practice patterns were unreliable, and their control
for case mix was untrustworthy.
168. See infra notes 194-97 and accompanying text. There has been substantial difficulty in determin-
ing how much of the upcoding has reflected more accurate coding practices, a sicker inpatient population,
or manipulation of the coding system to enhance payments. However, no one disputes that manipulation
has occurred. See, e.g., PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 142, at 41-51.
169. In this controversy, the different parries have come in two rounds. Initial attempts are made to
compare "the facts," followed by attempts to "respecify the facts" through utilizing different definitions
of"cost" and different models of rationally allocating "true economic costs" among different buyers willing
to pay different prices. One can follow this process of "comparing fact" and "respecifying fact" by reading
the following examples in order: Danzon, supra note 84; Joel W. Hay, The Impact of Public Health Care
Financing on Private-Sector Hospital Costs, 7 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 945 (1983); Frank A. Sloan
& Edmund R. Becker, Cross-Subsidies and Payment for Hospital Care, 8 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 660
(1984); Jack Hadley & Judith Feder, Hospital Cost Shifting and Care for the Uninsured, HEALTH AFF., Fall
1985, at 67; Richard W. Foster, Cost-Shifting Under Cost Reimbursement and Prospective Payment, 4 J.
HEALTH ECON. 261 (1985); David Dranove, Pricing by Non-Profit Institutions: The Case of Hospital Cost-
Shifting, 7 J. HEALTH ECON. 47 (1988); Stephen Zuckerman & John Holahan, PPS Waivers: Implications
for Medicare, Medicaid, and Commercial Insurers, 13 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 663, 675-79 (1988);
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evidence indicates that hospital administrators try to shift costs among payers
to increase reimbursement. 70 Because the dispute over cost-shifting drives
the debate whether one payer or group of payer "cross-subsidizes" other payers,
and because any such conclusion is evaluative, one ignores with peril the
expressed understanding of hospital financial officers that they use accounting
practices to increase their revenues. Any contrary finding that there is no cost-
shifting, resting on the use of theoretical constructs, reflects only the arrogance
of social scientific positivism, although of course such literature is helpful in
rendering the necessary normative judgments.
In light of this empirical evidence concerning hospital behavior under PPS,
the argument that PPS caused hospitals to engage in DRG-based product-line
management and specialization is unsustainable. PPS perhaps has caused some
generalized effects across all or most DRGs, such as reduced length of stay
across the board. It is also possible that these generalized effects are attributable
to the pressure imposed on a hospital by the sum total of its Medicare reim-
bursement' and the fact that hospital administrators do react to such a broad
bottom line if they can,' with general exhortations pitched to the entire
medical staff to reduce length of stay, to order fewer tests and services, and
to substitute less expensive therapies for more expensive ones.'73 Furthermore,
there are other more discrete activities from which one can plausibly infer some
form of organizational rationality, albeit not necessarily the type posited by
Fetter's model. To summarize the evidence described above, there has been
attention to particular procedures shifted to outpatient surgery; unbundling of
preadmission tests; reduction in average length of stay and a concomitant
increased use of home health care services across the board and increased use
of nursing care for hip procedures and a few other important DRGs; a focus
on the psychiatric DRGs; some substitution of the use of. long-term hospitals
and rehabilitation hospitals or distinct-part units for long-term inpatient rehabili-
tation;' enhanced attention given to intensive-care units; one-time, panicked
Michael A. Morrisey & Frank A. Sloan, Hospital Cost Shifting and the Medicare Prospective Payment
System (May 1989) (unpublished paper); JACK HADLEY & STEPHEN ZUCKERMAN, CHANGES IN HosPrrALS'
CHARGES TO PRIVATELY INSURED PATIENTS DURING PPS (Urban Institute, Project Report No. 3429-07,
1990). Given that there are always alternative conventions available to define "costs," the facts can always
be respecified. At least when sovereign action is discussed, the question is not an empirical one to be settled
by asking what type of behavior would be rational if accomplished by an economic actor in various types
of market structure. Instead, the issue calls for normative justification regarding the exercise of sovereign
authority: Is it proper that our sovereign acts solely to protect its own interests in administering PPS? It
is a question of right, and once one has defined what counts as "cost," one has determined what is right.
170. See infra notes 203-08 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., Feder et al., supra note 96; Hadley et al., supra note 96.
172. See, e.g., Arnold M. Epstein et al., Trends in Length of Stay and Rates of Readmission in
Massachusetts: Implications for Monitoring Quality of Care, 28 INQUIRY 19 (1991).
173. See infra notes 218-26 and accompanying text.
174. See Heinemann et al., supra note 128; Carroll & Erwin, Long-Term-Care Facilities in Pennsylva-
nia, supra note 135. But see Carroll & Erwin, Long-Term-Care Facilities in Georgia, supra note 135.
There are simply not enough studies concerning exempt hospitals and distinct-part units other than
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reductions in non-medical staff; attention to capital investments able to escape
the net thrown by PPS; a selective focus on a few very expensive new technol-
ogies; a large commitment of resources to coding; and a commitment of
resources by some hospitals to maximize opportunities for cost-shifting. Other-
wise, no other inferences of DRG-based product-line rationality are possible
from observed behavior. There is no proven attempted specialization, no proven
generalized attention to selective DRGs to tailor costs to match revenue oppor-
tunities, no proven attention to cream-skim at the admission side of the hospital
stay, and no proven effort selectively to push out patients at the discharge side.
The hospital generally does not act like that organism at the center of the
neoclassical model, weighing marginal costs and benefits by DRG-based
product line.
In short, while hospitals might have responded to the fact that PPS is a
prospective reimbursement system-behavior justifying the continued use of
some form of prospective payment-all evidence indicates that hospitals are
generally not "sensitive" to the price variations among the DRG-based rates
used in the Medicare PPS. 75 Because the complicated per-case payment
system rests on the behavioral premise that such price sensitivity exists, the
current form of prospective payment remains to be justified. Indeed, most
managers in hospitals seem to recognize that their organizations cannot respond
to such price variations, for the available evidence indicates that very few have
even generated, much less used, the information necessary for there to be such
sensitivity. To be sure, in the post-PPS era, many more hospitals are using
some type of automated cost-accounting system, 7 6 and many hospitals are
now making a much greater use of information pertaining to some forms of
"product lines." 177 However, one must distinguish carefully between different
types of product-line management, for the "product" can be defined in a
multitude of ways. It can be defined as narrowly as Fetter conceived it, by
DRG, or more broadly by aggregates of DRGs (for example, all cardiology
DRGs). The definition could be wider still, encompassing broad service lines
(for example, psychiatric services), or even departments (for example, patholo-
gy). Additionally, different definitions can be utilized within a single organiza-
tion for the different strategic functions of marketing, planning, budgeting, cost
accounting and utilization review. 78 In fact, the most systematic study, writ-
psychiatric ones. See Coulam & Gaumer, supra note 99, at 60.
175. See generally SYSTEMETRICS/MCGRAW-HILL, supra note 133.
176. See, e.g., id. at 13. PPS was a factor in generating this change but not the sole cause, for many
environmental alterations in the 1980s contributed.
177. Below there is a much fuller description of the manner in which hospitals use DRG-based
information. See infra notes 221-50 and accompanying text.
178. See. e.g., Robin Scott MacStravic, Prduct-Line Administration in Hospitals, HEALTHCARE MGMT. .
REV., Spring 1986, at 35; James X. Reynolds, Using DRGs for Competitive Positioning and Practical
Business Planning, HEALTHCARE MGMT. REV., Summer 1986, at 37.
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ten in 1988, concluded that most hospitals were still using traditional depart-
mental cost accounting,' that most hospitals were more interested in using
whatever type of information they did generate-even DRG-based informa-
tion-for maximizing reimbursement and promotional efforts than for control-
ling costs, 80 and that there were few differences among PPS and non-PPS
hospitals in the type of information generated and the use made of that informa-
tion once produced.' 8' This study and other literature indicates that, to the
extent that there even is more product-line management, the predominant forms
are much less complex than those differentiated by DRGs, particularly for
utilization review.'82 In summary,
the majority of U.S. hospitals are not poised to exploit the incentives
of the DRG system through cost management and strategic market
position. Among PPS hospitals, some progress was seen in hospitals'
awareness of their performance under PPS; however, comparisons of
cost and DRG data in hospital management has been quite limited. Non-
PPS hospitals in Maryland and New Jersey showed similar levels of
179. See SYsTEMETRiCS/McGRAW-HILL, supra note 133, at 2, 12-19. This study consisted of survey
evidence obtained from a small but nationally representative sample of 89 Medicare community hospitals.
Id. at 11. Even ignoring the sixteen small rural hospitals in the study that had no automated cost-accounting
system, see id. at 12-13, a large majority of the rest were using traditional departmental cost-accounting
systems and only a relative few were using a system capable of generating costs by procedure or by DRG.
See id. at 12-19.
180. Even among the hospitals generating procedure- or DRG-specific cost information, the majority
were comparing charges against the reimbursement rate for each DRG. See id. at 3, 19-25. The authors
of the study attributed the failure to compare costs against DRG rates to hospital managers' concerns about
the reliability of the relatively new type of cost information generated. See id. at 20-21. However, charges
are these managers' means of allocating costs among different payers. It is thus quite understandable "that,
although (these hospitals] have the capability to use actual cost information, they often find it more useful
to compare DRGs to charges." Id. at 20. This explanation is also consistent with the study's finding that
DRG-based information was not being used to control costs, but primarily to make decisions regarding the
expansion and promotion of service lines to non-Medicare payers in order to make up for any losses on
Medicare discharges. See id. at 4-6, 27, 33-46.
181. See id. at 6-7, 47-54. The comparison hospitals were drawn from New Jersey and Maryland.
Even though the hospitals studied were subject to three different reimbursement structures, there were few
relevant differences.
182. See, e.g., Steven R. Eastaugh, Has PPS Affected the Sophistication of Cost Accounting, HEALTH-
CARE FtN. MOMT., Nov. 1987, at 50 (surveying 54 hospitals and finding that approximately half of those
in PPS states were using job-order cost accounting for the highly variable DRGs); Glen I. Kazahaya and
Guy M. Masters, Case-Mix Management Enhances Profitability, HEALTHCARE FtN. MoMT., Sept. 1988, at
76 (describing broad service-line management implemented at twelve hospitals); Reynolds, supra note 178
(discussing the grouping of DRGs into a few departmental product lines and then into larger aggregations,
called strategic business units, for marketing, planning, budgeting and utilization review): David H.
Schroeder, Toward a Departmental Bottom-Line Perspective, 14 HEALTH CARE MGMT. REV. 25 (1989)
(describing the breakdown of DRG rates into departmental responsibility); Dalton A. Tong & Patricia L.
Jones, Physicians, Financial Managers Join Forces to Control Costs, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., Jan. 1990,
at 21 (describing educational efforts aimed at physicians with the use of DRG-based information).
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price sensitivity. Most hospitals continue to operate under an orientation
defined by cost-based reimbursement, which focuses on maximization
of revenue rather than management of costs.1
8 3
This discord between the predicted rational choices and observed behavior
stems directly from the organistic model with which we started. As Dr. Vladeck
observes, there is something in this empirical story for everyone. Part of this
ambiguity is due to the heavy reliance on composite measures:
[Such data] ...make[] for particularly lively and confusing public
policy debate, since there is something in it for almost everyone. Critics
of hospitals and of the theory of economic incentives point to the rate
of cost increases since PPS [year] I and argue that not even the power-
ful incentives of PPS have induced hospitals to change their cost-incur-
ring behavior. Hospitals can point to the aggregate increase in costs
since PPS was implemented and argue with some justice that it is lower
than might otherwise have been the case. Hospitals also argue, quite
correctly, that Medicare's costs are growing much more slowly
thanbefore the inception of PPS, while pointing, with increasing fervor,
to the growing cumulative disjunction between growth in the market
basket and PPS updates."'
The use of composite measures is in turn linked to the use of broad national
rates for payment, with the following necessary search for disparate impacts
and incentives among different types of hospitals: "Since uniform rates were
not introduced into a world of uniform costs.... considerable punishments and
rewards attach to what may be largely the results of idiosyncratic circumstanc-
es."'8 Thus, the original model's ambiguity regarding the process by which
PPS would drive "the hospital" carries forward from the legislation's initial
passage'86 to the debate concerning implementation and refinement; the
continuing "lively and confusing public policy debate" is linked to the organ-
istic model with which we started. Built upon this model, predictions concern-
ing rational organizational choice were and are made, particularly the crucial
one that there will be product-line management. Great hope is expressed that
the process of care will become more productive-this is the positive side of
medical discretion. Likewise, great fear is expressed that undertreatment will
183. SYSTEMETRICS/IMcGRAW-HILL, supra note 133, at 55. Although the data in this study are dated,
all evidence indicates that the conclusions are not.
184. Vladeck, supra note 117, at 463. The "market basket" is a general index of inflation in the goods
and services used by hospitals.
185. Id. at 470 (emphasis added).
186. See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
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occur-the negative side." 7 Evidence disconcerting for the maintenance of
the rationality model begins to come in-most tellingly, there is little evidence
of specialization. Then there is often a quite striking defensive reaction: The
models are right in positing organistic rationality, but the implementation in the
reimbursement system is flawed. There are, for example, necessary adjustments
to be made in the system in order to account for variations among hospitals and
the differential impact of PPS among them.'88 Additionally, there is much
work to be done refining the classification scheme itself.'89 Throughout the
development of the models, particularly during the 1980s, there is an accelerat-
ing differentiation of the parameters by which one can specify the hospital's
utility function or those of physicians. There is, however, no movement away
from the use of an organizational utility function. The use of the organistic
model in public policy in part generated uniform rates; it is linked to the
massive research effort concerning the effects of those rates and the complicat-
ed scheme of adjustments they necessitate; and this entire effort helps spawn
the continuing debate and expenditure of effort regarding refinement.
In sum, public policy concerning hospital reimbursement, based on the
organistic rationality of the optimizing firm, is bound to be flawed both instru-
mentally and evaluatively. Maximizing, organistic organizational rationality
could exist only if the hospital were structured along the lines of Weber's
rational-legal bureaucracy9 ° modified by consideration of the transactions
costs of different forms of vertical and horizontal integration.'' Our actual
hospitals, however, do not resemble these models. They are extremely complex
187. The worst fears were not realized, see Coulam & Gaumer, supra note 99, at 70, because these
fears, like the great hopes, relied upon the organistic model of the hospital. Given the inadequacy of the
model, neither set was realistic.
188. See, e.g., Lave, The Impact of PPS, supra note 51 (arguing for the use of rebased rates, a hospital-
specific component, and a geographic price index for nonlabor operating costs); Gregory C. Pope, Using
Hospital-Specific Costs To Improve the Fairness of Prospective Reimbursement, 9 J. HEALTH ECoN. 237
(1990) (arguing for the use of blended national and hospital-specific rates designed to separate hospital-
specific inefficiency from unobserved factors, such as severity, which the hospital cannot control); Feder
et al., supra note 96; Hadley et al., supra note 96 (arguing for the use of case-mix-adjusted hospital-specific
rates so that hospitals would be subject to equalized pressure); Jack Hadley, A Blunt Instrument, 29 INQUIRY
7 (1992) (arguing for a mixture of a hospital-specific component and case-mix-adjusted rates developed
around local areas of competition); Oday & Dobson, supra note 51 (arguing that the retention of national
rates is a necessary condition of efficiency); see also DAVIS ET AL., supra note 158, at 55-56 (arguing for
the use of an "objective" inflation factor); Frank D. Gianfrancesco, The Fairness of the PPS Reimbursement
Methodology, 25 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 1 (1990) (finding systematic bias in numerous design features,
including the geographic designations and the weights for the low-cost DRGs).
189. See, e.g., Freeman et al., supra note 31; Averill et al., supra note 31. In this regard, David
Dranove has offered a particularly ingenious attempt to avoid falsification of the rationality model. He
argues that specialization will be efficient only if the patient-care categories are homogeneous. Almost
everyone agrees by now that the DRGs are not homogeneous. Therefore, the argument runs, the lack of
efficient specialization indicates flawed implementation of the rationality model, not a problem with the
model itself. See David Dranove, Rate-Setting by Diagnosis Related Groups aiid Hospital Specialization,
8 RAND J. ECON. 417 (1987).
190. See generally WEBER, supra note 57, at 956-1005.
191. See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES (1975).
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organizations, with a multitude of diverse actors, all of whom interact in
complex and variable ways. To the extent that work is organized by a structure
or process at all, that organization is certainly not hierarchical. Assuming that
it is realistic even to speak of organizational rationality at all, it is nonetheless
totally unrealistic to model maximizing rationality. For just an individual, the
calculus adumbrated above for optimal behavior under PPS is dizzying in its
complexity and thus impractical as an algorithm for action. For a complex
organization, the calculus is not just an impracticality but an impossibility.
Further, it is extremely dangerous-again both instrumentally and normative-
ly-to formulate public policy around models that generalize across hospitals,
even when the models differentiate organizations by such structural factors as
case mix, size, location, and type. Each hospital has a particular mix of actors,
a singular history and culture, and operates within an environment perhaps
shared by a small number of other hospitals but certainly not by many, much
less by all.'92
V. The Hospital as a Singular, Complex, and Situated Organization
This conclusion can be elaborated by considering a contrast: Would
institutionally and ecologically rich models of satisficing organizations help
focus public policy? The claims are certainly more plausible. 3 Let us run
192. I recognize of course that models are chosen to address particular empirical questions. Compare,
e.g., Thorpe & Phelps, supra note 84 at 147 & n.7 (positing a "utility function for the hospital decision-
makers" as a "relatively harmless assumption" "for purposes of analyzing price controls") with Phelps, supra
note 6, at 112-16 (utilizing a political economic model of the hospital and its environment for purposes of
exploring "the hospital's view of price-setting and charge-shifting"); Phelps & Sened, supra note 89
(modeling the hospital as a political economy in which, to enable physicians to maximize their income, the
hospital exercises its monopoly power and distributes the resultant rents to the staff in the form of lower
input prices for staff production, and in which members of the medical staff compete internally and
externally for the allocation of those benefits, with internal decision rules dictating the internal allocation,
and interhospital competition dictating the equilibrium among hospitals). I also believe, however, that the
relatively simple organistic models have tended to darken more than illuminate, and that our public policy
has thereby suffered. Moreover, because I believe that factual construction is guided by normative interests,
see supra notes 21 & 30, my view is that the selection of models affects our understanding of our normative
choices. For a fuller discussion, see David M. Frankford, Neoclassical Health Economics and the Debate
over National Health Insurance: The Power of Abstraction, 18 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY (forthcoming 1993).
193. My aim here is not to present a full-blown theory but simply to offer enough so as to draw the
contrast between the organistic models and more complex organizational ones. I do not, for example, offer
a theory regarding the types and sequencing of organizational responses such as that in Cook et al., supra
note 89; Shortell et al., supra note 88. Further, I do not utilize the process-based distinctions between goal
formulation and implementation that are the basis of this work, see, e.g., id. at 222, and I do not invoke
the theory's relatively structuralist account of external and internal characteristics such as regulatory intensity
and market structure (external structure), and physicians' age and sex, number and composition of commit-
tees and governing boards, and hospital types and ownership (internal structure). See, e.g., Stephen M.
Shortell et al., Economic Regulation and Hospital Behavior: The Effects on Medical Staff Organization and
Hospital-Physicial Relationships, 20 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 597 (1985); Alexander et al., supra note 101;
Lawton R. Burns et al., The Effect of Hospital Control Strategies on Physician Satisfaction and Physician-
Hospital Conflict, 25 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 527 (1990). This theory assumes that the "environment" and
organizational rationality are independent, while I consider the environment to be perceptual. See, e.g.,
Thomas et al., supra note 88, at 873. This theory also utilizes organizational rationality postulates too strong
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down our previous list of the objects of organizational rationality. As a plausi-
ble beginning, we can categorize these objects by virtue of the extent to which
they threaten physicians' prerogatives, but our discussion will be enriched by
differentiating among types of hospitals and physicians, by considering the aims
of persons with whom physicians work, and by accounting for the process and
structure of the ecology external to the hospital.
We can begin with the coding of discharges. Everyone in the hospital
cheerfully can agree to game the coding system so as to increase the hospital's
reimbursement. At some organizations, this game can be profitably put in
motion simply by holding periodic training sessions on coding practices and
by utilizing a relatively minimal degree of administrative oversight. At other
hospitals, particularly the large urban teaching facilities, the stakes are higher,
and it is therefore worthwhile to expend more resources in the gaming effort.
Hence, there would be substantial investment in the plant and labor necessary
to increase revenues from coding, including the increased employment, with
appropriate perquisites,'94 of the clerical staff which performs the coding.'95
There would also be the devotion of a substantial amount of time by a financial
officer to coding and charging practices, perhaps even the hiring of outside
consultants,'96 and, most importantly, an investment in the necessary comput-
ing technology.'97 Within all hospitals there would be relatively minimal
for my tastes, for it conceives of organizational goal formulation as dominated by individual means-end
rationality, and it relies upon a fairly traditional conceptual division, albeit a porous one, between goal
formation and implementation. Compare, e.g., Shortell et al., supra note 88, at 220-24, 253-61 (utilizing
these concepts) with, e.g., Kimberly & Zajac, supra note 89, at 295 (utilizing recursive causation). As I
indicated previously, see supra note 88, i am more comfortable with the fluid, less structured process-based
accounts in works like Ashmos & McDaniel, supra note 9, particularly the pragmatic idea that information
processing and decisionmaking participation recursively flow with "the decision at hand," id. at 380,
although I place greater stress on the deployment of information as power than does an information-
processing model. See id. at 381-83 (discussing the processing of information to reduce organizational
uncertainty). My discussion will also indicate that I agree with Ashmos and McDaniel that the relationship
between strategic process, content and context is very important. See id. Finally, all of the behavioral
models rest on premises regarding nomological ordering of variables and falsificationism, neither of which
I share.
194. No one expressed this point better than the former Inspector General of DHHS, Richard Kusserow.
He commented that, with the advent of PPS, employees who code bills for reimbursement "'who were down
next to the boiler room in the sub-basement of the hospital are on the top floor with the hospital administra-
tors, and they also have the keys to the kingdom."' Inspector General Takes Aim at PPS Fraud, J. AM.
MED. RECORDS, March 1986, at A, reprinted in part in ELIZABETH E. HOGUE ET AL., PREVENTING FRAUD
AND ABUSE: A GUIDE FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID PROVIDERS 91 (1988).
195. See, e.g., Eileen Appelbaum & Cherlyn S. Granrose, Hospital Employment Under Revised
Medicare Payment Schedules, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Aug. 1986, at 37, 40-42, 45; see also Cromwell &
Pope, supra note 142, at 47; Cromwell & Puskin, supra note 122, at 376; PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESS-
MENT COMM'N, supra note 123, at 57 (showing increasing number of medical records technicians as a
percentage of all medical records staff); LEWIN-ICF, supra note 144, at 5-4, 5-6 to 5-7 (contrasting coding
practices at PPS winners and losers).
196. See, e.g., LEWIN-ICF, supra note 144, at 5-15, 5-39.
197. See, e.g., Barbara J. McNeil, Hospital Response to )RG-HLnsed PnIspective Payment, 5 MED.
DECISION MAKING 15 (1985); PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 142, at 44-45;
LEWIN-ICF, supra note 144, at 5-6 to 5-7. ProPAC has found that "winning hospitals [under PPS] were
likelier to have considered alternative DRG assignments before, during, and after a patient's hospitalization
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inconvenience, the game can actually be fun for all, and there is little threat to
the technical autonomy of the service professionals. 99
Meanwhile, outside the hospital the financial pain from higher payments
is spread among a fragmented reimbursement system, working particularly
against private payers, who have the least power.'99 The most powerful exter-
nal player, HCFA, is reduced to continual expressions of frustration at its
inability to stop the game, particularly because Congress, ProPAC and others
press it, first, to make changes in the classification system, which thereby set
off more opportunities for manipulation, and, second, to give hospitals the
benefit of the doubt in rate-setting decisions, which thereby keeps the game
profitable by allowing hospitals to retain a portion of the revenue that manipula-
tion generates. 2°° Indeed, both of these benefits accrue precisely to the high-
tech urban teaching institutions, which already have the greatest incentives to
game the system.2°1 The PROs can keep the manipulation within bounds, but
stopping it cold would depend at least upon a massive effort of record review,
and even that effort might not be terribly effective.
A fruitful comparison can then be drawn regarding the game of unbundling
preadmission tests and services. Unlike coding, unbundling could be cured quite
easily, as evidenced by the prophylactic rule enacted by Congress to govern
the DRG payment-window: For reimbursement purposes, the services that had
been uinbundled to outpatient care were by legislative fiat redefined such that
they became born-again "inpatient services."2 2 Moreover, unlike coding,
unbundling motivated a single powerful actor to seek legislative help, because
it imposed generalized inconvenience across numerous Medicare beneficiaries
who had to make additional trips to a hospital for what had previously been
a united episode of care, and because Medicare beneficiaries typically coalesce
into a powerful interest group when collective interests are threatened and
identified. In this arena, therefore, hospitals did the best they could, temporarily
winning the battle to manipulate the system though perhaps losing the war.
Altering coding practices and unbundling of preadmission services were
activities around which all internal actors could readily unite. In contrast,
obtaining organizational commitment to utilize opportunities for cross-subsidiza-
tion might be a little more difficult to attain and to maintain. High mark-ups
to maximize payments under the DRG-based system." PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra
note 123, at 92.
198. See, e.g., Cook et al., supra note 89, at 197-99 (discussing ho v professional organizations will
"buffer" their internal "technical core" by manipulating the environment if possible).
199. See, e.g., Phelps, supra note 6, at 112-16.
200. See Frankford, supra note 13.
201. See id.; see also, e.g., Shortell et al., supra note 88, at 260 (discussing how higher degrees of
competition necessitate more complexity in management information systems).
202. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. The fact that preadmission tests and services are
readily measurable means that they are easily unbundled, see Morrisey et al., supra note 70, at 34, but it
also means that these attempts to escape the regulatory net are easily policed. See, e.g., id. at 36.
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for some "products' might affect various services differently,2 3 thereby po-
tentially raising the hackles of some important players within the hospital,
creating internal rivalries, and triggering the standard defenses concerning
professional autonomy from lay interference. This danger might be particularly
acute in a large urban teaching facility, given the substantial power of the
department chiefs,' as well as their increased involvement in budgeting by
clinical departments. 5 However, these problems should not be overstated,
for they are probably surmountable. Charging falls within the domain of the
accountants and financial officers, not just in the sense of technical accounting
and pricing, but also in the sense that they are in the best position to render
judgments concerning the effects of different charging practices on the external
environment, the overall ecology.20 All others inside the hospital are therefore
dependent upon their expertise, both because of their managerial science and
due to their political skills and judgments as boundary spanners. 207 In fact,
the need for political judgments is indicated by the possibility that officers
might decide against a potential reimbursement strategy so as not to anger an
outside constituency, thereby "leav[ing] extra profits lying on the table." 8
When we move to the shifting of some services, particularly surgical ones,
to outpatient care, things start to get a bit trickier. The benefits from such a
change are obvious: potentially more lucrative reimbursement from more
attractive reimbursement structures; the possibility of countless games in
accounting to shift costs around in cost reports;2"9 the ability to project an
203. See Phelps, supra note 6, at 114-15.
204. See, e.g., YOUNG & SALTMAN, supra note 37, at 72-88.
205. See, e.g., Robert M. Heyssel et al., Decentralized Management in a Teaching Hospital, 310 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1477 (1985) (decentralized budgeting by clinical department); McNeil, supra note 197, at
16-19 (using DRG-based information, primarily aggregated by clinical departments and supplemented by
information regarding selective DRGs, forjoint management by administrators and clinical chiefs); cf., e.g.,
Iden Wickings, Combining Clinical Budgets and DRGs for Quality Management, 7 HEALTH POL'Y 215,
222-23 (1987) (similar use in the British National Health Insurance System).
206. See, e.g., PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT AsSEsSMENT COMM'N, supra note 123, at 91; LEWIN-ICF, supra
note 144, at 5-4, 5-11, 5-15, 5-38 to 5-40 (finding association between winning under PPS and managerial
skill in anticipating and maximizing reimbursement). My focus here is on the political economy of charging
as a means to shift costs among private and public payers. At least in competitive environments, charging
is also a marketing decision. Under this characterization of charging, Ashmos and McDaniel found less
physician participation than in areas related to production efficiency and effectiveness, see Ashmos &
McDaniel, supra note 9, at 381, 387 (table 2, item 1), 390, a finding limited by small sample size but
consistent with my analysis.
207. See, e.g., Cook et al., supra note 89, at 199; Alexander et al., supra note 101, at 222-23 (discuss-
ing how hospitals will acquire and utilize greater boundary spanning expertise to evolve stable and ongoing
responses to more intensive and uncertain regulatory environments).
208. Phelps, supra note 6, at 116; see LEWIN-ICF, supra note 144, at 4-13 to 4-14.
209. PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 123, at 93 (associating winning under
PPS with greater financial acumen, which "permitted winning hospitals to complete Medicare Cost Reports
in an advantageous manner and enabled hospitals to challenge Medicare on discretionary costs"); LEWIN-
ICF, supra note 144, at 5-12, 5-40 (discussing cost shifting to ambulatory-care facilities); cf PROsPECTIVE
PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 123, at 92-93; PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N,
WINNERS AND LOSERS UNDER PPS, supra note 147, at 8-17; LEWIN-ICF, supra note 144, at 5-8 to 5-9,
5-39 to 5-40 (associating winning under PPS with the ability to shift costs through creative accounting to
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image that the hospital provides state-of-the-art care;21° and greater "diversifi-
cation" in the sense that the hospital is less dependent upon Part A reimburse-
ment and its risk is spread over the much more fractured reimbursement system
that exists for outpatient care.2 1 Medical and allied professionals within the
hospital perceive little threat to the outcome of care, -given that technological
advances have made outpatient surgery safe and effective. Likewise, based on
this perception of quality of care, as well as perceptions of enhanced efficiency,
payers and regulators in the external environment are generally positive toward
such site-of-care substitution. However, unlike coding, unbundling and cross-
subsidization, outcomes are more directly implicated, and there is thus the
potential for more intensive oversight. In part not to ruffle internal professional
feathers, and in part not to spark even more stringent external scrutiny, adminis-
trators are careful not to move whole hog into outpatient services, but instead
act selectively, balancing the concerns for quality, internal peace, financial
opportunity and future regulatory action. Compared with coding and charging
games, one would thus expect to see greater deference to professional authority
and more variations among institutional practices." 2
In regard to hip procedures, matters become even more delicate. There is
increased uncertainty regarding appropriate episodes of care, and the risks of
error are large because hip fractures are associated with high morbidity and
mortality. Although orthopedic surgeons are very powerful actors within the
such non-PPS units as skilled nursing facilities and rehabilitation units).
210. See, e.g., Arnold D. Kaluzny et al., Emerging Organizational Networks: The Case of the
Community Clinical Oncology Program, in INNOVATIONS IN HEALTH CARE DELIVERY: INSIGHTS'FOR
ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY 86, 108-09 (Stephen S. Mick ed., 1990) [hereinafter INNOVATIONS IN HEALTH
CARE DELIVERY].
211. As noted by Bruce Vladeck, "[ilt is harder to control the volume and quality of services in the
pluralized, decentralized, diversified, and largely undefined world of outpatient care than in the well-defined
universe of only 5,000 or so hospitals." Vladeck, supra note 117, at 479; see, e.g., Cook et al., supra note
89, at 200 (discussing how such diversification "allows the hospital more latitude and flexibility to deal
with future changes in regulatory intensity"); LEwN-ICF, supra note 144, at 5-12 (discussing diversification
of revenue sources through expansion of ambulatory-care networks); see also Edward J. Zajac & Stephen
M. Shortell, Changing Generic Strategies: Likelihood, Direction, and Performance Indicators, 10 STRATE-
GIC MGMT. J. 413, 424-25, 427 (1989) (using a national sample and finding that under PPS more hospitals
were pursuing the strategy of maintaining their stable core of products while cautiously searching for more
diversified offerings); Gregory 0. Ginn, Strategic Change in Hospitals: An Examination of the Response
of the Acute Care Hospital to the Turbulent Environment of the 1980s, 25 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 565,
568-69, 573, 584-85 (1990) (comparing the adaptation strategies of suburban and urban hospitals in Texas
over two periods, 1976-1980 and 1981-1985, and making similar findings).
212. There are difficult questions of judgment involved, for decisions to shift surgical procedures to
outpatient care involve questions of reimbursement, accounting, and the technical core. Thus, for these
strategies the lines between Ashmos and McDaniel's categories of "marketing" and "production" are blurred.
Moreover, for some hospitals and some procedures, the shift to ambulatory-care surgery probably represents
an extension of old product lines, which are therefore less risky and easier to pull off internally. By contrast,
for other hospitals or procedures, the shift involves the creation of new lines and the concomitant greater
uncertainty and threat to internal stability. See, e.g., Shortell et al., supra note 88, at 229, 232-33, 238, 244,
257, 259. Finally, some shifts involve capital expenditures, a domain more traditionally within managerial
prerogatives and one that can be more centralized. See, e.g., id. at 257. In light of this richness of relevant
factors varying among hospitals, generalizations across them are dangerous.
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hospital, both because of their rank in the medical hierarchy and their ability
to generate revenues for the hospital," 3 they share power-with other profession-
als in the hospital, such as the physical therapists who oversee rehabilitation
and the social workers who make arrangements for post-discharge care. These
actors on the patient-care team sometimes disagree on the appropriate moment
for discharge. This potential rivalry therefore gives administrators an opening
to work their will, and they certainly have incentives to maintain oversight,
given that hip procedures are the most important Medicare DRGs. Additionally,
there is immense pressure asserted against this fairly delicate internal balance,
for from the beginning of PPS, Congress, ProPAC, researchers and various
interest groups have devoted a high degree of attention to these procedures.
Given this internal and external fragility and uncertainty, it is quite plausible
that many actors would decide to maintain the status quo that existed before
PPS, as reflected in discharge patterns consistent with prior practices."1 4 Neces-
sarily, the local availability of post-acute care will also greatly affect the
equilibrium at any particular organization. 15
A fruitful contrast can then be drawn between the DRGs involving hip
replacements and those involving psychiatric patients. Psychiatry is near the
bottom of the internal totem pole because even the internists, let alone the
surgeons, barely elevate it to the category of medicine. Moreover, the therapeu-
tic benefits of inpatient psychiatric care are intensely controversial, except that
therapy using pharmacological substances resonates better within the larger
medical community. Because inpatient psychiatric benefits are limited by most
third-party payers, and because external interests have been asserting increasing-
ly intensive pressure to reduce these services, administrators have great leverage
in reducing these lengths of stay, particularly for the less complex cases treated
in scatterbeds. Given the internal power equilibrium, administrators might thus
achieve relatively greater success than in instances involving hip procedures,
and given their knowledge of the insurance benefits available for each dis-
charge, lengths of stay would be expected to vary by the degree of financial
pressure imposed upon particular hospitals.216
213. See, e.g., Shortell et al., supra note 193, at 602, 604, 621-24 (discussing the relatively greater
power of high-volume-admitting, scarce specialists to obstruct changes in the hospital's managerial level
and technical core).
214. See Morrisey et al., supra note 126, at 693; Gerety, supra note 125, at 391.
215. See, e.g., PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 123, at 77-79 (tables 3-1
to 3-3), 80; PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, WINNERS AND LOSERS UNDER PPS, supra note
147, at 7, 9-13, 16-17, 19; LEWlN-ICF, supra note 144, at 4-10 to 4-11, 4-16.
216. See, e.g., Frank & Lave, supra note 129; Frank et al., supra note 90, at 17-19; Lave & Frank,
Factors Affecting Medicaid Patients' Length of Stay in Psychiatric Hospitals, supra note 90; Lave et al.,
supra note 128, at 356-60; Freiman et al., supra note 130; Lave & Frank, Hospital Supply Response to
Prospective Payment, supra note 90, at 14-19. There is evidence that nursing homes received psychiatric
discharges with increased needs after PPS was implemented. See James H. Swan et al., Ripple Effects of
PPS on Nursing Homes: Swimming or Drowning in the Funding Stream, 30 GERONTOLOGIST 323, 325-26,
329 (1990).
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In contrast, by the time we get to the question of "intensity of care" over
a wide range of services, administrators have far less leverage. We might define
"intensity of care" to mean the efficiency by which the hospital produces its
intermediate products, in which case we have defined away the interesting
questions. Everyone inside and outside the hospital can coalesce around this
"efficiency," for there is no threat to professionals' control over the technical
content of their work, and everyone understands this task to be the one that
hospital administrators are supposed to perform with the appropriate application
of managerial expertise. Similarly, we might again ignore all the interesting
questions by defining "intensity of care" to mean the employment level of non-
medical staff.2"7 Administrators have substantial power regarding employment,
and, moreover, a share-the-pain, across-the-board cut in non-medical staff,
enacted in a shared panicked response to anticipated federal stinginess, would
create relatively few internal disputes regarding division of the negative-sum
decrease. If we instead define "intensity" to include the mix of LPNs and
RNs,215 the resistance to cuts becomes stronger, generated by all professional
groups in the hospital-except possibly the LPNs-who would bear an in-
creased work load,219 particularly in the face of the increased case-mix com-
plexity sparked in part by PPS. Cutting the number of high-admitting physicians
is of course usually out of the question.220 Finally, if we enrich our under-
standing of "intensity of care" to include the practice patterns of physi-
cians-namely, the number and types of intermediate products used and the
manner in which physicians package them with the various types of labor in
the treatment of individual patients-we have entered the strongest of profes-
sional lairs. It should therefore not surprise us that the aggregate evidence
regarding the reorganization of the internal and external division of labor, the
numbers and types of services used, and the effects on outcomes is equivocal
at best. 2 ' Although selective and very intensive pressure at crucial costs
centers like the intensive-care units might be worth the administrative and
political capital invested, nothing is more likely to raise the ire of an entire
medical staff than a generalized attempt to trammel the individual professional's
control over her patient's course of treatment. "Productivity," in the end, falls
most directly within the ambit of the medical profession's control, not so much
,n an organized corporate sense, but in the sense that all view what they do as
217. See, e.g., Thorpe & Phelps, supra note 84, at 160-63.
218. See, e.g., id.
219. See, e.g., Kimberly & Zajac, supra note 89, at 295-96.
220. See, e.g., Jensen & Morrisey, Medical Staff Specialty Mix, supra note 84, at 265 ("With a supply
constraint and fixed transaction costs of adding a physician to the staff, a hospital operating under a flat
price per case payment arrangement will appoint all technically qualified physicians to its staff in those
specialties for which marginal product is increased."); see also Cowing et al., supra note 10, at 272-73.
The only constraint preventing unlimited output potential is the restricted supply of such specialties. See
Jensen & Morrisey, Medical Staff Specialty Mix, supra note 84, at 273.
221. See, e.g., Ashby & Altman, supra note I11.
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the art of clinical judgment rather than cookbook medicine.222 Almost every-
one in almost every hospital understands questions of "productivity" to be
evaluative, and no language regarding the "technical efficiency offered by
industrial engineering" '223 or "production efficiency" 2 is likely to shake
that understanding. Perhaps administrative jawboning to reduce length of stay
and service intensity across the board can be marginally effective,225 but
systematic, blunt attempts to interfere in individual clinical judgments are more
likely to sink the ship rather than keep it afloat.226
By contrast, carefully tailored joint attempts at management in the context
of institutional peer review are much more likely to succeed. Clinicians might
be more receptive to the information generated by the DRGs when it is used
selectively-for example, in the monitoring of admissions227 or a generalized
review of high-volume DRGs228 -and when it is used primarily within the
medical staff's professional peer-review processes.229 If the financial pinch
effectuated by PPS becomes sufficiently sharp, there might even be greater
administrative participation in those processes.23 ° However, the monitoring of
practice patterns across an entire hospital is one of the most complex,
controversial, and uncertain tasks faced by the organization. Therefore, it is
highly unlikely that particular goals could be formulated or implemented by
222. For a recent fairly stunning ethnography documenting the connection between this epistemology
and clinical training, see KATHRYN M. HUNTER, DOCTORS' STORIES: THE NARRATIVE STRUCTURE OF
MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE (1991).
223. See, e.g., Fetter, supra note 26, at 8-11.
224. See Seidman & Frank, supra note 3, at 157.
225. See Weiner et al., supra note 37. Even that conclusion, at least in the Medicare context, would
have to be made with great caution, given how equivocal the evidence is concerning changes in length of
stay, admissions and intensity.
226. In the extreme, there can be a full-scale revolt:
At [a PPS losing hospital], about 25 percent of the hospital's key admitters tried to change the
current system ownership by undermining the hospital's financial viability. For example, when
administrators attempted to control costs by sharing specific radiologic and pharmaceutic costs
with physicians, utilization of the more expensive procedures went up by 30 percent over the next
month.
LEWIN-ICF, supra note 144, at 5-18.
227. See Noralou P. Roos et al., Using Diagnosis-Related Groups for Studying Variations in Hospital
Admissions, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Summer 1988, at 53.
228. See LEwN-ICF, supra note 144, at 5-7.
229. This is an instance of professional adaptation, in which professionals make a concession to an
increasingly demanding, uncertain and unstable environment but do not surrender professional control over
the technical content of work. One must remain
[]sensitive to critical forms of functional and hierarchical differentiation within the profession and
the institutions that are responsible for insulating practitioners from some of the changes that are
taking place and reorganizing their relationships with each other in adaptation to other external
changes. . . . Potentially critical pressures have been cushioned by adaptive changes in the
organization of the interrelations among members of the profession, changes intended to satisfy
the demands of consumers, politicians, and third-party payers without sacrificing overall profes-
sional control.
Eliot Freidson, The Reorganization of the Medical Profession, 42 MED. CARE REV. 11, 23 (1985).
230. See, e.g., Cook et al., supra note 89, at 199-201; Shortell et al., supra note 88, at 229-30, 257-58;
Shortell et al., supra note 193, at 600-01,603, 618,624-25; Alexander et al., supra note 101, at 221,223-24,
229-33; Burns et al., supra note 193, at 530, 532, 534-35, 54041, 54849, 556.
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means of a centralized and rigidly hierarchical decisionmaking process, as
opposed to one that is decentralized and collegial.231 In the words of Ashmos
and McDaniel,
In hospitals, strategic production function decisions about the trans-
formation of inputs into a product or service depend more on the
information-processing abilities and judgments of physicians than do
other strategic decisions. The fundamental task of hospitals is executed
by the application of physicians' expertise and values to problem
situations and, therefore, the decision to alter a hospital's fundamental
task would depend partly on information possessed by physicians. 23
In sum, complex and centralized management information systems like the
DRGs are very useful for asserting managerial control over activities like
coding and charging, but they are much less useful for rationalizing individual
practice patterns around organizational goals, to the extent that such goals can
even be formulated. Thus, it is unremarkable that nothing in the qualitative
literature links the implementation of PPS, or the introduction of "state-of-the-
231. PPS might cause the oversight process to become increasingly formalized and led by an external
and internal professional elite, see, e.g, Eliot Freidson, The Reorganization of the Professions by Regulation,
7 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 279, 287-88 (1983); Eliot Freidson, The Changing Nature of Professional Control,
10 ANN. REv. Soc. 1, 10-16 (1984), but leadership and formalization should be not equated with centraliza-
tion and noncollegiality. Instead, it is more likely that there will be an increasingly complex internal and
external division of labor, see, e.g., Freidson, supra note 229, at 26-31; Eliot Freidson, The Medical
Profession in Transition, in APPLICATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE TO CLINICAL MEDICINE AND HEALTH POLICY
63, 66, 72 (Linda H. Aiken & David Mechanic eds., 1986), characterized by the involvement of a greater
number and types of actors in the monitoring process. Possibly the primary procedural mechanism will
be to form a greater number of committees and task forces with diverse memberships. See, e.g., Cook
et al., supra note 89, at 200; Shortell et al., supra note 193, at 600-01, 603, 618, 624-25. However, there
are also alternative, much less formal mechanisms. See, e.g., Ashmos & McDaniel, supra note 9, at 388
(figure 1). In either case, the primary mode of interaction will be collegial, in combination with greater
procedural formalism, see, e.g., Shortell et al., supra note 88, at 257, 259; Burns et al., supra note 193, at
530, 532, 533-38, 540-4.1, 545-57; see also LEwtN-ICF, supra note 144, at 5-7, 5-19 to 5-20, 5-30 to 5-32,
that remains nonetheless fluid as to the identity of participants and open to competing modes of evaluation.
See Ashmos & McDaniel, supra note 9. Potentially, there are distinctions to be drawn here correlating
different structures or processes with hospital, physician, and market characteristics. See, e.g., Shortell et
al., supra note 193, at 600-01, 603, 618, 624-25; Alexander et al., supra note 101, at 221, 223-24, 229-33;
Alexander et al., Physician Participation in the Administration and Governance of System and Freestanding
Hospitals: A Comparison by Type of Ownership, in FOR-PROFrr ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH CARE 402
(Bradford H. Gray ed., 1986); Burns et al., supra note 193, at 530, 532, 533-38, 540-41, 545-57. Space
limitations prevent a fuller discussion in this Article.
232. Ashmos & McDaniel, supra note 9, at 381. Ashmos and McDaniel's main point is as breathtaking
as it is clean-cut: Physicians' participation in attempts to increase efficiency and effectiveness is more
important to strategic decision making than physicians' participation in marketing. See id. at 381-83, 390-93.
I am grateful to Donde P. Ashmos for helping me understand this insight.
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art DRG" information and budgeting systems, with "greater cost consciousness"
among the medical staff as some collective,233 or among physicians individu-
ally.23
4
Perhaps the most telling points in this regard stem from the recent quantita-
tive and qualitative literature concerning "winning" under PPS-a hospital's
PPS revenues exceed its PPS expenses-and "losing" (the opposite). 235 This
literature strongly implies that many successful institutions succeeded both
before and after PPS and independently of actions taken pursuant to PPS.236
Previously winning hospitals continued to win under PPS because they were
already characterized by a culture in which controlling costs was a legitimate
goal:
In the case studies, winning hospitals consistently differed from losing
ones by having longstanding commitments to cost containment. They
tended to foster these activities both before PPS and in response to it.
233. See, e.g., Diana Barrett & Paul H. Campbell, Walking Softly: The Role of Management in Altering
Physician Practice Patterns in the Hospital Corporation of America, 7 ADVANCES HEALTH ECON. &
HEALTH SERVICES RES. 157 (1987); Campbell & Kane, supra note 158.
234. See, e.g., David R. Thomas & Kenneth M. Davis, Physician Awareness of Cost Under Prospective
Reimbursement Systems, 25 MED. CARE 181 (1987).
235. Case studies were conducted by Lewin-ICF, with Stephen Shortell serving as the outside project
consultant, under contracts with ProPAC but not under the Commission's direction. See LUWtN-ICF, supra
note 144. In an effort primarily to explain internal characteristics separating PPS winners from PPS losers,
the "case studies examined the hospitals' internal characteristics, management strategies, and responses to
PPS." PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 123, at 76; see LEWIN-ICF, supra note
144, at 1-1 to 1-2, 2-1 to 2-24 (explicating the project's sophisticated design, which utilized cross-sectional
and longitudinal qualitative and quantitative analysis). Utilizing the identical conceptual framework, see
PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 123, at 73-74, ProPAC also completed a
complementary multivariate analysis. See PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, WINNERS AND
LOSERS UNDER PPS, supra note 147. This quantitative work focused more on the external ecology causing
PPS winning and losing, an environment which ."sets the stage for hospital operations by defining the
resources available in the community, the number of competing providers, and the methods used to pay
hospitals." PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 123, at 76. The quantitative study
thus "attempted to identify the design features of PPS and the environmental and hospital characteristics
associated with winning and losing under PPS." PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note
123, at 75-76.
236. One should of'course neither generalize from the case studies, nor believe that the quantitative
evidence portrays the internal dynamics of one or more organizations. The evidence is complementary but
not conclusive. See PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 123, at 75. Additionally,
one should not draw conclusions that either the "internal" or "external" factors predominated. See id. at
73-74, 93; LEWtN-ICF, supra note 144, at E-3, E-16. Finally, it should be noted that reasons for "turn-
around"-converting a hospital from a PPS loser to a PPS winner-have not been studied. See LEWIN-ICF,
supra note 144, at E-3, E-15, 2-19, 6-8. For my purposes, however, the studies are extremely telling. The
first proposition I need to support is that the organistic models are inadequate for the formulation of public
policy. They do not account for any internal dynamics, much less complicated ones peculiar to individual
organizations, and they do not even consider the two-way interaction between an environment and the
"organism," particularly the fact that successful organizations often succeed by manipulating the world
beyond their boundaries in a manner that creates a tight fit between their organizational distinctiveness and
their local circumstances. In all these regards, the studies clearly indicate the superiority of rich and
complicated organizational models. The second assertion I need to support is that no evidence links per-case
DRG-based payments with the use of the DRGs as the primary, let alone sole, linguistic medium of the
hospital, a proposition also supported by the studies.
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Also important for winning hospitals was the widespread awareness of
the need to control costs, which permeated all levels of the hospital
organization. The importance of conservative resource use was commu-
nicated by senior management and reinforced by the medical staff
support. By contrast, even if a losing hospital had cost controls in place,
these were undertaken only in response to poor performance.237
Additionally, previously winning hospitals continued to win under PPS due to
'the quality of their leadership and the cordial, cooperative and productive
relationships between medical staffs and administrators:
The case studies revealed that management played a key role in differ-
entiating winning hospitals from losing hospitals. Management at
winning hospitals had productive relations with their medical staffs,
fully integrating physicians into the-hospital's financial decision making.
These relationships were facilitated by low turnover rates among senior
managers. High turnover made it more difficult for losing hospitals to
identify their weaknesses and take corrective actions on a sustained
basis.
Winning and losing hospitals also differed in the perspectives and
expertise of their leadership. Leaders at winning hospitals appeared to
be more innovative in their thinking and to have considered issues in
their external environment. Their broader perspective included assessing
community needs in defining their objectives and an interest in applying
new approaches to old problems. In addition, their leaders better under-
stood their hospitals' financial performance and the factors that drove
it. Moreover, their efforts to improve performance were focused on
specific activities that were given time to prove their effectiveness..
• Having specific management objectives, evaluating'them, and holding
managers accountable for achieving them characterized winning senior
management.23
237. PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 123, at 84; see LEWIN-ICF, supra note
144, at E-5 to E-9, E-16, 3-4 to 3-5, 3-9, 5-2 to 5-7, 5-10, 5-14 to 5-23, 5-32, 5-36 to 5-38, 5-48 to 5-51,
6-1 to 6-2. "As a result, for winners, meeting PPS incentives only required fine tuning existing systems,
not overhauling them." Id. at E-8; see id. at 5-20 to 5-23, 5-32. The quantitative multivariate study also
indicated that PPS winners were relatively productive both before and after PPS. See PROSPECTIVE
PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 123, at 78-79 (tables 3-2 & 3-3), 89-90; PROSPECTIVE
PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, WINNERS AND LOSERS UNDER PPS, supra note 147, at 9-11, 14-18. At
these institutions, one finds such phenomena as physicians "request[ing] that the price of antibiotics be
included on routine antibiotic sensitivity reports," and physicians "initiat[ing] an operating room task force
to identify ways to decrease supply redundancy." LEwIN-ICF, supra note 144, at 5-21.
238. PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 123, at 84-86; see LEWIN-ICF, supra
-note 144, at E-5 to E-9, E-16, 4-13, 5-2 to 5-7, 5-13 to 5-23, 5-36 to 5-38, 5-48 to 5-51, 6-1 to 6-2. It is
difficult to conceive of a causal line from per-case DRG-based reimbursement to leadership qualities:
"Strength of leadership was determined by a variety of factors including training and expertise, outward
338
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Finally, medical staffs at winning hospitals have been historically characterized
by strong leadership, coupled with decentralized and collegial decision making:
The activities at one winning hospital highlight the successful qualities
of a medical staff. Annually, all physicians were asked about upcoming
capital requirements. The physicians initiated a vigorous peer review
process that included paid physician reviewers of medical records.
Physicians were heavily involved in multidisciplinary task forces estab-
lished to address specific problematic resource usage. Efforts to reduce
the operating costs of routine clinical decisions, such as the drugs that
make up the pharmacy formulary, the use of the intensive care unit.
• . , and the resources used in the surgical suites, were commonplace.
Strong leadership was seen as key to appropriate peer review and
effective mediation between the medical staff and administration.239
Even assuming that a culture of cost control, quality leadership, and physi-
cians' commitment to organizational goals could be sparked through a reim-
bursement system's financial incentives, itself a dubious proposition,' there
simply is no evidence that these characteristics stem from a per-case payment
system based on the DRGs. l Winning organizations do successfully monitor
focus, interest in thinking about new ways of getting things done, ability to monitor and minimize costs
without compromising patient care, and success at engaging physician leadership and participation in
production efficiency issues ...." LEwiN-ICF, supra note 144, at E-6.
239. PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 123, at 87; see LEWIN-ICF, supra note
144, at E-5 to E-9, E-16, 5-2 to 5-7, 5-17 to 5-23, 5-30 to 5-32, 5-36 to 5-38, 5-48 to 5-51, 6-1 to 6-2.
240. Most significantly, "the case studies ... underscore the fact that poor medical staff-administration
relations are hard to change. Even new administrations brought in to improve relations or to turn around
an institution financially faced a difficult time overcoming longstanding conflicts." PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT
ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 123, at 87-88; see LEWIN-ICF, supra note 144, at 5-15 to 5-19; see also
id. at E-4 (finding that "while external environments contributed to winning or losing, both internal factors
and differences in the ways that management addressed them were judged overall to be more important").
More generally, how could a reimbursement system create such qualities as charisma, interpersonal skills
and commitment to organizational goals? See, e.g., Burns et al., supra note 193 (finding that organizational
commitment is unrelated to the control strategies sparked by PPS); LEWIN-ICF, supra note 144, at E-12
(showing that "the problems experienced by each hospital are unique and typically involve difficult cultural,
leadership, and inter-personal issues").
241. One can think of strategic adaptation as an interactive process in which an organization examines,
changes and implements strategy in order (1) to manipulate, if possible, the environment it perceives; and
(2) to alter its perceived internal structure and process to enable this manipulation and to match its particular
internal structure and process with particular features of this environment, all the while favoring and
attempting to preserve its conception of its uniqueness and individuality, comprised of its mission, philoso-
phy and goals. See generally Kimberly & Zajac, supra note 89. The findings in the Lewin-ICF study are
consistent with this concept, see PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 123, at 74-94;
LEWIN-ICF, supra note 144, at 3-1 to 5-55 (finding that "adapters" were more likely to be PPS winners
and that "idlers," "alarmists," and "late bloomers" were more likely to be losers, with some crossover among
the categories due to particularly favorable or unfavorable features of the reimbursement, socio-economic
or competitive environment). The study also indicates that strong leadership qualities, personal commitment
to the institution, and a culture of cost control-gave PPS winners the potential successfully to adapt to the
system.
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the productivity of their intermediate products; 2 they do watch their costs
and reimbursement per payer and their costs relative to peer institutions; 3
and they do utilize data in their peer review processes.' The management
of a winning institution also does pay attention to PPS.245 However, none of
these actions has been dependent upon the use of a DRG-based information
system: "A key factor that distinguished all winners and losers was not
242. Winning hospitals had in place better planning, monitoring, and control
systems. They were more likely to use flexible budgeting that set realistic
target expenditures and revised these periodically throughout the year to
reflect actual volume experience....
In addition, winning hospitals were more likely to aggressively control input
costs. Whereas most' hospitals benefitted from group purchasing, some winning
hospitals pursued multiple group purchasing contracts and then played these against each
other to obtain the lowest prices. Inventories were kept low and standardized with the
assistance of the medical staff. Physicians, for example, were asked how to streamline
the supplies they required and how surgical trays could be standardized across different
surgery teams.
Finally, restrained investments in equipment helped to keep unit costs low.
Furthermore, winning and losing hospitals differed in their ability to prioritize projects
and see them through to completion.
PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 123, at 90; see LEwiN-ICF, supra note 144, at
E-9 to E-10; 5-25 to 5-27, 5-36 to 5-38; see also PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, WINNERS
AND LOSER UNDER PPS, supra note 147, at 9-11, 14, 17-18.
243. PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 123, at 90; see LEwIN-ICF, supra note
144, at E-9 to E-10, 5-38. The case studies also indicated that this type of monitoring did not utilize a
comparison of the particular. reimbursement for a patient with the costs of that stay. Despite an array of
different public and private reimbursement mechanisms, and "[dlespite the recognized different incentives
these payment methods created, managers and physicians reported that they did not consider these in treating
patients." PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 123, at 80; see LEWIN-ICF, supra
note 144, at 4-14 to 4-15, 5-47 to 5-48. These conflicts were regarded as "noise" in the operating
environment.
244. Another key difference between winning and losing hospitals was the
amount of information shared with physicians. For seven of the 10 winning
hospitals, management regarded a high degree of information sharing as one
successful way to engage physicians in joint financial responsibility for the
hospital. For physicians, this was a way to increase their control over
practice decisions that might otherwise by made by management or by third-
party utilization review.
PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 123, at 91.
245. The case studies also showed that winning managements gave more priority
and attention to responding to PPS than their losing counterparts and that
these efforts persisted over time. Losing hospitals tended to ignore the advent
of PPS either because they were afraid to alienate their physicians by institut-
ing changes or they were confident that the transition to national rates would
carry them financially.
Id. at 86; see LEWIN-ICF, supra note 144, at E-9, 5-2 to 5-7. The importance of this attention to PPS,
however, should not be overstated:
[Situdy hospitals did not achieve winning Medicare performance solely because they
focussed on Medicare financial performance. Rather, they focussed primarily on total
performance (including non-financial measures such as patient satisfaction and quality
of care) and secondarily on Medicare performance (if at all). Favorable Medicare
performance was achieved because the factors that maximize total performance generally
parallel those that maximize Medicare performance (e.g., control of costs, development
of new revenue streams, strengthening of physician leadership).
Id. at E-16; see id. at 4-14 to 4-15, 5-47 to 5-48..
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whether their information systems were more or less state-of-the-art, but how
well they used information that was available to monitor their performance and
improve clinical and financial outcomes."'  The findings regarding length
of stay, the core motivational factor of PPS, are the most telling. Although
administrators, in conjunction with medical staffs, did monitor length of stay,
the qualitative studies indicated that they carefully tailored their efforts both
to focus upon the important DRGs and to respect the prerogatives of individual
clinicians. 7 Further, the multivariate study indicated that there is no evidence
that they hit the expected norm:
The [multivariate] analysis compared the hospital's actual length of stay
with an "expected" length of stay had it treated every case at the
national average length of stay for that DRG. Performance was not
associated with either the beginning of PPS or the change in expected
length of stay between 1984 and 1988. The null result for the change
variable may reflect the findings of the case studies. Winning hospitals
had implemented programs prior to PPS and therefore did not need to
change their behavior in response to it.'
In sum, regardless of the viability of a satisficing model, or any other
behavioral one, it is at least clear that in this context, the organistic models of
rational choice have not provided a strong basis for the formulation of public
policy. No one, other than the developers and consultants who market the
DRGs1 9 seems able to find the DRG-based product-line management that
246. LEwN-ICF, supra note 144, at 5-35; see PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra
note 123, at 90 (the "availability and sophistication of information systems did not differ for winning and
losing hospitals").
247. At one winning hospital, for example, the following carefully tailored activities occurred: (1) "the
hospital developed 'MD report cards' showing each MD's length of stay by patient"; (2) it studied "variance
in lengths of stay and resource use for frequently occurring DRGs and [presented] the results at medical
staff meetings"; and (3) the administrator in charge, the Director of Nursing, "and the medical staff president
often would sit down jointly with physicians to review charts," focusing on "education rather than punitive
action." LEwN-ICF, supra note 144, at 5-7; see id. at 5-30 to 5-31. More generally, "Itihough variable,
the types of reports provided most often included information on overall length of stay; information by DRG
or physician was provided less frequently." Id. at 5-31.
248. PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 123, at 89; see PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT
ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 147, at 9, 11, 15, 17-18; see also LEWIN-ICF, supra note 144, at 4-14
to 4-15. All in all, ProPAC found that the Lewin-ICF study and its multivariate analysis "support the basic
philosophy of PPS." Id. at 93; see LEwN-ICF, supra note 144, at E-9 to E-10. As I stated at the outset
of this Article, it is important to distinguish between the success of PPS as a prospective payment system
and its success as a per-case payment system based on the DRGs. If ProPAC meant the former, perhaps
it was correct purely as an instrumental matter, although, as it recognized, see PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT
ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 123, at 75; LEWIN-ICF, supra note 144, at 5-40, no evaluative conclusion
follows. If ProPAC meant the latter, it was wrong.
249. The DRGs have been a remarkable marketing story. Not only were the developers at Yale able
to leverage their ideas into substantial funding domestically, see, e.g., Fetter, supra note 45, at 7-8, but there
has been a growing market internationally. See generally, THE MIGRATION OF MANAGERIAL INNOVATION:
THE DRGs IN WESTERN EUROPE (John R. Kimberly & Gdrard de Pouvourville eds., 1993).
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Fetter and his collaborators had in mind, and no one else perceives that DRG-
based per-case payment has set in motion a process in which adoption of such
systems is in the offing.250 Therefore, the model's premises are at war with
the empirical evidence it has generated, and as an evaluative matter, the under-
lying prop supporting the normative framework is shaky. In Fetter's conception,
efficiency is carefully defined as an organizational process that would mediate
between individual and social needs, and the process is dependent upon rational
organizational choice over a highly differentiated hospital product, with a
delicate constructive tension between forces favoring particular interests and
those pushing toward general ones. However, there is nothing to indicate that
physicians and managers have structured their relationships around the DRG
classifications, that they now view their tasks to be defined by the information
embodied in the system, that the classification system is otherwise reflected in
the structure or process of the hospital, or that the tasks performed have
themselves now changed such that they embody the system.
In short, the fact that everyone in the hospital now speaks "DRG-eeze" '25'
does not mean that the DRGs have "colonized the mind"; it seems more, like
lip service.2 2 It is simply fallacious to assume that a new information system,
250. The DRG boosters often make bold claims about their success. For example, in 1991 Fetter wrote
that his DRG-based case management concept "is currently embodied in the management systems and
structures of many US hospitals .... As administrators and physicians become more familiar with DRGs
and DRG applications in hospital management, the full benefits of DRGs, in terms of containing costs and
improving quality, are being realized." Fetter, supra note 45, at 18-19. He then summarized, at a crude
aggregate level, the effects of PPS without establishing the crucial link between those effects and the use
of per-case DRG-based reimbursement. See id. at 19-22. There is also a substantial consulting industry
(and their literature in tow) promoting, with varying degrees of critical distance, the DRGs as management
tools. See, e.g., Sherman Folland et al., Implications of Prospective Payment Under DRGs for Hospital
Marketing, J. HEALTH CARE MARKETING, Dec. 1988, at 29; Frank E. Hemeon III, Productivity, Cost
Accounting, and Information Systems, ToPICS HEALTH CARE FINANCING, Spring 1989, at 55; Margaret
Hottinger, At Risk: A Look at Managing Medicare Losses, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., May 1991, at 23;
G. Martin Hutter et al., Creating a Market Strategy for "Brand Loyalty," HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. 23,
Oct. 1991, at 23. One should not confuse these promotional statements with the manner in which hospitals
as organizations are reacting to PPS and using DRG-based information systems. An article written in a
financing journal in 1989 is illustrative for it follows a typical pattern in the promotional literature. After
writing that "[tlhere is nothing in the current [financing] literature to suggest widespread application of DRG
reporting systems to the productivity process," the author continued by speculatifIg that in her opinion
"hospitals and physicians are moving toward case management and productivity systems." Martha
D'Erasmo, Productivity Systems and Diagnosis Related Group Reporting, ToPics HEALTH CARE FINANCING,
Spring 1989, at 69. The studies by SysteMetrics/McGraw-Hill in 1988 and by Lewin-ICF in 1992 belie
this opinion, and I have found nothing to indicate otherwise. Moreover, such an opinion rests on a common
confusion. The simple fact that hospital management buys hardware and software for a DRG-based
information system in no way indicates that the DRGs have become the hospital's linguistic medium in the
way Fetter and his collaborators hoped. The key lies in organizational strategy, structure and process. It
remains to be proven through empirical evidence that such dimensions have changed.
251. We can all blame Fred Hafferty for this term, for which I am most grateful.
252. 1 have borrowed the marvelous phrase, "colonize the mind," from MALCOLM ASHMORE ET AL.,
HEALTH AND EFFICIENCY: A SOCIOLOGY OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 10 (1989). This study, conducted within
the tradition of a "micro" version of the sociology of social science, described the interplay between
organizational and political dynamics, on the one hand, and a particular vision of social and organizational
rationality, on the other. The study concerned the ability of neoclassical health economists to actualize their
program for rationalizing the British National Health Service. Ashmore and colleagues showed the
342
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embodied in reimbursement rates or in peer review, will ipso facto cause
standards of technical efficiency to become integrated with noninstrumental
orientations. Hospitals and their environments are just too rich and too contin-
gent to support such an assumption. Environments are composed of multiple
institutions which impose inconsistent evaluative standards upon actors within
hospitals.253 Institutions of the state can and do comprise only part of this
environment; PPS and similar regulatory initiatives pull hospitals' actors in the
direction of technical efficiency. However, the institutions of the professions,
as well as constituencies seeking to preserve hospitals' voluntary missions, steer
actors toward noninstrumental goals. Disparate normative standards thus remain
available as resources to be used in internal battles-in internal language
games21-to justify certain types of behavior; an actor vying for authority
in a particular circumstance can draw upon the relevant normative standard as
a means to justify a desired course of action in that instance. 5 A hospital
may indeed turn a unified, more business-like face to the external world in
order to satisfy demands for technical efficiency, but simultaneously the
organization of work, dominated by professional autonomy, can continue
unabated.25 6 In particular, "hospitals will adopt management-information
difficulty, if not impossibility, of actualizing this program. Although the context described by my Article
is quite different, Fetter's vision and that described by Ashmore and collaborators are similar. Both
represent attempts to construct a "value-free" process in which normative practices will be subject to social
and organizational rationalization. Purportedly, the process itself will not affect the "underlying" and
"ultimate" norms. However, rationalization under norms of productivity is itself a normative enterprise,
for our institutions and our norms are conjoined. Any non-utilitarian theory of proceduralism must allow
for the contingency of institutions and the interaction of those institutions with norms, while not reducing
one to the other. See, e.g., DAVID SCIULLI, THEORY OF SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: FOUNDATIONS
OF A NON-MARXIST CRITICAL THEORY 107-80, 205-70 (1992).
253. The rest of this paragraph draws on one of the major insights of the new institutionalism.
Organizations are indeed dependent upon their environments for resources. However, those resources
include not only material means but also competing cognitive belief systems and evaluative standards.
Organizations recursively generate these environmental features and respond to them. See generally W.
Richard Scott & Elaine V. Backman, Institutional Theory and the Medical Care Sector, in INNOVATIONS
IN HEALTH CARE DELIVERY, supra note 210, at 20; Jeffrey A. Alexander & Thomas A. D'Aunno,
Transformation of Institutional Environments: Perspectives on the Corporatization of U.S. Health Care,
in INNOVATIONS IN HEALTH CARE DELIVERY, supra note 210, at 53. 1 thank Arnold Kaluzny for steering
me toward this collection of essays. For a compact description of this school and its place within social
theory, see John W. Meyer et al., Ontology and Rationalization in the Western Cultural Account, in
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE: CONSTITUTING STATE, SOCIETY, AND THE INDIVIDUAL 12 (George M. Thomas
et al. eds., 1987).
254. See generally PETER WINCH, THE IDEA OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE AND ITS RELATION TO PHILOSOPHY
(2d ed. 1990).
255. Following my symbolic interactionist inclinations, I have used the concept of competing external
evaluative standards not to describe an organization's response to the environment but to describe internal
interaction within the organization. How work is conceived and performed is far more interesting than
formal organizational structure. See generally John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organiza-
tions: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340 (1977).
256. [H]ealth care organizations will continue to have only loose control and
coordination of the work process itself. Although they will present them-
selves as efficient businesses to meet the expectations of external groups,
health care organizations will continue to allow professionals to work autono-
mously. Administrative procedures and structures established to meet exter-
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systems not so much because they can be used to increase efficiency in produc-
ing services but because such systems create an image of a sophisticated
business., 257
Fetter's concept of efficiency depends on the interpenetration of the lan-
guage of the DRGs with action, and there is little evidence of that intermin-
gling. Work in the hospital simply does not embody the language of the DRGs.
Because the non-utilitarian ethical ideals could be actualized only if this
phenomenon could be invoked, the normative framework cannot currently
satisfy its own normative criterion. A defense of the DRG-based payment
system might be mounted on a utilitarian definition of efficiency, in which all
the interesting questions concerning the aggregation of individual utility or
preferences into social ones are simply assumed away.25  That defense,
however, would be a far cry from the original promise of the DRGs. We might
wait for future factual developments because, after all, no form of normative
discourse is open to empirical falsification. Then again, we might try something
new.
Conclusion: Integrating the Hospital into the
Community Through a Normative Localism
Fetter and his collaborators constructed a very admirable evaluative frame-
work. Rather than cave into utilitarianism without reflection, they conceptual-
ized a framework in which neither the social nor the individual perspective
were to be eliminated. In the end, the point of their exercise was not so much
to reflect what hospitals were, but to shape what they could be.
I have endeavored to show in this Article that hospitals have not become
what the Yale group wanted them to be. I have also discussed powerful concep-
tual reasons why hospitals can never resemble this vision. Our regulation of
our hospitals has become tied to the view that if hospitals are not now homoge-
neous organisms, they should be pushed in the direction of becoming ones." 9
nal demands (for example, quality-assurance committees) will not be closely
tied to the production of services.
Alexander & D'Aunno, supra note 253, at 77.
257. Id.
258. See generally Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND
AGAINST 77 (.1C. Smart & Bernard Williams eds., 1973); Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams, Introduction:
Utilitarianism and Beyond, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND I (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds.,
1982); AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1987).
259. In a longer work, I have also linked the DRGs with a more generalized movement to make clinical
practices homogeneous. See Frankford, supra note 13. 1 agree with the assessment by Kane and Manoukian
that the attempt to enclose physicians within the iron cage of rationality spawns its own peculiar forms of
irrationality. See Kane & Manoukian, supra note 148, at 1382. We need to assert forms of rationality to
"ensur[e] an effective health system, one in which power over clinical decision making for specific patients
is returned to physicians and the financial limitations of the government do not influence such decisions
on a case-by-case basis." Id. at 1382. We also need to be sensitive to the possibility that our reimbursement
and regulatory systems will further entrench the dominance of the biomedical model and that such further
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To a great extent, each hospital is its own ecology, but the very point of the
use of DRG-based payments is to eliminate those variations."6° PPS does
recognize legitimate deviations from the norm, but the norm and the allowed
variations are managed at such a great conceptual, spatial, and regulatory
distance from our hospitals that the regulatory task is essentially unmanage-
able.261  For these reasons, there will continue to be a wide gulf separating
our federal regulators from those working within actual institutions.
Perhaps it would be more fruitful for public policy if we were to think
about hospitals in a different way. Each hospital could be granted its own
distinctiveness, while not necessarily the degree of autonomy that existed under
cost-based reimbursement. As it now stands, we are trying to make very
difficult and complex evaluative choices through the use of very centralized and
abstract payment formulae. We might instead utilize a regulatory structure built
upon budgeting focused around each different institution. Fetter's basic norma-
tive vision would remain intact, but the organizational frameworks of different
hospitals could serve as building blocks not as obstacles along the way. The
averaging of costs among patients-in other words, the mutual sharing of the
burdens of illness-would then be seen, not as a deficit to be overcome, but
as a positive virtue. Moreover, the locus of mediating between individual and
social interests would be changed, in that we might strive for a "normative
localism," if I might coin a phrase, in which local normative commitments
would be conjoined with local institutional arrangements for the formulation
medicalization will continue to push aside nonmedical ideology and systems of social support. See generally
Elizabeth A. Binney et al., Medicalization, Public Policy and the Elderly: Social Services in Jeopardy?,
30 Soc. ScI. & MED. 761 (1990).
260. PPS, therefore, is part of a process by which hospitals are pushed towards isomorphism, a
sameness utterly devoid of meaningful evaluative content. See generally Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W.
Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational
Fields, 48 AM. Soc. REV. 147 (1983). It is, to use John W. Meyer's phrase, an "orgy of counting," in
which rationalization proceeds under the aegis of productivity-standardization, routinization and formaliza-
tion as ends rather than means--thereby partially displacing the separate evaluative domain usually preserved
for the intrinsic value of human life. See John W. Meyer, Social Environments and Organizational
Accounting, II ACCOUNTING, ORGS. & SoC'Y. 345, 349-50 (1986). Fortunately, the experience under PPS
indicates that such rationalization cannot be complete, for PPS-a massive, centralized effort aimed at
homogenization-spawned an equally massive but decentralized reaction by which the force of PPS was
blunted. While professionalization may be a co-conspirator among the forces of rationalization, see, e.g.,
DiMaggio & Powell, supra, at 148, 152-54, the experience under PPS shows that professionalism is also
part of the resistance in that its aspirations, epistemology and practices are particularistic. See Eliot Freidson,
Professionalism as Model and Ideology, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES 215 (Robert L. Nelson
et al. eds., 1992); David M. Frankford, Professions and the Law, in THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF THE
MEDICAL PROFESSION: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (John B. McKinlay & Frederic W. Haft'erty eds.,
forthcoming 1993). The lifeworld is remarkably resistant to processes of formalization, although the conflict
engendered by this process and the resistance it generates is potentially explosive. See generally 2 JURGEN
HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 301-73 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1985). I am
grateful to both Kevin Delaney and Arnold Kaluzny for stressing the importance of DiMaggio and Powell's
article.
261. See generally Frankford, supra note 13.
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of hospital goals and organization.262 State and local regulatory frameworks
would serve as important mediating institutions, but more importantly, we
would utilize local institutional arrangements for the provision of meaningful
community input26 3 and as means to prevent the continuing erosion of non-
medical belief systems and networks of social support. That might be the sort
of evaluative framework we need. For now, its fuller elaboration is a subject
of later work.
262. Cf. EZEKIEL J. EMANUEL, THE ENDS OF HUMAN LIFE: MEDICAL ETHICS IN A LIBERAL POLrrY
(1991) (describing local institutions founded on ideals of community).
263. See, e.g., J. David Seay & Robert M. Sigmond, Community Benefit Standards for Hospitals:
Perceptions and Performance, 5 FRONTIERS HE4LTH SERVICES MGMT. 3 (1983); Anthony Kovner & Robert
M. Sigmond, A Program To Encourage the Implementation of Community Benefit Standards for Hospitals
(1988) (unpublished grant proposal submitted to the W.K. Kellogg Foundation).
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